Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/114272
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorDepartment of Industrial and Systems Engineering-
dc.contributorResearch Institute for Advanced Manufacturing-
dc.contributorResearch Centre for Digital Transformation of Tourism-
dc.creatorWu, W-
dc.creatorLi, M-
dc.creatorZhang, M-
dc.creatorWang, Y-
dc.creatorWang, L-
dc.creatorYou, Y-
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-22T01:34:08Z-
dc.date.available2025-07-22T01:34:08Z-
dc.identifier.issn0957-5820-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/114272-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Ltden_US
dc.subjectCarbon cap-and-trade mechanismen_US
dc.subjectElectric vehicle batteryen_US
dc.subjectReward-penalty mechanismen_US
dc.titleElectric vehicle battery closed-loop supply chain pricing and carbon reduction decisions under the carbon cap-and-trade and reward-penalty policiesen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage1467-
dc.identifier.epage1482-
dc.identifier.volume192-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.psep.2024.10.121-
dcterms.abstractRecycling end-of-life electric vehicles (EVs) batteries to conserve resources and reduce carbon emissions has obtained a great deal of concern. This paper studied how carbon cap-and-trade and reward-penalty measures jointly impacted EV battery pricing and decarbonization strategies. Three recycling modes covering single-participator, mixed-participator, and joint recycling are established. Optimal pricing and carbon mitigation strategies, total revenue, and recycling percentage are solved and compared. The dynamic effects of target recycling percentage and rewards and punishments on total revenue and recycling percentage are analyzed by numerical examples. Results show that: (1) The factory price, selling price, collection price, and carbon emission mitigation scale of power batteries are affected by cap-and-trade and reward-penalty mechanisms; (2) Reward-penalty can improve both total revenue and recycling percentage; (3) The cap-and-trade mechanism optimizes the total revenues, showing that the total revenue increase with the increasement of carbon quota and carbon price, while the increase of carbon price leads to worse recycling percentage; (4) The supply chain performance under different recycling modes is affected by policy intervention, and the joint recycling mode is better.-
dcterms.accessRightsembargoed accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationProcess safety and environmental protection, Dec. 2024, v. 192, p. 1467-1482-
dcterms.isPartOfProcess safety and environmental protection-
dcterms.issued2024-12-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85208356138-
dc.identifier.eissn1744-3598-
dc.description.validate202507 bcch-
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera3913en_US
dc.identifier.SubFormID51640en_US
dc.description.fundingSourceRGCen_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.date.embargo2026-12-31en_US
dc.description.oaCategoryGreen (AAM)en_US
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article
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Embargo End Date 2026-12-31
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