How leveraged buyout influences the competitiveness of state-owned firms

Abstract

提高国有企业的市场竞争力是中国经济体制改革的重要目的之一。几年来,政府在经济体制改革中引入了一系列旨在提高国有企业竞争力的措施,比如国有企业公司化、企业兼并重组等。这些措施对提高国有企业竞争力起了重要作用。在实践过程中,杠杆收购作为兼并重组的一种模式,正逐渐被广泛采用,但目前还很少有针对杠杆收购在提高国企竞争力方面发挥作用的研究,而这正是本文的研究目的。科学地认识杠杆收购的作用对进一步提高国企竞争力有重要意义。本文从公司治理结构和资本结构等方面的变化分析了杠杆收购对提高国有建筑企业的竞争力的作用。由于掌握国有企业实际控制权的政府官员不拥有剩余索取权,加之对企业经理层的不合理的绩效评价指标导致了无效的公司激励机制,所以传统国有企业的公司治理结构大大制约了企业的竞争力。杠杆收购通过改善公司治理结构中的所有权结构和激励机制有效地改变了这种状况。同时,杠杆收购通过强化债务激励作用和避税效应等方面提高了企业竞争力。 To improve the competitiveness of state-owned firms in China is one of the most important aims of implementing reforms on Chinese economy. Recently a series of effective measures, such as merger, acquisition and transforming traditional state-owned firm to corporation, have been introduced to improve the competitiveness of the firms. Although leveraged buyout (LBO), a pattern of acquisition and restructuring, has been gradually used in practice, there are few previous studies investigating how LBO influences the competitiveness of state-owned firms. It is considered of good significance to scientifically recognize LBO’s impact on the competitiveness of state-owned firms. From the aspects of changing corporate governance structure and capital structure, this paper analyzed how LBO improves the competitiveness of state-owned firms. Focuses are given in examining the existing situation where government officials have the power to control the state-owned firms of China, but have no residual claims on the firms, and the irrationality of the performance valuation criteria of the management leads to poor incentive mechanism. LBO can change this by improving the ownership and incentive mechanism. At the same time, LBO can also strengthen the debt’ s motivation to managers and the tax shield effect to improve the competitiveness of the firms.