控股权性质、债务税盾与上市公司股权融资偏好

Abstract

文章结合我国分税制财政体制,探讨了上市公司股权融资偏好的制度性因素。由于国有控股股东以利税总额最大化为目标,降低了国有控股上市公司债务融资的税盾价值,增强了股权融资偏好的倾向,而且股东利税分离程度越低,公司越倾向于股权融资。实证结果表明:民营控股上市公司负债率最高,中央政府控股上市公司负债率最低,地方政府控股上市公司负债率居于两者之间,而且所得税税率越高,民营控股和地方政府控股的上市公司越倾向于债务融资。 This paper investigates the institutional factors of equity financing preference of listed companies under tax sharing system in China. A higher share of corporate income tax enjoyed by the controlling shareholders whose objective is to maximize the sum of corporate profits and taxes will result in a lower net tax shield of debt financing and a higher level of equity financing. And the lower level of the separation between profits and taxes of shareholders will lead to companies’ preference for equity financing. The empirical results show that the private listed companies have the highest debt ratios, and listed companies controlled by the central government have the lowest debt ratios while listed companies controlled by local government s have the moderate debt ratios. With the higher income tax rate, private listed companies and listed companies controlled by local governments are more apt to select debt financing.