Activist-appointed directors

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/91252

Title:	Activist-appointed directors
Authors:	Kang, JK Kim, H Kim, J Low, A
Issue Date:	Jun-2022
Source:	Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, June 2022, v. 57, no. 4, p. 1343-1376
Abstract:	We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Journal:	Journal of financial and quantitative analysis
ISSN:	0022-1090
EISSN:	1756-6916
DOI:	10.1017/S0022109021000648
Rights:	This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of financial and quantitative analysis https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.
Appears in Collections:	Journal/Magazine Article

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Status	open access
File Version	Final Accepted Manuscript

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