Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/118441
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dc.contributorDepartment of Management and Marketing-
dc.creatorYi, S-
dc.creatorHardisty, DJ-
dc.creatorGriffin, DW-
dc.creatorAllard, T-
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-15T02:04:59Z-
dc.date.available2026-04-15T02:04:59Z-
dc.identifier.issn0093-5301-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/118441-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2025. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Journal of Consumer Research, Inc.en_US
dc.rightsThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact reprints@oup.com for reprints and translation rights for reprints. All other permissions can be obtained through our RightsLink service via the Permissions link on the article page on our site—for further information please contact journals.permissions@oup.com.en_US
dc.rightsThe following publication Yi, S., Hardisty, D. J., Griffin, D. W., & Allard, T. (2025). Promotion Architecture: A Deal Fairness Model of Restricted Price Promotions. Journal of Consumer Research, ucaf066 is available at https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucaf066.en_US
dc.subjectChoice architectureen_US
dc.subjectExpectationen_US
dc.subjectFairnessen_US
dc.subjectFramingen_US
dc.subjectPrice promotionen_US
dc.titlePromotion architecture : a deal fairness model of restricted price promotionsen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/jcr/ucaf066-
dcterms.abstractThis research examines the effectiveness of two common types of restricted price promotions: threshold promotions (conditional on spending more than a threshold amount; e.g., “Get $5 off on orders of $10 or more”) and capped promotions (limited to a maximum dollar value; e.g., “Get 50% off, up to $5 per order”). Results from seven preregistered studies, including one field study, show that threshold promotions lead to higher purchase intentions and conversion rates (but potentially lower purchase amounts) than comparable capped promotions—even though capped promotions are equivalent in maximal economic savings for the consumer—when the trigger value (the spending amount at which the promotion activates or caps) is low. This effect occurs because consumers have higher expected promotion levels for capped promotions and lower expected spending levels for threshold promotions, leading them to perceive the threshold promotion as a fairer deal. However, this effect reverses when the trigger value is high, wherein consumers perceive capped promotions as a fairer deal and prefer them to threshold promotions. The implications of our results for the optimal management of price promotion architectures were discussed.-
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationJournal of consumer research, Published: 31 January 2026, Advance articles, ucaf066, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucaf066-
dcterms.isPartOfJournal of consumer research-
dcterms.issued2025-
dc.identifier.eissn1537-5277-
dc.identifier.artnucaf066-
dc.description.validate202604 bcch-
dc.description.oaVersion of Recorden_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumberOA_TAen_US
dc.description.fundingSourceOthersen_US
dc.description.fundingTextThis research was partly supported by the Start-up Fund from The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (grant P0058135) awarded to the first author. This research was also supported in part by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, awarded to the second author and third author. Supplementary materials are included in the web appendix accompanying the online version of this article.en_US
dc.description.pubStatusEarly releaseen_US
dc.description.TAOUP (2025)en_US
dc.description.oaCategoryTAen_US
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