Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/112757
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dc.contributorDepartment of Logistics and Maritime Studiesen_US
dc.creatorJin, Zen_US
dc.creatorPan, Ken_US
dc.creatorShen, ZJMen_US
dc.creatorXu, Wen_US
dc.date.accessioned2025-04-29T01:33:04Z-
dc.date.available2025-04-29T01:33:04Z-
dc.identifier.issn2472-5854en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/112757-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis Inc.en_US
dc.rights© 2024 IISEen_US
dc.rightsThis is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in IISE transactions on 22 Oct 2024 (published online), available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/24725854.2024.2404555.en_US
dc.subjectAllocation and relocationen_US
dc.subjectCapacity sharingen_US
dc.subjectCompetitionen_US
dc.subjectShared micromobilityen_US
dc.subjectTwo-stage stochasticprogrammingen_US
dc.titleIntegrated vehicle allocation and relocation for shared micromobility under competition and demand uncertaintyen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage994en_US
dc.identifier.epage1013en_US
dc.identifier.volume57en_US
dc.identifier.issue8en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/24725854.2024.2404555en_US
dcterms.abstractThis article aims to understand the shared micromobility firms’ operations under competition and provide managerial guidance to the firms and the regulator. We consider two shared micromobility firms competing in the same service area, each providing micromobility vehicles to satisfy uncertain demands. Concerning allocation restrictions by the regulator, we propose an innovative capacity-sharing agreement between the two firms. Each firm solves an integrated vehicle allocation and relocation problem, modeled as a two-stage stochastic program on a spatial-temporal network. We explore the optimality condition of each firm’s decision-making and seek a Nash equilibrium by optimizing certain objectives over the joint optimality conditions of both firms. We prove that capacity sharing helps reduce the total demand loss in the system. We perform extensive numerical experiments based on real data to obtain managerial insights. We find that regulator restrictions impact firms’ profitability and service level. After introducing capacity sharing, one firm may act like a free rider that relies on the vehicles transferred from her opponent. Meanwhile, many vehicles are shared in periods and regions with high trip demands. Capacity sharing can reduce the number of relocated vehicles by serving as a substitution for relocation and also improves the firms’ profitability.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationIISE transactions, 2025, v. 57, no. 8, p. 994-1013en_US
dcterms.isPartOfIISE transactionsen_US
dcterms.issued2025-
dc.identifier.eissn2472-5862en_US
dc.description.validate202504 bcchen_US
dc.description.oaAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera3558-
dc.identifier.SubFormID50362-
dc.description.fundingSourceRGCen_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.description.oaCategoryGreen (AAM)en_US
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