Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/78428
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | - |
dc.creator | Du, J | - |
dc.creator | Hou, QC | - |
dc.creator | Tang, XS | - |
dc.creator | Yao, YW | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-28T01:16:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-28T01:16:30Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1755-3091 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/78428 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.rights | © 2018 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativ commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) | - |
dc.rights | The following publication Du, J., Hou, Q., Tang, X., & Yao, Y. (2018). Does independent directors’ monitoring affect reputation? evidence from the stock and labor markets. China Journal of Accounting Research, 11(2), 91-127 is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2018.01.002 | - |
dc.title | Does independent directors' monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 91 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 127 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 11 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.cjar.2018.01.002 | - |
dcterms.abstract | Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying "no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said "no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring. | - |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | China journal of accounting research, June 2018, v. 11, no. 2, p. 91-127 | - |
dcterms.isPartOf | China journal of accounting research | - |
dcterms.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000432474400002 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2214-1421 | - |
dc.description.validate | 201809 bcrc | - |
dc.description.oa | Version of Record | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | OA_IR/PIRA | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
dc.description.oaCategory | CC | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Du_Independent_Directors_Monitoring.pdf | 451.7 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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