Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/94405
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
dc.contributor | College of Professional and Continuing Education | en_US |
dc.creator | Cheng, CSA | en_US |
dc.creator | Fu, J | en_US |
dc.creator | Huang, W | en_US |
dc.creator | Jing, J | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-15T07:11:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-08-15T07:11:00Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0148-558X | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/94405 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | SAGE Publications | en_US |
dc.rights | This is the accepted version of the publication Cheng, C. S. A., Fu, J., Huang, W., & Jing, J. (2023). Strategic Use of Volume of Financial Items in 10-K Reports. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 38(3), 542–571. Copyright © 2021 (The Author(s)). DOI: 10.1177/0148558X21989909. | en_US |
dc.subject | Disclosure | en_US |
dc.subject | Annual report data items | en_US |
dc.subject | Profitability | en_US |
dc.subject | Market efficiency | en_US |
dc.subject | Compustat | en_US |
dc.subject | Managerial | en_US |
dc.subject | Opportunism | en_US |
dc.title | Strategic use of volume of financial items in 10-K reports | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 542 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 571 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 38 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/0148558X21989909 | en_US |
dcterms.abstract | We investigate whether firms limit the volume of financial items in annual reports (including the financial statements and footnotes) to obfuscate poor future firm performance, and how investors react to this reduced volume. We estimate abnormal volume to capture managers’ discretion over reporting in the 10-K and find that abnormally low volume predicts poor future earnings. This relation is more pronounced in firms where the market has difficulty in detecting managerial intervention in the disclosure process. We also find that abnormally low volume predicts negative future returns, suggesting that managers benefit from disclosing fewer financial items by delaying the incorporation of bad news into stock prices. Further corroborating our results, we find that the volume is abnormally low when there exist strong managerial incentives to withhold bad news and manipulate investor perceptions upward. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that managers attempt to obfuscate poor future performance and inflate current stock prices by disclosing fewer financial items in the 10-K. | en_US |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Journal of accounting, auditing and finance, July 2023, v. 38, no. 3, p. 542-571 | en_US |
dcterms.isPartOf | Journal of accounting, auditing and finance | en_US |
dcterms.issued | 2023-07 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85100674446 | - |
dc.description.validate | 202208 bcfc | en_US |
dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | AF-0039 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | Self-funded | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
dc.identifier.OPUS | 43141848 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Cheng_Strategic_Use_Numeric.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.22 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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