Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/61356
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Title: Strategic enforcement, intellectual property rights, and contractual R&D
Authors: Beladi, H
Marjit, S
Xu, X 
Yang, L 
Issue Date: Oct-2016
Source: Economic inquiry, Oct. 2016, v. 54, no. 4, p. 1904-1917
Abstract: This study examines the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in contractual research and development (R&D) in developing countries. We find that strong IPRs provide incentives for firms, both multinational and local, to specialize in R&D activities in which they have competitive advantage (the specialization effect). They also facilitate the switching process from imitators to potential innovators for local firms (the switching effect). Moreover, we also demonstrate that a multinational firm's strategic IPRs enforcement behavior can be an effective instrument for subsidizing contractual R&D in developing countries (the subsidizing effect). We further illustrate how a policy mix of IPRs and a foreign direct investment subsidy in these countries affects R&D activities by adding an offshore R&D subsidiary as an additional organizational form. (JEL L13, O31, O34).
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Journal: Economic inquiry 
ISSN: 0095-2583
EISSN: 1465-7295
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12352
Rights: © 2016 Western Economic Association International
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Beladi, H., Marjit, S., Xu, X., & Yang, L. (2016). Strategic enforcement, intellectual property rights, and contractual R&D. Economic Inquiry, 54(4), 1904-1917, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12352. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
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