Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/104481
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dc.contributorDepartment of Industrial and Systems Engineering-
dc.creatorJiang, ZZen_US
dc.creatorHe, Nen_US
dc.creatorQin, Xen_US
dc.creatorIp, WHen_US
dc.creatorWu, CHen_US
dc.creatorYung, KLen_US
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-05T08:50:18Z-
dc.date.available2024-02-05T08:50:18Z-
dc.identifier.issn1751-7575en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/104481-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.rights© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Groupen_US
dc.rightsThis is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Enterprise Information Systems on 08 Dec 2017 (published online), available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17517575.2017.1412503.en_US
dc.subjectBounded rationalityen_US
dc.subjectOnline group-buyingen_US
dc.subjectRegulatory strategiesen_US
dc.subjectSystem dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectThree-parties evolutionary gameen_US
dc.titleEvolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamicsen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage695en_US
dc.identifier.epage713en_US
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.identifier.issue6en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/17517575.2017.1412503en_US
dcterms.abstractThe emergence of online group-buying provides a new consumption pattern for consumers in e-commerce era. However, many consumers realize that their own interests sometimes can’t be guaranteed in the group-buying market due to the lack of being regulated. This paper aims to develop effective regulation strategies for online group-buying market. To the best of our knowledge, most existing studies assume that three parties in online group-buying market, i.e. the retailer, the group-buying platform and the consumer, are perfectly rational. To better understand the decision process, in this paper, we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration. Firstly, a three-parties evolutionary game model is established to study each player’s game strategy based on bounded rationality. Secondly, the game model is simulated as a whole by adopting system dynamics to analyze its stability. Finally, theoretical analysis and extensive computational experiments are conducted to obtain the managerial insights and regulation strategies for online group-buying market. Our results clearly demonstrate that a suitable bonus-penalty measure can promote the healthy development of online group-buying market.-
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationEnterprise information systems, 2018, v. 12, no. 6, p. 695-713en_US
dcterms.isPartOfEnterprise information systemsen_US
dcterms.issued2018-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85041120140-
dc.identifier.eissn1751-7583en_US
dc.description.validate202402 bcch-
dc.description.oaAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumberISE-0627-
dc.description.fundingSourceOthersen_US
dc.description.fundingTextNational Natural Science Foundation of China; Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universitie; The Hong Kong Polytechnic Universityen_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.OPUS6814674-
dc.description.oaCategoryGreen (AAM)en_US
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