Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/93363
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
dc.creator | Gu, X | en_US |
dc.creator | Hasan, I | en_US |
dc.creator | Lu, H | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-21T08:22:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-06-21T08:22:08Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0888-7233 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/93363 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. | en_US |
dc.rights | © Association for Comparative Economic Studies 2019 | en_US |
dc.rights | This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use (https://www.springernature.com/gp/open-research/policies/accepted-manuscript-terms), but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41294-019-00099-8 | en_US |
dc.subject | Litigation | en_US |
dc.subject | Loan spreads | en_US |
dc.subject | Political connection | en_US |
dc.subject | Relationship | en_US |
dc.title | Corporate misconduct and the cost of private debt : evidence from China | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 443 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 463 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 61 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1057/s41294-019-00099-8 | en_US |
dcterms.abstract | Using a comprehensive dataset of corporate lawsuits in China, we investigate the implications of corporate misconduct on the cost of private debt. Evidence reveals that firms involved in litigations obtain subsequent loans with stricter pricing terms, 15.1 percent higher loan spreads, than non-litigated borrowers. Strong political connection and repeated relationship help to flatten the sensitivity of loan pricing to litigation. Nonbank financial institutions react in stronger manner to corporate misconduct than traditional banks in pricing loans. Overall, we show that private debt holders care about borrowers’ wrongdoing in the past. | en_US |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Comparative economic studies, Sept. 2019, v. 61, no. 3, p. 443-463 | en_US |
dcterms.isPartOf | Comparative economic studies | en_US |
dcterms.issued | 2019-09 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85067385689 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1478-3320 | en_US |
dc.description.validate | 202206 bcfc | en_US |
dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | AF-0090 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | Self-funded | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
dc.identifier.OPUS | 41792998 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Lu_Corporate_Misconduct_Cost.pdf | Pre-Published version | 436.8 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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