A reputation-aware defense framework for strategic behaviors in federated learning

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) enables privacy-preserving model training across distributed clients. However, its reliance on voluntary client participation makes it vulnerable to strategic behaviors—actions that are not overtly malicious but significantly impair model convergence and fairness. Existing defense methods primarily focus on explicit attacks, overlooking the challenges posed by economically motivated “pseudo-honest” clients. To address this gap, we propose a Reputation-Aware Defense Framework to mitigate strategic behaviors in FL. This framework introduces a multi-dimensional dynamic reputation model that evaluates client behaviors based on gradient alignment, participation consistency, and update stability. The resulting reputation scores are incorporated into both aggregation and incentive mechanisms, forming a behavior-feedback loop that rewards honest participation and penalizes opportunistic strategies. We theoretically prove the convergence of reputation scores, the suppression of low-quality updates in aggregation, and the emergence of honest participation as a Nash equilibrium under the incentive mechanism. Experiments on datasets such as CIFAR-10, FEMNIST, MIMIC-III demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms baseline methods in accuracy, fairness, and robustness, even when up to 60% of clients act strategically. This study bridges trust modeling and robust optimization in FL, offering a secure foundation for federated systems operating in open and incentive-driven environments.