Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/91252
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
dc.creator | Kang, JK | en_US |
dc.creator | Kim, H | en_US |
dc.creator | Kim, J | en_US |
dc.creator | Low, A | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-19T08:11:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-19T08:11:59Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1090 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/91252 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_US |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of financial and quantitative analysis https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022109021000648. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington. | en_US |
dc.title | Activist-appointed directors | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 1343 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 56 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 1376 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 57 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0022109021000648 | en_US |
dcterms.abstract | We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships. | en_US |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, June 2022, v. 57, no. 4, p. 1343-1376 | - |
dcterms.isPartOf | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis | en_US |
dcterms.issued | 2022-06 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1756-6916 | en_US |
dc.description.validate | 202110 bchy | en_US |
dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | a0662-n01 | - |
dc.identifier.SubFormID | 788 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | Self-funded | en_US |
dc.description.fundingText | The author(s) received no specific funding for this work. | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Kang_Activist_Appointed_Director.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.03 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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