Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/104481
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering | - |
| dc.creator | Jiang, ZZ | en_US |
| dc.creator | He, N | en_US |
| dc.creator | Qin, X | en_US |
| dc.creator | Ip, WH | en_US |
| dc.creator | Wu, CH | en_US |
| dc.creator | Yung, KL | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-02-05T08:50:18Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-02-05T08:50:18Z | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1751-7575 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/104481 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | en_US |
| dc.rights | © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group | en_US |
| dc.rights | This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Enterprise Information Systems on 08 Dec 2017 (published online), available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17517575.2017.1412503. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Bounded rationality | en_US |
| dc.subject | Online group-buying | en_US |
| dc.subject | Regulatory strategies | en_US |
| dc.subject | System dynamics | en_US |
| dc.subject | Three-parties evolutionary game | en_US |
| dc.title | Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamics | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.spage | 695 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.epage | 713 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.volume | 12 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issue | 6 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/17517575.2017.1412503 | en_US |
| dcterms.abstract | The emergence of online group-buying provides a new consumption pattern for consumers in e-commerce era. However, many consumers realize that their own interests sometimes can’t be guaranteed in the group-buying market due to the lack of being regulated. This paper aims to develop effective regulation strategies for online group-buying market. To the best of our knowledge, most existing studies assume that three parties in online group-buying market, i.e. the retailer, the group-buying platform and the consumer, are perfectly rational. To better understand the decision process, in this paper, we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration. Firstly, a three-parties evolutionary game model is established to study each player’s game strategy based on bounded rationality. Secondly, the game model is simulated as a whole by adopting system dynamics to analyze its stability. Finally, theoretical analysis and extensive computational experiments are conducted to obtain the managerial insights and regulation strategies for online group-buying market. Our results clearly demonstrate that a suitable bonus-penalty measure can promote the healthy development of online group-buying market. | - |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Enterprise information systems, 2018, v. 12, no. 6, p. 695-713 | en_US |
| dcterms.isPartOf | Enterprise information systems | en_US |
| dcterms.issued | 2018 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85041120140 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1751-7583 | en_US |
| dc.description.validate | 202402 bcch | - |
| dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
| dc.identifier.FolderNumber | ISE-0627 | - |
| dc.description.fundingSource | Others | en_US |
| dc.description.fundingText | National Natural Science Foundation of China; Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universitie; The Hong Kong Polytechnic University | en_US |
| dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
| dc.identifier.OPUS | 6814674 | - |
| dc.description.oaCategory | Green (AAM) | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yung_Evolutionary_Game_Analysis.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.45 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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