Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/77019
PIRA download icon_1.1View/Download Full Text
Title: Do banks price independent directors’ attention?
Authors: Huang, HH
Lobo, GJ
Wang, C 
Zhou, J
Issue Date: Aug-2018
Source: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, Aug. 2018, v. 53, no. 4, p. 1755-1780
Abstract: Masulis and Mobbs (2014), (2015) find that independent directors with multiple directorships allocate their monitoring efforts unequally based on a directorship’s relative prestige. We investigate whether bank loan contract terms reflect such unequal allocation of directors’ monitoring effort. We find that bank loans of firms with a greater proportion of independent directors for whom the board is among their most prestigious have lower spreads, longer maturities, fewer covenants, lower syndicate concentration, lower likelihood of collateral requirement, lower annual loan fees, and higher bond ratings. Our evidence indicates that independent directors’ attention is associated with lower cost of borrowing.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Journal: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 
ISSN: 0022-1090
EISSN: 1756-6916
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109018000157
Rights: Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
do-banks-price-independent-directors-attention.pdf300.54 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Open Access Information
Status open access
File Version Version of Record
Access
View full-text via PolyU eLinks SFX Query
Show full item record

Page views

60
Last Week
1
Last month
Citations as of Nov 20, 2022

Downloads

2
Citations as of Nov 20, 2022

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

14
Citations as of Nov 24, 2022

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

14
Last Week
0
Last month
Citations as of Nov 24, 2022

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.