Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/116871
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | - |
| dc.creator | Qin, Y | - |
| dc.creator | Xiao, H | - |
| dc.creator | Lin, J | - |
| dc.creator | Song, L | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-01-21T03:53:31Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2026-01-21T03:53:31Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1059-0560 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/116871 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | en_US |
| dc.rights | © 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). | en_US |
| dc.rights | The following publication Qin, Y., Xiao, H., Lin, J., & Song, L. (2025). Independent directors’ political connections and CEO compensation: Evidence from China. International Review of Economics & Finance, 104, 104653 is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2025.104653. | en_US |
| dc.subject | CEO compensation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Independent director | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political connection | en_US |
| dc.title | Independent directors’ political connections and CEO compensation : evidence from China | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.volume | 104 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.iref.2025.104653 | - |
| dcterms.abstract | This study investigates the relationship between independent directors' political connections and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2018. Our empirical analysis reveals that politically connected independent directors (PCIDs) significantly reduce excessive CEO compensation. Channel tests demonstrate that this effect stems from PCIDs’ enhanced negotiation power relative to CEOs. The negative association between PCIDs and CEO compensation is attenuated in firms with politically connected CEOs but amplified in firms benefiting from substantial preferential bank loans and government subsidies. Heterogeneity analysis further shows that this negative relationship weakens in firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while intensifying among firms led by experienced and talented CEOs. Our results remain robust across a battery of endogeneity checks and alternative specifications. | - |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | International review of economics and finance, Dec. 2025, v. 104, 104653 | - |
| dcterms.isPartOf | International review of economics and finance | - |
| dcterms.issued | 2025-12 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-105017018181 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1873-8036 | - |
| dc.identifier.artn | 104653 | - |
| dc.description.validate | 202601 bcch | - |
| dc.description.oa | Version of Record | en_US |
| dc.identifier.FolderNumber | OA_Scopus/WOS | en_US |
| dc.description.fundingSource | Others | en_US |
| dc.description.fundingText | We would like to express our gratitude to the editors and anonymous reviewers at the International Review of Finance and Economics for their insightful suggestions and strong support. He Xiao gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Guangdong Higher Education Upgrading Plan (2025-2028) under Grant No. UICR0400015-25. | en_US |
| dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
| dc.description.oaCategory | CC | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1-s2.0-S1059056025008160-main.pdf | 1.15 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Access
View full-text via PolyU eLinks 
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.