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Title: A Game-theoretic Approach to Choice of Profit and Revenue Maximization Strategies in Tourism Supply Chains for Package Holidays
Other Title: 基于博弈理论的包价旅游供应链战略选择研究 : 收入最大化或利润最大化
Authors: Yang, S
Huang, GQ
Song, H 
Liang, L
Issue Date: 2008
Source: Journal of China tourism research (中國旅游硏究), 2008, v. 4, no. 1, p. 45-60
Abstract: Enterprises in a tourism supply chain (TSC) often optimize their businesses by adopting and operating profit or revenue maximization strategies. This article investigates the conditions under which these strategies are preferred. We consider a TSC consisting of three sectors: a theme park operator, tour operators, and accommodation providers. Simultaneous non-cooperative games are used as decision models of individual enterprises within the same sector, while a two-stage sequential game is used to coordinate tourist quantities between the three sectors that form the two layers at the TSC. The theme park determines the admission price, while the accommodation sector achieves market clearing prices through quantity competition. Afret learning the decisions of the theme park and the accommodation sector. the tour operator sector decides final price of package holiday through quantity competition. Several observations are derived from equilibrium solutions. First, tour operators and accommodation providers that select the revenue maximization strategy obtain larger market shares and profits than those that select the profit maximization strategy, while the theme park operator generally prefers enterprises in the other two sectors to select the revenue maximization strategy. Second, the profit maximization strategy is a better choice when all enterprises in each of the sectors choose the same strategy. Finally, if tour operators and accommodation providers are free to choose their own strategies, there is a market equilibrium where profit and revenue maximization strategies can coexist.
旅游供应链中的企业往往采用利润最大化或收入最大化战略来优化企业业务。本文主要研究旅游企业如何运用这些战略。本文考虑的旅游供应链包含三个部分: 主题公园、旅行社和酒店。在同一行业中的企业采用非合作静态博弈,而供应链上下游企业间采用两阶段动态博弈。首先,主题公园决策门票价格,酒店之间通过数量竞争获得市场均衡价格。旅行社在获得上述信息的基础上,通过数量竞争决定包价旅游的最终市场价格。通过对市场均衡的分析,可以得到以下结论: 首先,采用收入最大化战略的旅行社和酒店获得的市场份额和利润要分别高于选择利润最大化的旅行社和酒店。但主题公园希望这两个行业的企业选择收入最大化战略。其次,如果同一个行业的企业选择相同的战略,那么利润最大化是他们的最优选择。最后,如果旅行社和酒店能够自由的在收入最大化和利润最大化战略中选择,那么存在一个市场均衡。在这个市场均衡中,采用收入最大化和利润最大化的企业能够共存。
Keywords: Tourism supply chain
Package holidays
Game theory
Profit maximization
Revenue maximization
Publisher: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
Journal: Journal of China tourism research (中國旅游硏究) 
ISSN: 1938-8160
EISSN: 1938-8179
DOI: 10.1080/19388160802099709
Rights: Copyright © 2008 by The Haworth Press.
This is an electronic version of an article published in S. Yang et. al. (2008), Journal of China Tourism Research, 4(1), 45-60. Journal of China Tourism Research is available online at and the open URL of the article:
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