Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/80999
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies | en_US |
dc.creator | Guo, P | en_US |
dc.creator | Tang, CS | en_US |
dc.creator | Wang, Y | en_US |
dc.creator | Zhao, M | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-07-09T04:44:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-07-09T04:44:02Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1523-4614 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/80999 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences | en_US |
dc.rights | ©2018 INFORMS | en_US |
dc.rights | This is an Author Accepted Manuscript of an article published by INFORMS. The final published version of record is available online: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0690 | en_US |
dc.subject | Healthcare operations | en_US |
dc.subject | Fee-for-service | en_US |
dc.subject | Bundled payment | en_US |
dc.subject | Queueing | en_US |
dc.title | The impact of reimbursement policy on social welfare, revisit rate, and waiting time in a public healthcare system : fee-for-service versus bundled payment | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 154 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 170 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 21 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1287/msom.2017.0690 | en_US |
dcterms.abstract | This paper examines the impact of two reimbursement schemes, fee-for-service and bundled payment, on the social welfare, the patient revisit rate, and the patient waiting time in a public healthcare system. The two schemes differ on the payment mechanism: under the fee-for-service scheme, the healthcare provider receives the payment each time a patient visits (or revisits) whereas, under the bundled payment scheme, the healthcare provider receives a lump sum payment for the entire episode of care regardless of how many revisits a patient incurs. By considering the quality-speed trade-off (i.e., a higher service speed reduces service quality, resulting in a higher revisit rate), we examine a three-stage Stackelberg game to determine the patients’ initial visit rate, the service provider’s service rate (which affects the revisit rate), and the funder’s reimbursement rate. This analysis enables us to compare the equilibrium outcomes (social welfare, revisit rate, and waiting time) associated with the two payment schemes. We find that when the patient pool size is large, the bundled payment scheme dominates the fee-for-service scheme in terms of higher social welfare and a lower revisit rate, whereas the fee-for-service scheme prevails in terms of shorter waiting time. When the patient pool is small, the bundle payment scheme dominates the fee-for-service scheme in all three performance measures. | en_US |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Manufacturing and service operations management, Winter 2019, v. 21, no. 1, p. 154-170 | en_US |
dcterms.isPartOf | Manufacturing and service operations management | en_US |
dcterms.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.ros | 2018001847 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1526-5498 | en_US |
dc.description.validate | 201907 bcrc | en_US |
dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | a0327-n01, a0774-n09 | en_US |
dc.identifier.SubFormID | 1603 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | RGC | en_US |
dc.description.fundingText | 15504615 | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
healthcaredtraft-MSOM_Final-withonlineappendix.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.04 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Page views
262
Last Week
2
2
Last month
Citations as of Sep 22, 2024
Downloads
650
Citations as of Sep 22, 2024
SCOPUSTM
Citations
93
Citations as of Jul 4, 2024
WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations
82
Citations as of Sep 26, 2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.