Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/90699
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorDepartment of Logistics and Maritime Studiesen_US
dc.creatorXu, Jen_US
dc.creatorNg, CTen_US
dc.creatorCheng, TCEen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-20T02:04:32Z-
dc.date.available2021-08-20T02:04:32Z-
dc.identifier.issn0925-5273en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/90699-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.subjectCoresen_US
dc.subjectRemanufacturingen_US
dc.subjectTake-back regulationen_US
dc.subjectUncertaintyen_US
dc.titleRemanufacturing strategies under product take-back regulationen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.volume235en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108091en_US
dcterms.abstractWe consider a profit-maximizing original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that produces a new product for the primary market. At the end of the first stage of product use, the OEM collects the used products (cores) and remanufactures them if they are eligible for remanufacturing; otherwise, the OEM sends them to material recycling. In the US and most European countries, the product take-back regulation mandated by the government holds the OEM accountable for the proper and safe treatment of end-of-life products in order to reduce their harmful environmental effects, and sets a collection rate target. In this paper, we take the collection rate of used products as an endogenous variable satisfying the set target and consider the uncertainty of the amount of collected cores qualified for remanufacturing. We formulate the problem and derive several optimal remanufacturing strategies for the OEM, depending on the inverse operating cost and new product manufacturing cost with and without the take-back regulation. Our major findings are: (i) The OEM should adopt the maximum (minimum) collection rate when the inverse operating cost is extremely low (high). (ii) A combination of the inverse operating cost and new product manufacturing cost leads to the optimal collection rate, thereby determining the new and remanufactured product prices, and remanufacturing quantity. (iii) A comparison between the cases with and without the take-back regulation indicates that, counter-intuitively, regulating the collection rate may not necessarily hurt the OEM.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsembargoed accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationInternational journal of production economics, May 2021, v. 235, 108091en_US
dcterms.isPartOfInternational journal of production economicsen_US
dcterms.issued2021-05-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85104944379-
dc.identifier.artn108091en_US
dc.description.validate202108 bcvcen_US
dc.description.oaNot applicableen_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera1007-n09-
dc.identifier.SubFormID2422-
dc.description.fundingSourceOthersen_US
dc.description.fundingTextThis research project (Project Number: S2019.A8.013.19S) is funded by the Strategic Public Policy Research Funding Scheme from the Policy Innovation and Co-ordination Office of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.en_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.date.embargo2024-05-31en_US
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article
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Embargo End Date 2024-05-31
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