Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/77019
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
dc.creator | Huang, HH | en_US |
dc.creator | Lobo, GJ | en_US |
dc.creator | Wang, C | en_US |
dc.creator | Zhou, J | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-07-19T04:45:37Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-07-19T04:45:37Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1090 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/77019 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_US |
dc.rights | Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018 | en_US |
dc.title | Do banks price independent directors’ attention? | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 1755 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 1780 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 53 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0022109018000157 | en_US |
dcterms.abstract | Masulis and Mobbs (2014), (2015) find that independent directors with multiple directorships allocate their monitoring efforts unequally based on a directorship’s relative prestige. We investigate whether bank loan contract terms reflect such unequal allocation of directors’ monitoring effort. We find that bank loans of firms with a greater proportion of independent directors for whom the board is among their most prestigious have lower spreads, longer maturities, fewer covenants, lower syndicate concentration, lower likelihood of collateral requirement, lower annual loan fees, and higher bond ratings. Our evidence indicates that independent directors’ attention is associated with lower cost of borrowing. | en_US |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, Aug. 2018, v. 53, no. 4, p. 1755-1780 | en_US |
dcterms.isPartOf | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis | en_US |
dcterms.issued | 2018-08 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85047244692 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1756-6916 | en_US |
dc.description.validate | 201807 bcwh | en_US |
dc.description.oa | Version of Record | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | AF-0120 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | Self-funded | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
dc.identifier.OPUS | 6841206 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
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do-banks-price-independent-directors-attention.pdf | 300.54 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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