

Resetting China's Conservative Revolution: "People's Livelihood" in 1950s Taiwan

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As a state, the Republic of China (ROC) is a kind of its own. In its almost eleven decades of existence, it took on many guises: from a warlord-controlled, unstable polity in the 1910s–1920s and a party-state that claimed control over a fragmented continental nation to a Cold War remnant of “Free China” and an electoral democracy governing Taiwan and adjacent islands. In all these stages of the ROC’s dramatic transformation, the Guomindang (GMD; also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party or, officially, the Kuomintang) has played a major role. In particular, the party, its leadership, and doctrines were enmeshed in the ROC’s tumultuous transition from Nanjing to Taipei through the twentieth century. The relocation of government headquarters from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan was a result of interparty rivalries within China. Yet, the geopolitical configurations that beset Asia and the wider world call attention to the global significance of the Chinese Civil War.

This chapter argues that the ideological legacy of the conservative revolution—a nation-building and modernization project informed by anti-colonialism, anti-communism, and state-managed capitalism—in mainland China was transplanted onto Taiwan in the 1950s and made pliable to US-led geopolitical designs for the Asia-Pacific. It pays attention to both the continuities and ruptures of GMD rule across the Taiwan Strait, focusing on the rearticulation of the party-state’s strategies in nation and society building as its president, Chiang Kai-shek, settled into the same office that housed Japanese colonial governors. Instead of examining concrete policies, however, this chapter scrutinizes its ideological texts and meta-texts, in particular senior cadres’ diaries. Specifically, it explains why Chiang was compelled to “complete” Sun Yat-sen’s (1866–1925) canon in

1953, almost three decades after the *Three People's Principles* was first published, and how his two “supplementary” chapters (*Yu le liangpian bushu*; hereafter “Supplement”) signaled a recalibration of China's conservative revolution.

Additions to the *Three People's Principles* impacted heavily on public life in GMD-controlled Taiwan. As the ROC's default ruling party until 1996, when the republic's presidential election was first contested by opposition politicians, Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy and its paraphernalia undergirded the state's doctrine, if not always devoutly. Along with the posthumous personality cult built around Sun, the late revolutionary leader's eponymous *Three People's Principles* held exalted status in GMD-governed areas.¹ The *Three People's Principles* was the staple of political indoctrination in Nationalist China since 1928, when Chiang Kai-shek nominally unified the country under a government the party led. Taught under the guise of party theory (*dangyi*) or civics (*gongmin*), catechism on Sun Yat-sen thought was an integral part of the schooling process, so much so that it was part of Taiwan's college entrance examinations until 1998.² The *Three People's Principles* was originally a collection of sixteen lectures on the principles of *minzu* (nationalism), *minquan* (democracy), and *minsheng* (people's livelihood) Sun gave in Guangzhou, where the Nationalist government was headquartered in 1924.³ Of the three principles, *minsheng* was the most controversial, since it was entangled with socialism, communism, and Marxism. The fact that the speeches were delivered at the height of the First United Front, an alliance the GMD forged with the communists against the warlord-controlled regime governing from Beijing in exchange for Comintern aids, introduced nuances to Sun's attitude toward communism. His ambiguity contrasted sharply with the virulent hostility against Chinese communism held by Chiang and his government. Chiang's additions to the canon represented an attempt to adapt the GMD's ideological inheritance, shaped during the interwar era, to Cold War geopolitical realities.

My inquiry into Supplement challenges two approaches to the history of Taiwan and/or the ROC that downplay transwar—the Chinese Civil War that began in 1927 and its intersections with a regional order, the domineering power of which changed from Japan to the United States—vicissitudes. Views aligned with the GMD, particularly when Chiang and his son Ching-kuo were in power, consider socioeconomic developments in Taiwan as the culmination of the revered revolutionary Sun Yat-sen's vision for China. The ROC's achievements in its “model province” (*mofan sheng*) would have been more widespread on the mainland if the GMD had prevailed over the Chinese communists. Contrary to this interpretation is one that sees the GMD state's loss of mainland China

as a decided break in its history. Calling it “Taiwanization” (*Taiwan-ka*), Wakabayashi Masahiro charts the reduction of the ROC from a continental state to an island one, as a tumultuous process which saw an authoritarian “settler state” (*sensensha kokka*) dominated by mainland Chinese elite eventually took on liberal democratic and Taiwanese guises.⁴ This Taiwan-centrism gains traction as the island’s population increasingly questioned their Chinese identity.

Both viewpoints, diametrically opposed as they are, downplay the complex connections between the party-state headquartered in Taipei, the revolutionary project that formed the ROC in the first place, and how Cold War geopolitics made the GMD rework its nation- and social-building strategies. During its stint in mainland China, the regime’s appeal to nationalism and a corporatist alternative to the capitalist order both domestically and internationally belied a state and a movement that harbored world-historical ambitions, setting itself as an example for other societies at the receiving end of capitalist imperialism, particularly those in Asia, to follow. Reduced in its territorial reach to the island of Taiwan and a few archipelagos off Fujian Province and hinged on US military protection, the GMD state’s desire to overcome global modernity was no longer tenable. The “updated” canon reflected the circumstances the GMD confronted and the party’s reduced ambitions in the 1950s. While continuing to celebrate its Chinese nationalist credentials, the regime’s claim to a distinct solution to achieving national independence and taming capitalism while leveraging the latter for economic development rang hollow. Instead, Chiang’s additions to the principle of people’s livelihood (*minsheng*) in the *Three People’s Principles* projected a developmentalist, welfarist vision that sought to legitimate the postwar consensus in the “free world.” Yet, the revised canon, published in 1953, was amorphous enough that it allowed for interpretations that stressed continuity between Sun’s original ideals and those that were attributed to his successor at the helm of the party-state. It provided critical ideological glue between interwar and wartime China, on one hand, and postwar Taiwan, on the other.

Resetting the Conservative Revolution

The early 1950s was a period of tremendous flux; the United States had replaced Japan as the regional hegemon, leading a global crusade against communism. The Korean War prompted Washington to provide military protection to Chiang’s regime and turn Taiwan into one of its unsinkable aircraft carriers. The GMD party-state, once abandoned by its American sponsors, gained a new lease of

life and vowed to reclaim (*guangfu*) the Chinese mainland from its communist nemesis. “Free China” rested its legitimacy on Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary enterprise, which was putatively derailed by Beijing. As I argue elsewhere, the GMD initiated a conservative revolution—a project promoting state-directed capitalist development while suppressing its attendant sociopolitical chaos—since the party’s break with its one-time communist allies.⁵ The party’s governing premise was the transformation of China, with Taiwan as its experimental site, into a modern, sovereign industrial power that commanded leadership over an Asia freed from Western colonial dominance. Exercising effective control over only the lower Yangzi region of China even during its heyday before the formal onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the body politic the party-state claimed to govern was tentative and fragmented. Exiled to Taiwan, the GMD had a chance to relaunch its conservative revolution, albeit in a highly modified form.

Shortly after moving to Taiwan, the GMD reignited the conservative revolution that imploded in mainland China. Social and cultural movements, the methods of which stemmed from the party-state’s mobilization experience on the mainland, were launched. While Japan and, by extension, the Axis powers were the evil empires against which the Chinese nation was kept “free,” the socialist bloc and the government headed by Mao Zedong and Zhu De in Beijing became China’s existential threats in the 1950s. To be sure, state-led campaigns began in earnest once the ROC took over the island from Japan, with a focus on imparting Chinese culture and Mandarin on a population who mostly did not partake in China’s revolutionary experiences. While sinicization, often couched in terms of cultivating the voluntaristic “national spirit,” continued to be key, “anticommunism and resistance against Russia” became the leitmotif of mass movements. Animosity against Japan, Washington’s other unsinkable aircraft carrier in Asia, was downplayed.⁶ In April 1950, the GMD established the Chinese Youth Anti-Communist and Resist Russia League (*Zhongguo qingnian fangong kang-E lianhehui*). Led by Chiang Kai-shek’s son Ching-kuo and National Taiwan University president Fu Sinian, the league resembled GMD-led youth organizations on the mainland. League propaganda slogan alluded to Sparta and Prussia, focusing on their putative austere martial. Members, most of them university students and recent high school graduates, patrolled the streets, dissuading diners, moviegoers, and drivers from indulging in frivolities and consuming scarce resources, reminiscent of the New Life Movement Chiang launched in 1934. The league was subsequently absorbed by the China Youth Anti-Communist Corps (*Zhongguo qingnian fangong tuan*) in March 1952.⁷ The corps also founded the Chinese Youth Writing Association (*Zhongguo qingnian*

xiezu xiehui). Together with the Chinese Literary Association (*Zhongguo wenyi xiehui*), founded in May 1950, the organization was the vehicle through which the GMD produced anti-communist and Chinese nationalist literary materials for popular consumption.⁸ In terms of aesthetics, modes of organization, and its exaltation of the nation against all other forms of politics, the GMD transplanted the paraphernalia of China's conservation revolution onto the territories it still governed.

Yet, GMD rule was not a replica of its reign in mainland China. The regime proved much more effective in introducing socioeconomic changes to Taiwan. Shredded of debilitating factional strife as party elders either passed away or were sidelined, more capable cadres took over. Official such as Premier Chen Cheng (1897–1965) were efficient state builders. A trusted subordinate of Chiang, Chen was tasked with spearheading economic development in Taiwan and reforming the battered party. His job was made much easier by the fact that defense was outsourced to the United States, relieving the regime of substantial military expenses that had drained the state's coffers on the mainland. Thus, while the party's agrarian programs on mainland China quickly grounded to a halt during the Nanjing Decade (1927–1937), the GMD succeeded in bringing about sweeping campaigns in rural Taiwan. Land reform in the Taiwanese countryside, as economist Chu Wan-Wen observed, was nothing less than “social change of a revolutionary nature.” As a class, the landlord was obliterated by a series of measures the party-state imposed from 1949 to 1953 under Chen's supervision. The government stressed the gradualist and incremental nature of its agrarian project—from rent reduction and sale of public land through reregistration of the cadastre and the Land to the Tiller program. The GMD's ability to carry through agrarian programs without appealing to class struggle and revolutionary violence created an alternative, albeit on a scale much smaller than mainland China, to land reform pursued by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).⁹ It echoed strongly Sun Yat-sen's concern for the land problem in his lectures on *minsheng*. Sun's second lecture on people's livelihood, in which the revered revolutionary sought to relate to the social goals of his communist allies while distinguishing them from those he urged GMD cadres to take up, highlighted land ownership as the cardinal problem that plagued modern societies. He saw his own country as virgin territory insofar as industrial capitalism was concerned, at one point comparing the country to Australia, a settler colony of which the population was a lot smaller than China's. The crux of the *minsheng* principle was to avoid the accumulation of land among a few hands before “industry and commerce [were] fully developed.” The GMD's method, however, was different from that of the

communists as the former recognized private ownership of land, just not how landlords could profit excessively from it at the expense of those who labored.¹⁰ In subsequent years, activists from across the political spectrum fought vigorously on how the *minsheng* principle could be interpreted and implemented, causing ruptures within the GMD. Among the party's left-wingers, debates continued even after the collapse of the United Front as to whether the GMD should be a vehicle for a social revolution favoring peasants and the much smaller working class or concentrate on bringing about equality between classes through economic development.¹¹ With the onset of the Cold War, land reform was a centerpiece of the rivalry between the GMD and its communist nemesis, which both ran largely agrarian societies, along with the visions they embodied.

The land reforms Chen introduced in Taiwan renewed scrutiny within the GMD on the principle of *minsheng*. As Chiang conceded in his early June 1952 entries in his yet-unpublished diary, the president "spent rather much thought (*po fei xinli*)" revising his "Essentials of State-Owned Land" (*Tudi guoyou de yaoyi*) speech delivered on April 21 for publication. The aspect that most warranted Chiang's attention was some of Sun's remarks, for example, "The Principle of Livelihood is socialism, it is communism, it is Utopianism."¹² Such a statement was so incendiary that some readers, since Sun's demise in 1925, were shocked into believing that it was forgery and demanded that public security authorities censor it.¹³ Chiang stressed that "communism aimed for the complete destruction of the system of private property. The *minsheng* principle not only protected private property but also rewarded legitimate (*heli de*) private enterprises. Communist bandits, on the other hand, not only confiscated private capital but also completely destroyed it."¹⁴ The Generalissimo, therefore, echoed the thrust of Sun's 1920s prognosis, which envisioned, if counterintuitively, a noncapitalistic economy in which private property thrived. Of course, the revered late revolutionary's social ideal belied an "ahistorical and timeless transhistorical pro-statist principle," an appeal to an exalted order free from imperialism, capitalist modernization, and class struggle.¹⁵ For Cui Shuqin, a Harvard-educated intellectual dedicated to Sun's political philosophy, the *minsheng* principle was a superior form of socialism, facilitating the people's sustainment and flourishing (*yangmin*). To be specific, *minsheng* sought to accord private capital to all, while communism as pioneered in Soviet Russia aimed to strip everyone of property so that everyone joined the proletariat.¹⁶ Following Cui's train of thought, land reform in "Free China" was the state's empowering citizens with value-producing land while land reform in communist-run mainland was appropriation of people's wealth by malevolent cadres.

Cui's interpretation of *minsheng* symptomized the difficult transwar legacy the GMD state inherited from Sun, whose openness to communism proved to be an embarrassment in a fervently anti-communist Taiwan. The statement in Sun's own *minsheng* lectures, which suggested that pre-empting capitalist features in society—"check[ing] the growth of large private capital and prevent[ing] the disease of extreme inequality between the rich and the poor"—was his priority, was downplayed.¹⁷ Ideological warfare against Soviet Russia and communist China became cardinal as, Cui suggested, any overlapping between Sun's thoughts and communism was to be disavowed.¹⁸ Prior ruminations in Republican China on the compatibility between *minsheng* and communism, even non-Marxist ones, were repudiated. Cui's argument was echoed enthusiastically by the Nationalist leadership. At the party's national congress in October 1952, the first one held in Taiwan, Chiang presented a lengthy report, which he began by differentiating between *minsheng* and communism. "One only needed to read carefully lectures on the *minsheng* principle to see how the Premier (i.e., Sun) fully refuted all core elements of Marxism such as historical materialism, surplus value and class struggle." The party chief bemoaned how cadres became "lost (*miwang*)" and used Marxist concepts such as dialectical materialism to understand the Three People's Principles. Some even "distorted the Three People's Principles in order to pander (*kaolong*) to communist bandits." But Sun's purportedly ideological ecumenism vis-à-vis communism had been linked to the revolutionary's policy, hammered out in 1923, to ally with Soviet Russia and cooperate with the Chinese communists. Chiang sought to stress that Sun's position was borne out of expediency and "the neglect of the China question in U.S. diplomacy" in the early twentieth century.¹⁹ To put it even more bluntly, as Cui did, Sun's apparent reconciliation with communism was nothing but a tactical ploy to rally Chinese communists behind the Nationalist banner in the 1920s.²⁰ Far from a meeting of minds, Sun's tolerance of Soviet Russia and Chinese communists was no more than a strategy to advance China's own interests as the GMD defined them. Ideological concessions to communism as espoused by the Russians or the Chinese communists were out of the question.

Chiang's attempt to rationalize, or explain away, Sun's embrace of Soviet assistance and Chinese communists on strategic grounds was one means by which the GMD head sought to draw the line. The other prong of this endeavor to end ideological confusion or, indeed, debates was to rearticulate and renew the canon. As Chiang remarked in the conclusion of his report, cadres "must cleanse thoughts within the party, return to teachings bequeathed by the Premier, in particular the understanding that the Three People's Principles were rooted in

[China's] national spirit and culture."²¹ Land reform, as *minsheng* principle in action, compelled Chiang and other senior cadres to revisit the entanglement between Sun's thoughts and various forms of socialism. GMD's discourse on land reform hinged on the recognition and protection of private property. Taipei's land policy, Chiang explained, was to allow for "the reasonable existence of private property (including land ownership) system under the principle of land nationalization." This is because it was a defining principle in Sun's thinking that he was not against capital but only the concentration of it in a few private hands. Land reform pursued by the GMD, hence, could not be compared to what the communists were carrying out on the mainland. Turning Marxian class analysis on its head, Chiang accused "cunning bandits Mao [Zedong] and Zhu [De]" of "exploiting, incessantly and by layers, the proletariat." While the GMD, as "a party representing all people," empowered the citizenry, the communists stripped people of their land and enriched themselves. This, Chiang charged, was nothing less than dictatorship (*zhuanzheng*) of the ruling class which Mao and Zhu represented.²² Mass dispossession, Stalinist terror, and concentration of wealth in the hands of the communist elite were far from what the *minsheng* principle envisioned.

The stark contrast Chiang set up between land reform on Taiwan and land reform on the mainland became the foundational narrative of the GMD's self-image as the legitimate Chinese government, temporarily exiled onto the subtropical former Japanese colony. Chen Cheng, Chiang's right-hand man, reproduced this narrative in a celebratory mood for an international readership who might "want to carry out similar projects" in 1961. His book, translated as *Land Reform in Taiwan* in English in the same year the original Chinese version was published, came out in Spanish and French in 1964 and 1966, respectively, making it comprehensible to political elites in newly independent countries across Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The introductory chapter of Chen's book traced the genealogy of China's "land problem" to Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE), a Han Dynasty scholar who was credited with making Confucianism into a state ideology. After describing briefly how rulers and officials in the Han and Song Dynasties dealt with the land issue, Chen turned abruptly to Taiwan, "as the Chinese mainland is presently under Communist occupation." He marshaled figures showing that prior to initiatives implemented by the GMD, "maladjustment in land distribution and land utilization" in Taiwan was dire and called for state interventions. Turning to Sun Yat-sen as the theoretical basis for lands reform, Chen stressed that the late revolutionary, while advocating land nationalization, would "let private individuals have land ownership ...

because private individuals are by no means entirely free but are bound by the laws and regulations of the country.” Compared with the benign measures rolled out in Taiwan, land nationalization in mainland China was “expropriation of all property,” a “reign of terror,” and peasants reduced to “serfs.”²³ The superiority of the *minsheng* principle over Marxism was, for Chen, obvious.

Cleansing Thoughts

There is an unmistakable sense of *déjà vu* in Chiang and Chen's readings of *minsheng*, which aimed, among other things, to disabuse the Chinese citizenry and foreign observers of the compatibility between Sun's national revolution and the political designs of its erstwhile partner-turned-enemy. Chiang himself lamented in the party congress report that his exegesis of *minsheng* came too late as cadres' thoughts and beliefs had been contaminated by communism since Sun's death, a reason which the party chief cited for China's crisis. Yet, the GMD cannot be faulted for not trying to clean the air or, less generously, suppress dissent. In the mid-1920s, even before the United Front forged by Sun collapsed, ideologue Dai Jitao (1891–1949) took pains to establish *minsheng* as an ideology that facilitated a unique form of revolutionary politics. As I argue elsewhere, it promised drastic social change but excluded class struggle as a strategy, favoring a depoliticized approach whereby a technocratic vanguard served as mobilizers and coordinators of capital and labor.²⁴ Corporatism was the core of the national revolution, the legacy of which the GMD must defend from Marxist critiques.

To differentiate *minsheng* further from Marxist historical materialism, Dai made the bold claim that Sun's talks on clothing (*yi*), food (*shi*), housing (*zhu*), and transportation (*xing*)—material necessities of the people—did not complete the revolutionary's lectures on *minsheng*. Dai claimed to have seen written notes held by Sun's widow indicating that two topics—sustaining the living (*yangsheng*) and disposal of the dead (*songsì*)—were to be discussed by the revered leader if he had lived beyond March 1925. From these notes, Dai extrapolated that the two unspoken themes that Sun took to his grave were *yu* and *le*, both contributing to the citizenry's “beautiful and elegant enjoyment” (*youmei gaoshang de xiangle*).²⁵ He also argued, therefore, that *minsheng* was in its philosophical fundamentals distinct from communism. The latter, Dai explained,

was very naïve, taking as its theoretical basis Marx's historical materialism. *Minsheng*, on the other hand, was based on thoughts derived from China's

primordial ethical and political philosophy. Therefore, the purview [of these two ideologies] was very different. The problems that communism wanted to solve was confined to those of economic life. *Minsheng*, in embodying *yu* and *le*, went beyond economic life.²⁶

On one hand, Dai was intent on elevating *minsheng* into a philosophy grounded in nebulous, Confucian-sounding dictums such as benevolence (*ren'ai*) and the doctrine of the mean (*zhongyong*).²⁷ On the other hand, he agreed with commentators that *minsheng* was no more than a social policy, a strategy of development for a late industrializing country. The ideologue endowed the creed with utopian aspirations, alluding to the timeless Confucian ideal of great harmony (*datong*). However, *minsheng* philosophy promised an end to the ills of capitalism and liberation of oppressed nations around the world. Dai's reading of *minsheng*, with its eclectic mix of registers, allusions, and vocabularies, exacerbated what historian Marie-Claire Bergère calls the "intellectual confusion" whereby the three meanings of *minsheng*—philosophical, normative, and programmatic—were entangled and not carefully parsed through in Sun's own lectures.²⁸ Sun's energetic speeches, if effective for rallying the committed, did not form a coherent philosophical program. This aporia between the ahistorical, nativist framing of *minsheng* and *minsheng* as an alternative strategy of dealing with imperialist capitalism, both locally inflected and as a global problematic, was left unaddressed until 1953.

Updating the Canon for Cold War Taiwan

Of course, adding Supplement to a long-cherished canon was not just about bridging an epistemological gap. Such an act also betrayed the changing political conditions which underscored the discrepancies between what *minsheng* meant when the GMD was paramount in China and when the party-state's survival was at the mercy of US protection. A close reading of the Supplement, in comparison with earlier texts produced before the end of China's anti-Japanese resistance war, attests how *minsheng* was (1) reshaped to legitimize the developmentalist, welfarist focus of the GMD state as it settled onto Taiwan; and (2) cleansed of its global and potentially more radical ambitions.

Just a decade before the Supplement was published, Chiang wrote *China's Destiny*. Published at the tail end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, *China's Destiny*, written in response to the abolition of treaties imposed by the United

States and Britain since the Opium War, offered a grand narrative of modern China's submission to Western imperialism and its rebirth as a major nation-state. As the famed writer Lin Yutang (1895–1976) introduced it to an American readership, the book was nothing less than a statement of “China's responsibilities growing out of her great heritage and her new status as an independent nation.” It outlined Chiang's “philosophy of revolution and cultural and moral reconstruction.”²⁹ The American journalist Philip Jaffe (1895–1980) hyperbolically named it “the *Mein Kampf* of China,” claiming that the “antidemocratic views and opposition to all concepts of Western liberalism” the book expressed were sources of embarrassment for the pro-GMD government in Washington.³⁰ Indeed, the penultimate chapter of *China's Destiny* described China's resurgence as an event of world-historical significance. It chastised the West for creating a global order which saw “capitalism and imperialism reinforcing each other,” resulting in constant international and domestic strife. The independence of China represented not just the ascendancy of a new power, much less a new hegemon in the mode of Japan in Asia or Germany in Europe. It represented the triumph of Chinese political philosophy represented by the likes of Mencius and Laozi, under which “Asiatic people” coexisted peacefully before the onslaught of Euro-American imperialism. The same philosophy and morality, with China's independence, would bring Asia freedom and lasting peace.³¹ Chiang's triumphalism was echoed in state-sanctioned materials intended for students. A companion to the *Three People's Principles*, published in 1943 with the blessing of the Ministry of Education, claimed that Sun's creeds overcame (*kefu*) the three malicious systems of thought prevailing over the world: capitalism, imperialism, and communism.³² China was uniquely placed to bring about global unity because of its population size, large territory, long history, wealth of resources, and moral attraction to other “weaker” (*ruoxiao*) nations across the world. The catechism went on to forecast blithely that China would spearhead the formation of a world government—with singular executive, legislature, and judiciary branches—which would be set up under the guidance of the Three People's Principles. China's kingly way (*wangdao*) would pave the way for an order under which “national borders were abolished, peoples lived in harmony, economic cooperation reigned and cultures converged.”³³ Such gestures against capitalist imperialism and the nation-state system in the language of Pan-Asianist unity, even if rhetorical, became hollow if not downright ludicrous with “Free China” reduced to running Taiwan and a few archipelagos off the coast of communist-controlled Fujian province.

“Supplement,” on the other hand, was a very different text. To begin with, its tone was much somber, a shift that was no doubt overdetermined by the GMD’s existential crisis. While *China’s Destiny* ruminates on the “lasting peace and the emancipation of mankind [*sic*]” and the “sufferings and tribulations” China had gone through since the nineteenth century, “Supplement” outlined specific plans and policies.³⁴ *China’s Destiny* offered broad strokes of modern history, but “Supplement” was detailed and was almost one-third as long as the abridged version of Sun’s sixteen lectures that the GMD produced for public consumption. In this sense, “Supplement” was very different from Sun’s own *Three People’s Principles*, which as a propaganda tool was a product of “fiery oral rhetoric” and “forceful, simple formulations.”³⁵ These intertextual differences are attributable to the individuals who created the documents. While Chiang claimed ownership over both *China’s Destiny* and “Supplement” as his own works, neither was the product of one man alone. The latter, moreover, could not be more remote from Sun’s style. Both texts included the input of Tao Xisheng (1899–1988), a historian whom Arif Dirlik labels a GMD Marxist—someone who rejected class struggle but retained Marxist frameworks under which he diagnosed society.³⁶ Associated with the GMD “left,” the figurehead of which was Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), Tao, like many Marxists, was a contributor to a major debate on Chinese social history in the late 1920s and 1930s, in which not only the country’s past but more importantly its revolutionary future were at stake. China, Tao argued, had been stuck between feudalism and capitalism for two millennia since the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). The GMD’s task, therefore, was to deliver the nation from this conundrum so that it evolved into a capitalist society and followed a putatively universal mode of development. Instead of a social revolution, which Tao was vehemently against, he advocated a *political* one which would allow the state to spearhead industrialization and eliminate residual feudal forces in society. As a historical materialist, Tao was therefore also different from Dai Jitao, who first highlighted *yu* and *le* as Sun’s legacy to be fleshed out by his followers. While conversant in Marxism, Dai was more invested in claiming for Sunist thoughts nationalist and pan-Asian credentials by appealing to Confucian vocabularies. Indeed, Dai’s interpretation of *minsheng* put stress on its alleged nonmaterialistic, spiritualist elements. Tao’s contributions to “Supplement” were tantamount to a reinterpretation of Dai, whose demise in 1949 ended the elder’s hold on what *minsheng* meant.

The pronounced differences between *China’s Destiny* and “Supplement,” meanwhile, can partly be explained by Tao’s varying degree of involvement in their respective production processes. Tao reportedly claimed that his contributions

to Chiang's major treatises—including the two titles under discussion and the 1956 *Soviet Russia in China* (*Su-E zai Zhongguo*)—were no more than that of a “typewriter that put on record the thoughts of its owner.”³⁷ However, his other accounts contradicted this claim and show that his contributions to Chiang's ideological state apparatus were uneven. A 1964 collection of Tao's essays insisted that the sexagenarian played a mere editorial role in the creation of *China's Destiny*, a claim Dirlik finds plausible given that the story of China's decline in Chiang's book was out of tune with his Marxist historical framework.³⁸ In contrast, Tao's recently published personal diary, compiled by his son, shows that the then chief lecturer (*zong jiangzu*) at his party's think tank Research Institute of Revolutionary Praxis (*Geming shijian yanjiusu*) was the main force behind “Supplement.” Tao started writing “Supplement” on January 10, 1953, and delivered the manuscript to the publisher on November 13 in the same year. During this period, the diary mentions the drafting, revising, and printing of “Supplement” at least seven times. After “Supplement” was made available to the public, Tao wrote newspaper articles explaining the chapters and gave multiple lectures on them for audiences ranging from members of the GMD-led youth movement and rank-and-file cadres to officers in the air force and government officials.³⁹ On his part, Chiang commissioned Tao to write “Supplement” on November 12, 1952, and commented on drafts, requesting revisions throughout the process.⁴⁰ Thus, despite his disclaimer and self-effacement, Tao's fingerprints were all over “Supplement.”

“Supplement” and Reorientation of the Conservative Revolution

Tao's central role in putting together such canonical texts as “Supplement,” in addition to numerous speeches and exhortations attributed to Chiang, indicates that he became the GMD's core postwar ideologue as the party considered how it should govern Taiwan, with a view to eventually reconquering mainland China. While Taiwan's economic growth was promoted as vindication for the efficacy of free enterprise, the island actually witnessed, from the 1950s until at least the 1960s, what much of East and Southeast Asian societies experienced, that is, state-led industrialization under which private capital played a subordinate and collaborative role in an export-oriented economy. Main drivers of Taiwan's development under the GMD such as Chen Cheng and engineer Yin Zhongrong (1903–1963) cited the British Labour Party and

the Meiji government in Japan, respectively, as inspirations for the policies they formulated for Taiwan. They subscribed to the standard *minsheng* position that the state, not private capital, should perform a domineering and paternalistic function in the economy. It goes without saying that this position was incompatible with free-market propaganda served by both Washington and Taipei.⁴¹ Instead, it bore strong resonances with the corporatist approach to industrialization championed by Wang Jingwei and the “left” GMD in the 1930s, a strategy that drew on Sun’s emphasis on managing private capital and was pitched as an alternative to liberal capitalism and communism. It also represented a shift in Chiang’s vision—salient during the GMD’s reign in mainland China but no longer applicable in Taiwan as military defense was provided by the United States—which privileged military industries in the nation-building process.⁴² Seen under this light, Tao’s growing prominence in the GMD’s ideological state apparatus on Taiwan was unsurprising.

Unlike *China’s Destiny*, therefore, “Supplement” showed clear signs of Tao’s ruminations on China that were carried over from his time on the mainland. It reflected Tao’s Marxian belief in one universal mode of development to which China, like Euro-America before it, must conform. “The basic aim,” the Supplement stated in its beginning section, “of the *minsheng* principle is industrial development.”⁴³ Industrialization meant that the bulk of Taiwan’s—and eventually mainland China’s—population would be displaced from the countryside and relocated to cities. It also created incredible unevenness in society, whereby structures, norms, and relations inherited from the past were upended while modern equivalents had yet to coalesce into a coherent, even whole. As “Supplement” puts it, “the main tendencies of Chinese society which have developed in the course of the last three decades are two: gradual decay in agriculture without the compensatory advantage of industrial development; disintegration of the old social organization without the emergence of a new one to take its place.” What unfolded in twentieth-century Taiwan/China was made to vindicate what Sun had described as the cause of revolutionary upheaval in nineteenth-century Euro-America, that is; the benefits mechanization brought about were negated by social displacement. Not properly managed, capitalist social change threatened to derail the national revolution. Such ruminations were not merely academic, as “Supplement” lamented that social disintegration ended up benefitting the Chinese communists and their Russian sponsors, who exploited it to their advantage.⁴⁴ Instead, they set the stage for the general tone the “Supplement” adopted in its proposal for China’s future.

Yu and *le*, like the four elements of *minsheng* that Sun covered three decades ago, served to manage the transition from agrarian to industrial society and absorb the resultant blow on the nation's fabric. Refuting the option to give free rein to centrifugal forces in society, "Supplement" cited Sun's definition of socialism to justify "planned social reform" and "methodical planning." This strain of thought found strong echoes in Dai's valorization of a strong state, which would use the tool of a vanguard revolutionary party to magnify the benefits of industrialization while thwarting class tensions, imperialist encroachment, and sociocultural disorientation that global capitalism brought about. It, however, also gave ideological voice for the GMD's new developmentalist focus on producing labor-intensive goods for export instead of developing a military-industrial complex. This is obvious from the opening section of the *yu* chapter, which debunked Malthusianism by citing Sun's concern that China's population was too small compared to that of other powers. Yet, while Sun alluded to fear of hostile states colonizing China's frontier regions, "Supplement" saw increasing the population as a way to expand the pool of industrial labor. To encourage population growth and improve the quality of the workforce, "Supplement" envisioned a paternalistic welfare state. The rest of the *yu* chapter was devoted to education and welfare provisions for children, the disabled, the divorced and the widowed, and the elderly (both sustenance and disposal after death). The narrative was similar for each aspect the chapter covered: disintegration of old social structures, demands of modernity, Chinese communist mischief, and constructive work to be undertaken by the state in Taiwan and eventually the mainland. Take, for example, the issue of elderly care. "Supplement" cited the loosening of "patriarchal family system," the rise of the nuclear family—which put less emphasis on the roles of grandparents—and widespread unemployment of older people in the machine age as causes for the plight of the elderly. To make matters worse, the communists allegedly promoted patricide and forced family members to struggle against one another, thus widening further the gap between the elderly and their technically adept, urbanized offspring. The GMD's task was to rekindle "the Chinese people's innate love for their family." Having stressed the GMD's role as the custodian of China's Confucian tradition, the "Supplement" turned abruptly to pensions and aged care homes. It envisioned broad provisions of pensions for workers in both the public and private sectors and aged care facilities for the homeless in every county and city.⁴⁵ Taken together, the first of the two supplementary chapters read like a blueprint of a welfare state for an industrializing society, with ample, colorful dose of anti-communist rhetoric and perfunctory nods to Confucianism.

This medley of distinct philosophical and political traditions suggests that the text was a result of composite authorship, although it leaves little to no doubt that Tao was responsible for execution. Tao, unlike the likes of Dai Jitao, had little investment in Confucianism and Chinese traditions. His bookshelf in the 1950s featured works of US-based sociologists such as Karl Mannheim and Pitirim Sorokin. As a Protestant Christian, Tao also read theologian Louis Berkhof. Confucian classics were conspicuous by their absence.⁴⁶ This indifference toward China's putative national essence diverged from the GMD's position, embraced by Chiang, that Sun was the intellectual inheritor of China's heritage that began with Confucius and Mencius. While Chiang Kai-shek was also a Christian, the generalissimo had always accorded a strong Confucian tinge to the state he led and, more remarkably, did not share Tao's materialist epistemology. This tension between Tao's own intellectual disposition and the party-state's apparent Confucian obsession was apparent in Chiang's comments on his subordinate's drafts. Having read the first draft of "Supplement," Chiang requested major revisions. "The chapter on *le* was very weak," Chiang bemoaned in his diary. Given Tao's materialist outlook, it is not surprising that he was not conversant in what Dai cryptically called "beautiful enjoyment." Chiang instructed Tao to expand the *le* chapter with a focus on the humanistic and martial arts (*wen, wuyi*). Under both categories, discussion was to begin with the Six Arts (*liuyi*)—Confucian education for men in imperial China—and move on to modern art forms. Humanistic arts, thus, encompassed not only poetry and *go*, a refined chess-like strategy board game, but also film and radio. As for sustainment of the living and disposal of the dead, Chiang continued, discussion should reference "ancient system" (*gushi zhidu*).⁴⁷ Tao paid little more than lip service to Chiang's exhortation. The *le* chapter in the "Supplement" followed the pattern in the *yu* chapter. It, too, put emphasis on concrete steps the regime would take to address challenges brought about by industrial capitalism. Water conservation, forestry, and urban parks were identified as critical to a "healthy and happy environment," even though they had at best a tenuous connection to the humanistic arts or Confucian values Chiang championed. Rivers, lakes, and woods, while lauded for contributing to the nation's beauty purportedly cherished through generations, were prized as much for the very concrete goals such as ensuring soil conservation and supply of clean drinking water as their contribution to enjoyment and spiritual well-being. The rationale for the building of urban parks was Sun Yat-sen's land equalization principle, rather than anything particularly Confucian or ancient. Private ownership of urban spaces should be put under check and parks built, along with children's playgrounds and sports fields, for

public enjoyment. Even discussion of literature and music, supposedly spiritual components of *minsheng*, followed the pattern described above. Modern cultural industry, Tao had Chiang remark, meant commercialization of literature and music. Against “yellowbacks”—profitable reading materials and equivalents in music and film—the communists proffered “Red propaganda” through the very means that the Nationalist state counted upon to edify the masses and reignite in them, however fleetingly, China’s glorious literary and musical memories. It became imperative for the state to make these arts widely and affordably available to citizens, with infrastructure such as theaters and opera houses in major cities.⁴⁸

This remarkably measure-driven approach to promoting “health and happiness,” as the official English translation of the text rendered *le*, found echoes in exegeses on the renewed canon. Such observation was reinforced in a catechism written for high-school students. The author Cheng Jingfu, a literary editor and writer, committed his career to vanquishing “Red” literature and promoting “liberal democratic” ones. He cited *La Marseillaise* at the French Revolution as a fine example of how the people could be inspired to fight an enemy without swords and other weaponry.⁴⁹ Yet, when explaining the *le* principle to young readers, Cheng followed Tao’s discussion of building public facilities—woods and rivers, sports fields, children playgrounds. He privileged, like Tao, provisions to urban dwellers (*shimin*) and facilities agreeable to children’s bodies and hearts (*yishen yixin*).⁵⁰ The message had consistently been that outlets for relieving the urban population of stress from factory or office discipline were vital measures to fulfill the goals of *minsheng*, at least insofar as furthering citizens’ happiness was concerned. Simply put, the two chapters of “Supplement” constituted a blueprint for building a robust welfare state to soften the blow of capitalist urbanization. It laid out measures that, along with land reform and other initiatives undertaken by Nationalist technocrats, were symptomatic of what Bruce Cumings identifies as East Asian developmental state, with its emphasis on mass education and state-coordinated industrialization and appeal to the nation’s cultural essence.⁵¹

Conclusion

As a text produced in the aftermath of the Korean War, thanks to which the GMD could expect US guarantee of its military hold on Taiwan, “Supplement” displayed remarkable continuities and permutations in the party-state’s self-identity. A corporatist approach to industrialization, animosity against class

struggle, and primacy of a state staffed by technocrats remained at the core of the GMD's vision for nation building and its claim to offer an alternative to both liberal capitalism and revolutionary socialism. At the same time, the party's diminished and precarious geopolitical existence as a virtual protectorate of Washington allowed, if not compelled, Chiang to shift his government's military focus to one that privileged industrial development and the construction of a welfare state. This subtle but significant change was underscored by the materialist turn of *minsheng*. Instead of emphasizing the incendiary and idealist urges in Sun's ideology, "Supplement" "completed" *minsheng* by listing a set of initiatives that complemented and rationalized Taiwan's anticipated urbanization. Instead of providing a superior alternative to capitalist modernity, the ultimate goal of the conservative revolution promised concrete benefits such as jobs, pensions, compulsory education, childcare, and care for the elderly. That this shift paralleled much of East Asia and Europe was unsurprising given larger Cold War rivalries between the "free world" and the socialist bloc.

This chapter traces the transwar legacy the GMD state carried from mainland China to Taiwan. While its primary focus is on the Chinese Civil War, trends that solidified in the 1950s were transnational as the United States and Britain designed arrangements after the Pacific War, with American military hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region as their cardinal goal. Chiang reconciled himself to the "Cold War reconfiguration," as Wang Hui calls it, at the 1943 Cairo Conference.⁵² His deference to the United States set the tone of *minsheng* and of Taiwan's developments in the 1950s and beyond. Indeed, the few years from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until the incremental hardening of Cold War dichotomies in the 1950s saw the conservative revolution that informed the party-state being reduced from overseeing a continental-size country to perching on Taiwan and a few small archipelagoes thanks to US military and economic might. This dramatic decline in the GMD's fortunes resulted in a change not just of scale but of the nature of the nationalist revolution (*guomin geming*) the party led. Just as the GMD ideological commitments changed under the Cold War order, so did the nature of the arguably unfinished Chinese Civil War, as revolutionary mobilization increasingly gave way to competing modes of state-driven economic development. With Chiang Kai-shek's demise, military "recovery" of mainland China faded from the GMD agenda. As ROC president, Chiang Ching-kuo oversaw a détente between the two rival Chinese governments, pitching Taiwan—under the banner of the Three People's Principles—as a successful model of industrial modernization against mainland China, which was recovering from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Taiwan

was presented as a land of material abundance and an economy well connected with those of Japan, North America, and Europe, qualities which the Chinese communists under Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) were themselves pursuing. The Three People's Principles gave thin cover to the capitalist, urban modernity the GMD celebrated in the late twentieth century, despite Sun's rejection of capitalism in his *minsheng* speeches. As the GMD's influence on Taiwan politics waxed and waned since the 1990s, the Three People's Principles, along with the intellectual labor invested into *minsheng*, gradually faded from public memory. While the party itself remains a political force to this day, the GMD has all but abandoned any pretense to offer a mode of social formation different from the one that has prevailed with the end of the Cold War.

Notes

- 1 Chen Yunqian, *Chongbai yu jiyi: Sun Zhongshan fuhao de jian'gou yu chuanbo* (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chuabshe, 2009).
- 2 Perri Johanna Strawn, "Teaching Nationalism in the Crucible: Changing Identities in Taiwan High Schools after Martial Law" (PhD diss., Yale University, 1999), 241.
- 3 The Guomintang produced official English translation of its core texts. The translator of *Three People's Principles* was the Presbyterian missionary Frank W. Price, who also translated many of Chiang's speeches during the war of resistance against Japan and assisted in jurist Wang Chonghui's translation of *China's Destiny*. Unless otherwise stated, this chapter cites official translations, with minor stylistic changes, where they are available.
- 4 Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan no seiji: Chūka Minkoku Taiwan-ka no sengoshi* (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2008). A Chinese translation came out in Taiwan in 2014.
- 5 Brian Tsui, *China's Conservative Revolution: The Quest for a New Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- 6 Tehyun Ma, "Making Taiwan Chinese, 1945–60," in *Routledge Handbook of Revolutionary China*, ed. Alan Baumler (London: Routledge, 2019), 204–9.
- 7 Jennifer Liu, "Indoctrinating the Youth: Guomintang Policy on Secondary Education in Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937–1960" (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2010), 114–23.
- 8 Feng-Huang Ying, "Reassessing Taiwan's Literary Field of the 1950s" (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2000), 26–9.
- 9 Qu Wanwen, *Taiwan zhanhou jingji fazhan de yuanqi: houjin fazhan de weihe yu ruhe* (Taipei: Lianjing, 2017), 87–8; Julia C. Strauss, "Campaigns of

- Redistribution: Land Reform and State Building in China and Taiwan, 1950–1953,” in *States in the Developing World*, ed. Miguel A. Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 335–54.
- 10 Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People* (Chungking: Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, 1943), 419–31.
- 11 Margherita Zanasi, *Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Brenda Sansom, “‘Minsheng’ and National Liberation: Socialist Theory in the Guomindang, 1919–1931” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1988).
- 12 Sun, *San Min Chu I*, 364.
- 13 Cui Shuqin, *Sanmin zhuyi xinlun* (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1987), 255. This book was first published in January 1945, before Japan surrendered to the Allies, when full-fledged hostilities between the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party were supposed to be manageable for national unity’s sake.
- 14 Lü Fangshang, *Jiang Zhongzheng xiansheng nianpu changbian*, vol. 10 (Taipei: Guoshiguan, Guoli Zhongzheng jiniantang guanlichu and Caituan faren Zhongzheng wenjiao jijin hui, 2015), 61–2.
- 15 Rebecca E. Karl, “‘Serve the People’: An Exemplary Chinese Socialist Text of 1944,” in *Reading the Postwar Future: Textual Turning Points from 1944*, ed. Kirrily Freeman and John Munro (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 221.
- 16 Cui, *Sanmin zhuyi xinlun*, 272–3.
- 17 Sun, *San Min Chu I*, 441.
- 18 Cui, *Sanmin zhuyi xinlun*, 258.
- 19 Chiang Kai-shek, *Zongtong Jianggong sixiang yanlun zongji*, vol. 25, 113–14, http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=categories&id=103&Itemid=256 (accessed April 15, 2020).
- 20 Cui, *Sanmin zhuyi xinlun*, 262.
- 21 Chiang, *Zongtong Jianggong sixiang yanlun zongji*, vol. 25, 143.
- 22 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, 47–9.
- 23 Chen Cheng, *Land Reform in Taiwan* (Taipei: China Publishing, 1961), xiii, 1–17.
- 24 Tsui, *China’s Conservative Revolution*, 37–9.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 42. Official English translation of “Supplement” rendered *yu* and *le* as “national fecundity, social welfare and education” and “health and happiness,” respectively. The translator opted not to decide on individual English words to encapsulate the meaning of the two Chinese characters but simply list items discussed under the two categories, belying the myriad meanings of *yu* and *le*. Underscoring the ambiguity of the two terms, this chapter adopts pinyin transliteration throughout.
- 26 Dai Jitao, *Sun Wen zhuyi zhi zhexue de jichu* (1925; reprint, Taipei: Zhongyang gaizao weiyuanhui wenwu gongying chu, 1951), 15.

- 27 Ibid., 21, 54.
- 28 Marie-Claire Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 381–2.
- 29 Lin Yutang, “Introduction,” in Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, trans. Wang Chung-hui (New York: Macmillan, 1947), viii–x.
- 30 Philip Jaffe, “The Secret of *China's Destiny*,” in *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory* (New York: Roy, 1947), 19.
- 31 Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, trans. Wang Chung-hui (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 228–34.
- 32 Liu Xiuru, *Sanmin zhuyi jiaocheng* (Chongqing: Zhengzhong shuju, 1943), 301.
- 33 Ibid., 301–4.
- 34 Chiang, *China's Destiny*, 235; Chiang, *San Min Chu I*, 215.
- 35 Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 353.
- 36 Arif Dirlik, *Culture and History in Postrevolutionary China: The Perspective of Global Modernity* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011), 69; “T'ao Hsi-sheng: The Social Limits of Change,” in *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China*, ed. Charlotte Furth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 305–31.
- 37 Tao Tailai and Tao Jinsheng, *Tao Xisheng nianbiao* (Taipei: Lianjing, 2017), 293.
- 38 Tao Xisheng, *Chaoliu yu diandi* (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1964), 204; Dirlik, “T'ao Hsi-sheng,” 305n1.
- 39 Tao Jinsheng, *Tao Xisheng riji: Zhongguo minguo lizu Tai, Peng, Jin, Ma de lishi jianzheng*, vol. 2 (Taipei: Lianjing, 2014).
- 40 Lü, *Jiang Zhongzheng xiansheng nianpu changbian*, 120–220.
- 41 Nick Cullather, “‘Fuel for the Good Dragon’: The United States and Industrial Policy in Taiwan, 1950–1965,” *Diplomatic History* 20 (1996): 1–8. Tao himself was also reportedly interested in referencing postwar experiments undertaken in Western countries in his formulation of *minsheng*, with a view to finding a “third way” (Tao and Tao, *Tao Xisheng nianbiao*, 292).
- 42 Zanasi, *Saving the Nation*.
- 43 Chiang, *San Min Chu I*, 216.
- 44 Ibid., 218–19.
- 45 Ibid., 250–4.
- 46 Dirlik, “T'ao Hsi-sheng,” 325; Tao, *Tao Xisheng riji*, 606, 612.
- 47 Lü, *Jiang Zhongzheng xiansheng nianpu changbian*, 196.
- 48 Chiang, *San Min Chu I*, 294–306.
- 49 Ying Fenghuang, *Wuling niandai wenxue chuban xianying* (Taipei County: Taibei xian wenhua ju, 2006), 3–4.
- 50 Cheng Jingfu, *Sanmin zhuyi zhi lilun ji shiti jieda* (Taipei: Banyue wenyi she, 1957), 69.

- 51 Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 88–92.
- 52 Wang Hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 243–60. Wang pivots his discussion on Okinawa or the Ryukyus but makes a much more significant argument on the Cairo Conference as an “omen” of the Cold War.