Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/77019
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dc.contributorSchool of Accounting and Financeen_US
dc.creatorHuang, HHen_US
dc.creatorLobo, GJen_US
dc.creatorWang, Cen_US
dc.creatorZhou, Jen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-19T04:45:37Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-19T04:45:37Z-
dc.identifier.issn0022-1090en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/77019-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.rightsCopyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018en_US
dc.titleDo banks price independent directors’ attention?en_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage1755en_US
dc.identifier.epage1780en_US
dc.identifier.volume53en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022109018000157en_US
dcterms.abstractMasulis and Mobbs (2014), (2015) find that independent directors with multiple directorships allocate their monitoring efforts unequally based on a directorship’s relative prestige. We investigate whether bank loan contract terms reflect such unequal allocation of directors’ monitoring effort. We find that bank loans of firms with a greater proportion of independent directors for whom the board is among their most prestigious have lower spreads, longer maturities, fewer covenants, lower syndicate concentration, lower likelihood of collateral requirement, lower annual loan fees, and higher bond ratings. Our evidence indicates that independent directors’ attention is associated with lower cost of borrowing.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationJournal of financial and quantitative analysis, Aug. 2018, v. 53, no. 4, p. 1755-1780en_US
dcterms.isPartOfJournal of financial and quantitative analysisen_US
dcterms.issued2018-08-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85047244692-
dc.identifier.eissn1756-6916en_US
dc.description.validate201807 bcwhen_US
dc.description.oaVersion of Recorden_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumberAF-0120-
dc.description.fundingSourceSelf-fundeden_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.OPUS6841206-
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