Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/91252
PIRA download icon_1.1View/Download Full Text
Title: Activist-appointed directors
Authors: Kang, JK
Kim, H
Kim, J 
Low, A
Issue Date: 2021
Source: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 2021, p. 1-56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648
Abstract: We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Journal: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 
ISSN: 0022-1090
EISSN: 1756-6916
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109021000648
Rights: This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
When citing an Accepted Manuscript or an earlier version of an article, the Cambridge University Press requests that readers also cite the Version of Record with a DOI link. The article is subsequently published in revised form in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648.
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Kang_Activist_Appointed_Director.pdfPre-Published version1.03 MBAdobe PDFView/Open
Open Access Information
Status open access
File Version Final Accepted Manuscript
Access
View full-text via PolyU eLinks SFX Query
Show full item record

Page views

92
Citations as of Jul 3, 2022

Downloads

13
Citations as of Jul 3, 2022

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.