Impact of value evaluation policy on patent disclosure and licensing strategy

Abstract

专利审查机制是提升高校专利质量的重要途径,本文通过构建博弈模型探讨了专利审查对教职工发明披露和高校专利许可策略的影响。结果表明:专利审查对教职工发明披露有负面作用,但对高价值发明披露影响较弱;高校专利质量较差时须进行审查,但不可与提高教职工许可收益同时实施,专利审查比例与许可收益分配比例及转化成本负相关;最后,专利审查应与高校的许可策略配套实施,仅当预期未来收益较低时才可对外许可未经审查的教职工发明。 Patent evaluation is considered as one of the most effective way to improve the quality of university patents.In this paper,a static game model is developed to analyze the influence of patent evaluation on faculty’s patent disclosure and universities’ licensing strategy.We find that patent checking has negative relationship with faculty’s patent disclosure,but it plays less influence on high-value patents.University has to check the quality of faculty patents because of their low commercial value,and the checking rate is negatively related to the inventor’s share of licensing revenue and transferring cost.It indicates that patent checking policy cannot implement under the policy of increasing inventor’s share profit.Lastly,patent checking policy has to be matched with universities’ licensing strategy,and universities have motivation to license patents without quality checking and value evaluation when they have lower expected future profit.