Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/91252
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dc.contributorSchool of Accounting and Financeen_US
dc.creatorKang, JKen_US
dc.creatorKim, Hen_US
dc.creatorKim, Jen_US
dc.creatorLow, Aen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-19T08:11:59Z-
dc.date.available2021-10-19T08:11:59Z-
dc.identifier.issn0022-1090en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/91252-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.rightsThis article has been published in a revised form in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washingtonen_US
dc.rightsWhen citing an Accepted Manuscript or an earlier version of an article, the Cambridge University Press requests that readers also cite the Version of Record with a DOI link. The article is subsequently published in revised form in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648.en_US
dc.titleActivist-appointed directorsen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage1en_US
dc.identifier.epage56en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022109021000648en_US
dcterms.abstractWe examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationJournal of financial and quantitative analysis, 2021, p. 1-56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648en_US
dcterms.isPartOfJournal of financial and quantitative analysisen_US
dcterms.issued2021-
dc.identifier.eissn1756-6916en_US
dc.description.validate202110 bchyen_US
dc.description.oaAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera0662-n01-
dc.identifier.SubFormID788-
dc.description.fundingSourceSelf-fundeden_US
dc.description.fundingTextThe author(s) received no specific funding for this work.en_US
dc.description.pubStatusEarly releaseen_US
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