Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/93346
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
| dc.creator | Fung, MK | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-21T08:22:03Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-06-21T08:22:03Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/93346 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
| dc.rights | © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
| dc.rights | © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.rights | The following publication Fung, M. K. (2020). Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry. Economics Letters, 191, 109084 is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109084 | en_US |
| dc.subject | Banking | en_US |
| dc.subject | Executive compensation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Risk | en_US |
| dc.title | Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.volume | 191 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109084 | en_US |
| dcterms.abstract | Excessive risk taking induced by equity-based executive compensation is more (less) of a concern to the shareholders if the largest potential risk exposure is large (small). This study empirically shows that the intensity of option-based compensation to a bank's CEO decreases with the bank's largest potential risk exposure and its largest potential increase in risk exposure. These findings suggest a possibility of banks self-regulating their compensation structures. | en_US |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Economics letters, June 2020, v. 191, 109084 | en_US |
| dcterms.isPartOf | Economics letters | en_US |
| dcterms.issued | 2020-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85082689444 | - |
| dc.identifier.artn | 109084 | en_US |
| dc.description.validate | 202206 bcfc | en_US |
| dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
| dc.identifier.FolderNumber | AF-0055 | - |
| dc.description.fundingSource | Others | en_US |
| dc.description.fundingText | AF Departmental Grant (4-ZZ6Y) | en_US |
| dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
| dc.identifier.OPUS | 25850547 | - |
| dc.description.oaCategory | Green (AAM) | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fung_Option-Based_Compensation_Restrained.pdf | Pre-Published version | 795.26 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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