From contention to clientelism : evidence from the ten-year fishing ban in China

Abstract

How do ordinary Chinese people circumvent unpopular state policies? The existing literature primarily focuses on resistance against local bureaucrats. Drawing on ethnographic research on the ten-year fishing ban in the Yangtze River Basin, this article finds that fishermen (clients) continue to fish by maintaining patron–client relationships with the enforcers of the fishing ban (patrons). Ordinary fishermen seek the protection of enforcers through bribery. Enhanced state monitoring under the fishing ban facilitates bribery-based clientelism by weakening the fishermen’s everyday resistance, but it also constrains the power of enforcers by increasing the risk that their corruption will be discovered by upper-level authorities. For extremely poor fishermen, who are barely able to afford to pay bribes, their daily acts of resistance are morally justified by the need for subsistence safety, presenting enforcers with a dilemma: they must fulfil their law enforcement duties while also ensuring the survival of these individuals to maintain social stability. Therefore, cultivating a clientelist relationship with impoverished fishermen enables enforcers to manage their noncompliance, thereby balancing these conflicting goals. While clientelism protects people from unpopular policies to some extent, it more fundamentally strengthens the power of local bureaucrats, creating the potential for greater exploitation and larger-scale popular grievances in the long run. 中国民众如何规避不受欢迎的国家政策? 现有文献主要关注民众对地方官僚的反抗。基于对长江流域十年禁渔的民族志研究, 我发现渔民与禁渔令的执法者维持着一种庇护关系。首先, 普通渔民通过贿赂来寻求执法者的庇护。禁渔令下国家增强的监管能力, 一方面透过削弱渔民日常的反抗助长了这种以贿赂为基础的庇护主义, 另一方面却透过增加腐败被上级政府发现的风险限制了庇护人的权力。对于极度贫困的渔民来说, 虽然他们几乎无力支付贿赂, 但是他们日常的反抗具有维系生存安全的道德正当性。这给执法者造成了两难: 既要完成执法目标, 又要保护他们的生存安全以维持社会稳定。因此, 与这些穷人建立庇护关系成为了平衡这两种相互冲突的目标的重要方式。尽管庇护主义在一定程度上保护了民众免受不受欢迎的政策的影响, 但从根本上来说它增强了地方官僚的权力。从长远来看, 这可能会对民众造成更大的剥削从而引发更大规模的社会不稳定。