Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/90691
PIRA download icon_1.1View/Download Full Text
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorDepartment of Logistics and Maritime Studiesen_US
dc.creatorWang, Xen_US
dc.creatorNg, CTen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-20T02:04:27Z-
dc.date.available2021-08-20T02:04:27Z-
dc.identifier.issn0254-5330en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/90691-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018en US
dc.rightsThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Annals of Operations Research. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2994-9.en US
dc.subjectBehavior-based pricingen_US
dc.subjectConsumer recognitionen_US
dc.subjectNew retailen_US
dc.subjectPrice competitionen_US
dc.titleNew retail versus traditional retail in e-commerce : channel establishment, price competition, and consumer recognitionen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage921en_US
dc.identifier.epage937en_US
dc.identifier.volume291en_US
dc.identifier.issue44228en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10479-018-2994-9en_US
dcterms.abstractThe concept “new retail” in e-commerce is to establish an offline channel and integrate it with the online retail channel. The development of new retail encounters three main problems: locations of the offline stores, the price competition with the traditional online retail, and the difficulty in consumer recognition in the two channels. In this paper, we present a duopoly model consisting of a new retail firm and an online firm, which sell the same product in two periods. The two firms compete for the market share using the behavior-based pricing (BBP), which means that in the second period each firm offers different prices to consumers with different purchasing histories/behaviors in the first period. We also solve the benchmark pricing model, where the histories/behaviors are not considered. The results of this paper provide valuable insights to the development of new retail in e-commerce. In the Nash equilibrium, each price of the new retail firm is higher than the corresponding price of the online firm due to a higher channel cost for the offline stores and high-speed deliveries. Under certain condition, the new retail firm will establish an offline channel with a larger hassle cost, which is a measure of the easiness of reaching the offline stores by the consumers, in the BBP model than that in the benchmark model. Interestingly, the difficulty in consumer recognition results in that the new retail firm occupies more market share and may obtain higher profit.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationAnnals of operations research, July 2020, v. 291, no. 44228, p. 921-937en_US
dcterms.isPartOfAnnals of operations researchen_US
dcterms.issued2020-07-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85051624575-
dc.identifier.eissn1572-9338en_US
dc.description.validate202108 bcvcen_US
dc.description.oaAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera1007-n01-
dc.identifier.SubFormID2414-
dc.description.fundingSourceRGCen_US
dc.description.fundingTextPolyU 152207/17Een_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
a1007-n01_2414.pdfPre-Published version556.09 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Open Access Information
Status open access
File Version Final Accepted Manuscript
Access
View full-text via PolyU eLinks SFX Query
Show simple item record

Page views

42
Citations as of Jun 26, 2022

Downloads

40
Citations as of Jun 26, 2022

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

13
Citations as of Jun 30, 2022

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

12
Citations as of Jun 30, 2022

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.