Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/93352
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | School of Accounting and Finance | en_US |
dc.creator | Ng, J | en_US |
dc.creator | Wu, H | en_US |
dc.creator | Zhai, W | en_US |
dc.creator | Zhao, J | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-21T08:22:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-06-21T08:22:05Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/93352 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.rights | © 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. | en_US |
dc.rights | © 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_US |
dc.rights | The following publication Ng, J., Wu, H., Zhai, W., & Zhao, J. (2021). The effect of shareholder activism on earnings management: Evidence from shareholder proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance, 69, 102014 is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102014 | en_US |
dc.subject | Accrual-based earnings management | en_US |
dc.subject | Real activities manipulation | en_US |
dc.subject | Shareholder activism | en_US |
dc.subject | Shareholder proposals | en_US |
dc.title | The effect of shareholder activism on earnings management : evidence from shareholder proposals | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 69 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102014 | en_US |
dcterms.abstract | We find that in general, both accrual-based and real earnings management decrease after the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. However, when accounting for the type of proposal, we observe significant heterogeneity in the effects on earnings management. Specifically, proposals focused on changing the governance structure (e.g., board independence) lead to reductions in both types of earnings management, whereas proposals specifically targeted at improving financial reporting quality lead to decreased accrual-based earnings management but increased real earnings management. The results suggest that constraints on accrual-based earnings management induce a shift toward real earnings management. Our paper indicates that the nature of the shareholder proposal has a significant impact on shareholder intervention. | en_US |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | en_US |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Journal of corporate finance, Aug. 2021, v. 69, 102014 | en_US |
dcterms.isPartOf | Journal of corporate finance | en_US |
dcterms.issued | 2021-08 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85110219001 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1872-6313 | en_US |
dc.identifier.artn | 102014 | en_US |
dc.description.validate | 202206 bcfc | en_US |
dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | AF-0010 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | Self-funded | en_US |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | en_US |
dc.identifier.OPUS | 53838655 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Ng_Effect_Shareholder_Activism.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.02 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Page views
53
Last Week
0
0
Last month
Citations as of May 19, 2024
Downloads
91
Citations as of May 19, 2024
SCOPUSTM
Citations
15
Citations as of May 17, 2024
WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations
13
Citations as of May 16, 2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.