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Title: Price interactions between theme park and tour operator
Authors: Song, H 
Yang, S
Huang, GQ
Issue Date: Dec-2009
Source: Tourism economics, Dec. 2009, v. 15, no. 4, p. 813-824
Abstract: This paper conducts a theoretical investigation into pricing competition and coordination between Hong Kong Disneyland (HKD) and a tour operator. HKD supplies two types of admission ticket to the tour operator: an admission-only ticket and a package ticket that combines admission to the park and one night's accommodation in its hotels. The tour operator then sells these two types of admission ticket in the target market. A Stackelberg game model is proposed to formulate the leader–follower relationship, with HKD leading and the tour operator following. The equilibrium prices are derived by backward induction. The theoretical results show that HKD can coordinate with the tour operator through a quantity discount schedule. A Nash bargaining game suggests that HKD receives a larger share of the profit growth due to its dominant market power.
Keywords: Hong Kong Disneyland
Tour operators
Stackelberg game
Bargaining game
Publisher: IP Publishing Ltd
Journal: Tourism economics 
ISSN: 1354-8166
EISSN: 2044-0375
Rights: Copyright © 2009 IP Publishing Ltd. Reproduced by permission. The journal web site is located at
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