Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/114272
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering | - |
| dc.contributor | Research Institute for Advanced Manufacturing | - |
| dc.contributor | Research Centre for Digital Transformation of Tourism | - |
| dc.creator | Wu, W | - |
| dc.creator | Li, M | - |
| dc.creator | Zhang, M | - |
| dc.creator | Wang, Y | - |
| dc.creator | Wang, L | - |
| dc.creator | You, Y | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-22T01:34:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-07-22T01:34:08Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0957-5820 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/114272 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier Ltd | en_US |
| dc.subject | Carbon cap-and-trade mechanism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Electric vehicle battery | en_US |
| dc.subject | Reward-penalty mechanism | en_US |
| dc.title | Electric vehicle battery closed-loop supply chain pricing and carbon reduction decisions under the carbon cap-and-trade and reward-penalty policies | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.spage | 1467 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 1482 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 192 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.psep.2024.10.121 | - |
| dcterms.abstract | Recycling end-of-life electric vehicles (EVs) batteries to conserve resources and reduce carbon emissions has obtained a great deal of concern. This paper studied how carbon cap-and-trade and reward-penalty measures jointly impacted EV battery pricing and decarbonization strategies. Three recycling modes covering single-participator, mixed-participator, and joint recycling are established. Optimal pricing and carbon mitigation strategies, total revenue, and recycling percentage are solved and compared. The dynamic effects of target recycling percentage and rewards and punishments on total revenue and recycling percentage are analyzed by numerical examples. Results show that: (1) The factory price, selling price, collection price, and carbon emission mitigation scale of power batteries are affected by cap-and-trade and reward-penalty mechanisms; (2) Reward-penalty can improve both total revenue and recycling percentage; (3) The cap-and-trade mechanism optimizes the total revenues, showing that the total revenue increase with the increasement of carbon quota and carbon price, while the increase of carbon price leads to worse recycling percentage; (4) The supply chain performance under different recycling modes is affected by policy intervention, and the joint recycling mode is better. | - |
| dcterms.accessRights | embargoed access | en_US |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Process safety and environmental protection, Dec. 2024, v. 192, p. 1467-1482 | - |
| dcterms.isPartOf | Process safety and environmental protection | - |
| dcterms.issued | 2024-12 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85208356138 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1744-3598 | - |
| dc.description.validate | 202507 bcch | - |
| dc.identifier.FolderNumber | a3913 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.SubFormID | 51640 | en_US |
| dc.description.fundingSource | RGC | en_US |
| dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
| dc.date.embargo | 2026-12-31 | en_US |
| dc.description.oaCategory | Green (AAM) | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article | |
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