Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/90307
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
| dc.creator | Zhang, S | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T06:35:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-06-16T06:35:08Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0304-405X | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/90307 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
| dc.rights | © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
| dc.rights | © 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. | en_US |
| dc.rights | The following publication Zhang, S. (2021). Directors’ career concerns: Evidence from proxy contests and board interlocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 140(3), 894-915 is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.02.001. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Board interlocks | en_US |
| dc.subject | Career concerns | en_US |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | en_US |
| dc.subject | Proxy contests | en_US |
| dc.title | Directors’ career concerns : evidence from proxy contests and board interlocks | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.spage | 894 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.epage | 915 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.volume | 140 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.02.001 | en_US |
| dcterms.abstract | This paper studies the disciplinary spillover effects of proxy contests on companies that share directors with target firms, that is, interlocked firms. In difference-in-differences tests, I find that interlocked firms reduce excess cash holdings, increase shareholder payouts, cut CEO compensation, and engage in less earnings management in the year after proxy contests. The effects are more pronounced when both the interlocked and target firms have a unitary board and when the interlocking director is up for election, is younger, or has shorter tenure. Overall, the evidence highlights the importance of directors’ career concerns in policy spillovers across firms with board interlocks. | en_US |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Journal of financial economics, June 2021, v. 140, no. 3, p. 894-915 | en_US |
| dcterms.isPartOf | Journal of financial economics | en_US |
| dcterms.issued | 2021-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85101524520 | - |
| dc.description.validate | 202106 bcvc | en_US |
| dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
| dc.identifier.FolderNumber | a0920-n01 | - |
| dc.description.fundingSource | Self-funded | en_US |
| dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zhang_Directors_Career_Concerns.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.65 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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