Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/109272
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dc.contributorFaculty of Business-
dc.creatorBae, KH-
dc.creatorGong, Z-
dc.creatorTong, WHS-
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-03T08:17:35Z-
dc.date.available2024-10-03T08:17:35Z-
dc.identifier.issn0306-686X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/109272-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.rights© 2023 The Authors. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.en_US
dc.rightsThis is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permitsuse and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications oradaptations are made.en_US
dc.rightsThe following publication Bae, K.-H., Gong, Z. J., & Tong, W. H. S. (2024). Restricting CEO pay backfires: Evidence from China. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 51, 1015–1045 is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12741.en_US
dc.subjectCEO compensation restrictionen_US
dc.subjectPay-performance sensitivityen_US
dc.subjectPerk consumptionen_US
dc.subjectState-owned enterprisesen_US
dc.subjectTunnelingen_US
dc.titleRestricting CEO pay backfires : evidence from Chinaen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage1015-
dc.identifier.epage1045-
dc.identifier.volume51-
dc.identifier.issue5-6-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jbfa.12741-
dcterms.abstractUsing the pay restriction imposed on CEOs of centrally administered state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) in China in 2009, we study the effects of limiting CEO pay. Compared with CEOs of firms not subject to the restriction, the CEOs of CSOEs experienced a significant pay cut. In response to the pay cut, CEOs increased the consumption of perks and siphoned off firm resources for their own benefit. Pay-performance sensitivity for these firms also significantly decreases. The performance of these firms dropped following the pay restriction. Our findings suggest that restricting CEO pay distorts CEO incentives and brings unintended consequences. Our findings caution against limiting CEO pay.-
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationJournal of business finance and accounting, May-June 2024, v. 51, no. 5-6, p. 1015-1045-
dcterms.isPartOfJournal of business finance and accounting-
dcterms.issued2024-05-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85165149251-
dc.identifier.eissn1468-5957-
dc.description.validate202410 bcch-
dc.description.oaVersion of Recorden_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumberOA_Scopus/WOSen_US
dc.description.fundingSourceSelf-fundeden_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.description.oaCategoryCCen_US
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