Distributed higher order differentiator-based distributed secondary control for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks

Abstract

When the false signal cyber-attacks are applied, the secondary control cannot be achieved any more. More seriously, the stability of the DC microgrid may also be threatened by the intrusive false signal cyber-attacks. To this end, a distributed higher order differentiator (DHOD)-based distributed secondary resilience control is proposed in this work. The DHOD detects and locates the attack signals based on local data and data from neighboring nodes. The estimated attack-signals by the DHOD are further compensated to the distributed secondary control for eliminating the negative impact from the false signal cyber-attacks. The stability of the DHOD is also analyzed in this work. Simulation results presented in Section IV have verified the DHOD-based control can regulate the distributed energy resource (DER) under various types of false signal cyber-attacks.