Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/95383
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dc.contributorDepartment of Building Environment and Energy Engineeringen_US
dc.contributorResearch Institute for Sustainable Urban Developmenten_US
dc.creatorTang, Ren_US
dc.creatorWang, Sen_US
dc.creatorLi, Hen_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-19T01:59:59Z-
dc.date.available2022-09-19T01:59:59Z-
dc.identifier.issn0306-2619en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/95383-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPergamon Pressen_US
dc.rights© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.rights© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.rightsThe following publication Tang, R., Wang, S., & Li, H. (2019). Game theory based interactive demand side management responding to dynamic pricing in price-based demand response of smart grids. Applied Energy, 250, 118-130 is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.04.177.en_US
dc.subjectBuilding demand managementen_US
dc.subjectDemand responseen_US
dc.subjectDynamic pricingen_US
dc.subjectLoad uncertaintyen_US
dc.subjectSmart griden_US
dc.subjectStackelberg gameen_US
dc.titleGame theory based interactive demand side management responding to dynamic pricing in price-based demand response of smart gridsen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage118en_US
dc.identifier.epage130en_US
dc.identifier.volume250en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.04.177en_US
dcterms.abstractBidirectional interaction between power grid and buildings is a key characteristic of smart grids. Achieving a win-win situation for a grid and buildings with such interactions remains a challenge. Game theory is a powerful tool for using strategic analysis to identify the best interactions between multiple players. Stackelberg game can effectively reflect the core status of grid and the auxiliary position of buildings in this interaction (particularly in demand response programs), but no study used this game to establish such interactions while simultaneously considering the multiple requirements of grid and buildings, particularly for the commercial sector. In this study, therefore, basic and enhanced interaction strategies between a grid and buildings are developed using the Stackelberg game based on their identified Nash equilibria. The grid optimizes the price to maximize its net profit and reduce demand fluctuation, and individual building optimizes the hourly power demand to minimize electricity bill and effects of demand alternation from the baseline. In addition, the effects of building demand baseline uncertainty on the interaction are investigated and the enhanced robust interaction is proposed to deal with such uncertainty. Real site data of buildings on a campus in Hong Kong are used to validate the proposed interaction strategies. The results show that the proposed basic interaction increased net profit by 8% and reduced demand fluctuation by about 40% for the grid, with savings in electricity bills of 2.5–8.3% for the buildings. Moreover, the proposed robust interaction effectively relieved the negative effects caused by prediction uncertainty.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationApplied energy, 15 Sept. 2019, v. 250, p. 118-130en_US
dcterms.isPartOfApplied energyen_US
dcterms.issued2019-09-15-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85065243368-
dc.identifier.eissn1872-9118en_US
dc.description.validate202209 bckwen_US
dc.description.oaAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumberRGC-B2-0913, BEEE-0337-
dc.description.fundingSourceRGCen_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.description.oaCategoryGreen (AAM)en_US
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