Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/115397
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorDepartment of Industrial and Systems Engineering-
dc.creatorXu, SX-
dc.creatorZhao, Z-
dc.creatorHuang, GQ-
dc.creatorDing, Y-
dc.creatorLi, M-
dc.creatorFeng, J.-
dc.date.accessioned2025-09-23T03:16:46Z-
dc.date.available2025-09-23T03:16:46Z-
dc.identifier.issn1366-5545-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/115397-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPergamon Pressen_US
dc.subjectCyber-Physical Interneten_US
dc.subjectVickrey-Clark-Grovesen_US
dc.subjectTransportation services procurementen_US
dc.subjectRouting tableen_US
dc.subjectOn-demandAuctionen_US
dc.titleA meta-auction for on-demand transportation procurement in industry 5.0en_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.volume193-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.tre.2024.103842-
dcterms.abstractThe Cyber-Physical Internet (CPI) is a cutting-edge concept that brings together physical systems and cyber technologies to enable seamless interaction between the physical and virtual worlds. This innovative approach is revolutionizing the transportation industry by paving the way for a new era of logistics and transport networks. Introducing CPI into the procurement of transport services is leading to a re-evaluation of fundamental issues such as routing, mode choice and real-time pricing. This paper provides an in-depth discussion on the application of transport services procurement auctions in a CPI environment, with the aim of establishing a novel CPI-based trading platform for transport services using CPI technology, and calls the methodology proposed in this paper a meta-auction. The transport route allocation quandary is simplified into an auction model, where carriers truthfully submit unit route costs, and the winning carrier and pricing are determined using the single-unit Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) method. To address scenarios with multiple carriers per network segment node, this paper proposes the multi-unit VCG auction method. Furthermore, the weighted affine VCG auction method is introduced, considering the weight of each network segment route. All three mechanisms are generalized VCG auctions, ensuring incentive compatibility, budget balance, allocation efficiency, and individual rationality. Case studies validate the effectiveness of the proposed methods, offering managerial insights based on key findings that are valuable for industry professionals and researchers in the CPI domain. This study highlights the transformative potential of CPI to revolutionize auctions for the procurement of transport services and underlines the benefits of combining physical and cyber technologies in auction design.-
dcterms.accessRightsembargoed accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationTransportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review, Jan. 2025, v. 193, 103842-
dcterms.isPartOfTransportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review-
dcterms.issued2025-01-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85207650957-
dc.identifier.eissn1878-5794-
dc.identifier.artn103842-
dc.description.validate202509 bcrc-
dc.description.oaNot applicableen_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera4084ben_US
dc.identifier.SubFormID52062en_US
dc.description.fundingSourceRGCen_US
dc.description.fundingTextNational Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72321002, 72071093); the Beijing Institute of Technology Research Fund Program for Young Scholars; the 2019 Guangdong Special Support Talent Program – Innovation and Entrepreneurship Leading Team (China) [2019BT02S593]; Guangzhou Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project [2024GZGJ32];en_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.date.embargo2028-01-31en_US
dc.description.oaCategoryGreen (AAM)en_US
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article
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Embargo End Date 2028-01-31
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