Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/65448
Title: Strategic investments in accessibility under port competition and inter-regional coordination
Authors: Wan, Y 
Basso, LJ
Zhang, A
Keywords: Coalition stability
Inland accessibility
Inter-regional coordination
Seaport competition
Strategic investment
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Pergamon Press
Source: Transportation research. Part B, Methodological, 2016, v. 93, p. 102-125 How to cite?
Journal: Transportation research. Part B, Methodological 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the incentives for and welfare implications of collaboration among local governments in landside port accessibility investment. In particular, we consider two seaports with their respective captive markets and a common inland market for which the ports compete. The ports and the inland belong to three independent regional governments, each making investment decisions on accessibility for its own region. We find that there is a conflict of interest between the port governments and inland government in terms of their jointly making accessibility investment decisions, and that each region's preference over various coalitions is highly affected by ownership type of the competing ports. For public ports, the inland may compensate the port regions to achieve the grand coalition that maximizes total welfare but requires a sizable investment in the port regions. For private ports, however, the port regions benefit from coordinating with the inland and hence may be able to compensate the inland to form the grand coalition.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/65448
ISSN: 0191-2615
EISSN: 1879-2367
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2016.07.011
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