Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/88427
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorDepartment of Logistics and Maritime Studiesen_US
dc.creatorZhuge, Den_US
dc.creatorWang, Sen_US
dc.creatorZhen, Len_US
dc.creatorLaporte, Gen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-10T06:48:46Z-
dc.date.available2020-11-10T06:48:46Z-
dc.identifier.issn0894-069Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/88427-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sonsen_US
dc.subjectAir emission taxesen_US
dc.subjectGreen port and shippingen_US
dc.subjectSharing subsidyen_US
dc.subjectSubsidy gameen_US
dc.subjectVessel speed reduction incentive programen_US
dc.titleSubsidy design in a vessel speed reduction incentive program under government policiesen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage344en_US
dc.identifier.epage358en_US
dc.identifier.volume68en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/nav.21948en_US
dcterms.abstractAs a green port and shipping‐related policy, the vessel speed reduction incentive program (VSRIP) involves using a subsidy to induce ships to reduce their speed in a port area so that the emissions can be reduced at the port. However, this program may attract new ships to visit the port because of the subsidy; in this case, the port's profit will grow due to more ship visits, but its total emissions may also increase, which is counter to the original intention of the subsidy. The government could then intervene by providing part of the subsidy for the VSRIP or by collecting air emission taxes for the increased emission at the port. This paper studies how to design suitable subsidies for ships participating in a VSRIP. Two bilevel subsidy design models are formulated based on a Stackelberg game to maximize the port's profit (related to the profits from original and new ships, the subsidy provided by the port, and air emission taxes) and to minimize the government's cost (related to the damage cost of air emissions, the subsidy provided by the government, and air emission taxes). We determine which policy (including a sharing subsidy policy, no government intervention, and an air emission tax policy) should be implemented by the government in different cases and how much subsidy should be provided by the port under each government policy. We find that these decisions are affected by several practical factors, such as the damage cost of air emissions per ton of fuel and the subsidy sensitivities of original and new ships. We also outline several meaningful insights based on the analysis of these practical factors.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsembargoed accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationNaval research logistics, Apr. 2021, v. 68, no. 3, p. 344-358en_US
dcterms.isPartOfNaval research logisticsen_US
dcterms.issued2021-04-
dc.identifier.eissn1520-6750en_US
dc.description.validate202011 bcrcen_US
dc.description.oaNot applicableen_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera0502-n03, a1003-n13-
dc.identifier.SubFormID2395-
dc.description.fundingSourceSelf-fundeden_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.date.embargo2022-04-30en_US
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article
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Embargo End Date 2022-04-30
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