Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/103303
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dc.contributorDepartment of Building and Real Estate-
dc.creatorYang, Xen_US
dc.creatorZhang, Jen_US
dc.creatorShen, GQen_US
dc.creatorYan, Yen_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-11T00:33:02Z-
dc.date.available2023-12-11T00:33:02Z-
dc.identifier.issn0959-6526en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/103303-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.rights© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.rights© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.rightsThe following publication Yang, X., Zhang, J., Shen, G. Q., & Yan, Y. (2019). Incentives for green retrofits: An evolutionary game analysis on Public-Private-Partnership reconstruction of buildings. Journal of cleaner production, 232, 1076-1092 is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.014.en_US
dc.subjectCase simulationen_US
dc.subjectEvolutionary game analysisen_US
dc.subjectGreen retrofitsen_US
dc.subjectIncentive measuresen_US
dc.subjectPublic-private-partnership reconstruction of buildingsen_US
dc.titleIncentives for green retrofits : an evolutionary game analysis on Public-Private-Partnership reconstruction of buildingsen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage1076en_US
dc.identifier.epage1092en_US
dc.identifier.volume232en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.014en_US
dcterms.abstractTo solve the problems of existing buildings with high energy consumption, the government has organized for private sectors to implement green retrofits for the Public-Private-Partnership reconstruction of buildings (PPP-BR). However, most private sectors are reluctant to implement green retrofits because of high costs, low benefits and long payback periods. The existing literature analyzed PPP-BR projects, barriers and incentives of green retrofits. However, it does not provide any quantitative method to illustrate the effectiveness of incentives and the strategy changes of investment groups. To fill this gap, this paper reveals the game strategy change of encouraging green retrofits and implementing green retrofits in government groups and investment groups through an evolutionary game analysis. On this basis, the case simulation method is used to change the parameters to analyze the incentive effectiveness and the strategy change of green retrofitting by investment groups. It can be found that the final evolutionary game results will take on two forms: first, the government groups encourage green retrofits, and the investment groups implement green retrofits; second, the government groups do not encourage green retrofits, and the investment groups do not implement green retrofits, respectively. When the government groups highly encourage green retrofits, the investment groups will also increase its willingness to implement green retrofits. The simulation results show that reducing costs and increasing benefits will promote green retrofits; however, this incentive measure will be limited by objective conditions. Comparatively speaking, the policy incentive measures are less affected by an objective environment, but positive policy incentive measures will get negative effects. In contrast, negative policy incentive measures that may cause problems will be most effective. Therefore, the combination of positive and negative policy incentive measures will be the better and more moderate way to promote green retrofits for PPP-BR.-
dcterms.accessRightsopen accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationJournal of cleaner production, 20 Sept 2019, v. 232, p. 1076-1092en_US
dcterms.isPartOfJournal of cleaner productionen_US
dcterms.issued2019-09-20-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85067287540-
dc.description.validate202312 bcch-
dc.description.oaAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumberBRE-0508-
dc.description.fundingSourceOthersen_US
dc.description.fundingTextthanks the funding support from The Hong Kong Polytechnic Uni-en_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.OPUS24259372-
dc.description.oaCategoryGreen (AAM)en_US
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