

1 Running: Social Norms & Renewable Energy Transition

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4 Effects of perceived social norms on support for renewable energy transition:

5 Moderation by national culture and environmental risks

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1 **Title:** Effects of perceived social norms on support for renewable energy transition:
2 Moderation by national culture and environmental risks

3 **Abstract**

4 Transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources is indispensable to the achievement
5 of carbon-neutral targets in climate change mitigation. Such transition not only requires
6 policy changes and technological advances but also hinges on individuals' actions and
7 support. Accordingly, there is a pressing need to engage the public in renewable energy
8 transition. In this pre-registered study, we examined the effects of perceived descriptive
9 norms and injunctive norms on people's support for renewable energy transition among 31
10 European countries. Importantly, we compared how the strength of such effects varied
11 between the countries with different cultures and levels of environmental risks. With data
12 from the ECHOES international survey, we found that the two perceived social norms were
13 positively related to support for renewable energy transition, and these positive associations
14 were stronger among countries with higher levels of individualism and cultural tightness, or
15 lower levels of air pollution and vulnerability to climate change risks. Overall, although these
16 observations are contrary to our hypotheses developed based on the cross-cultural psychology
17 literature, they speak of the imperative for researchers and practitioners to acknowledge that
18 the behavioral influence of social norms in the energy domain is sensitive to contextual
19 factors.

20

21 **Keywords:** Perceived descriptive norms, perceived injunctive norms, renewable energy,
22 cultures, environmental risks, cross-national comparisons

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1. Introduction

Tackling global climate change requires substantial reduction of carbon emissions. Some states have pledged commitment in this regard. For example, the European Union recently submitted a more ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC, aiming at “at least 55%” net reduction of domestic emissions below 1990 levels by 2030. Similarly, China proposed to update its NDC and commit to a net-zero “before 2060” target. Japan also aims to become carbon-neutral by 2050.

To meet the reduction targets, transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources is key, and such transition requires policy changes and technological advances. Notably, its effectiveness also hinges on individuals’ actions, such as their own way of using energy and support for energy policies (Creutzig et al., 2016; Gram-Hanssen, 2013; Stern, 2020). How to motivate members of the public to support renewable energy transition is therefore a pressing issue.

From the studies crossing various social science disciplines, social norms are known to be one of the strongest predictors of pro-environmental behavior (Farrow et al., 2017; Thøgersen, 2006). Research has also shown that social norm-based messages and interventions in general generate positive results (Cialdini & Jacobson, 2021; for meta-analyses, see Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; Bergquist et al., 2019; Farrow et al., 2017). Similar findings have been obtained in the energy domain (e.g., Allcott, 2011; Bonan et al., 2020).

Remarkably, recent studies have shown that the predictive power of many known antecedents of pro-environmental behavior, values (Chan, 2020), environmental concern (e.g., Chan & Tam, 2021; Eom et al., 2016; Tam & Chan, 2017), or social dominance orientation (Milfont et al., 2018) significantly vary across social and cultural contexts (Milfont & Markowitz, 2016; for reviews, see Tam et al., 2021; Tam & Milfont, 2020). These studies

1 together have called for a comparative, person-context approach to the study of human
2 responses to environmental problems. That is, to answer the question as to how energy-
3 related behavioral change can be promoted in the general public, scientists must explicitly
4 recognize the possibility of cross-national or cross-cultural variability of pathways to these
5 behaviors. This recognition has yet to be fully achieved in the study of the behavioral effects
6 of social norms, however, mainly due to the lack of large-scale international data in this
7 respect (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Eom et al., 2016; Tam & Milfont, 2020). Addressing this
8 void, the present investigation offers the direly needed comparison of the effects of social
9 norms on energy-related behavior across 31 societies. In particular, we adopted the data from
10 the ECHOES project – a cross-national research project aimed to provide in-depth insights
11 into individual and collective energy-related choices among European countries (Reichl et al.,
12 2019).

13 **1.1 The Role of Social Norms on Energy-Related Behavior**

14 Social norms impact a wide range of behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991), including
15 behaviors that can address environmental problems (Farrow et al., 2017; Thøgersen, 2006).
16 Researchers have theorized two distinct types of social norms--descriptive social norms and
17 injunctive social norms—that serve different motivations (Cialdini et al., 1991; Thøgersen,
18 2006). This distinction is widely accepted both in the study of pro-environmental behavior in
19 general, and in energy-related behavior specifically. The two types of norms are usually
20 operationalized in terms of people’s subjective perceptions and expectations.

21 The role of descriptive and injunctive social norms on human behavior is elaborated
22 in the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991). Descriptive norms
23 shape behavior by informing individuals which action is deemed to be prevalent (and thus
24 adaptive) in a situation. In the environmental domain, research has consistently shown that

1 individuals who perceive a pro-environmental behavior to be prevalent among others,
2 compared to those who do not, are more likely to engage in the behavior. For example, in a
3 recent meta-analysis based on over 30 effect sizes, Geiger et al. (2019) found a large effect in
4 the association between descriptive norms and recycling. In terms of energy-related behavior,
5 Chen et al. (2016) found that stronger perceived descriptive norms of sustainable behavior
6 were related to university students' stronger intention to adopt solar water heaters and drive
7 alternative fuel vehicles in the future. Wang et al. (2019) also found a positive relationship
8 between perceived descriptive norms and electricity conservation behavior in the workplace.
9 Other studies revealed that perceived descriptive norms were related to stronger perceived
10 energy-saving responsibility, which in turn was related to stronger intention to save energy
11 (e.g., Fornara et al., 2016). Notably, interventions that highlight the prevalence of a pro-
12 environmental behavior are generally effective in bringing positive behavioral change in the
13 audience (for meta-analysis studies, see Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; Bergquist et al., 2019;
14 Farrow et al., 2017), including energy-related behavior (e.g., Dwyer et al., 2015; Schultz et
15 al., 2008).

16 Injunctive norms refer to the perception of what other people approve or disapprove
17 (Cialdini et al., 1990). Injunctive norms motivate behavior by suggesting the prospect of
18 rewards or sanctions by other people. In the environmental domain, individuals who perceive
19 more social approval towards a pro-environmental behavior are more likely to adopt it. For
20 example, Barth et al. (2016) found that injunctive norms, independently from descriptive
21 norms, significantly predicted individuals' acceptance of electric vehicles. Chen and Knight
22 (2014) also found a positive relationship between perceived injunctive norms and energy-
23 saving behavior intention in the workplace. In terms of behavioral interventions, researchers
24 have observed that a combination of injunctive and descriptive norm messages effectively
25 reduce people's energy consumption (Allcott, 2011; Bonan et al., 2020; Schultz et al., 2008).

1 Meta-analysis studies also suggest that injunctive norms-based interventions are effective in
2 inducing pro-environmental behavior change (e.g., Bergquist et al., 2019).

3 **1.2 Research Gap: Comparison of the Effects of Social Norms across Societies**

4 As noted earlier, recent studies have shown that the predictive power of factors behind
5 pro-environmental behavior typically varies across societies (Chan, 2020; Chan & Tam, 2021;
6 Milfont & Markowitz, 2016; Tam & Chan, 2017; Tam & Milfont, 2020). These findings
7 together call for a comparative approach that takes into account both the role of persons and
8 the role of contexts for the study of human responses to environmental problems. A
9 comparison of effects of social norms across countries or cultures, which we attempt to offer
10 in the present study, should fittingly echo this call.

11 In the study of pro-environmental behavior, the possibility that the predictive power
12 of the two types of norms varies across societies has rarely been tested, however. Most
13 studies on the association between social norms and pro-environmental behavior were single-
14 country (Bamberg & Möser, 2007). In only a few exceptions, a comparison between two or a
15 small number of countries was conducted. Ando et al. (2007) compared the effects of
16 subjective norms (a specific form of social norms that refers to perceptions of a behavior's
17 prevalence and approval by close and significant others) and descriptive norms on three
18 behaviors between Japan and the United States. Another study by Ando and colleagues
19 (Ando et al., 2010) compared the effects of subjective norms on individual and collective pro-
20 environmental behaviors between Japanese and Germans. Arvola et al. (2008) compared the
21 effects of subjective norms on organic food consumption across Finland, Italy, and the United
22 Kingdom. Eom et al. (2016) compared the effect of descriptive norms between a Japanese
23 sample and an American sample. Most recently, Joanes et al. (2020) tested the effects of

1 subjective norms on personal clothing consumption in five developed countries (Germany,
2 Poland, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom).

3 These exceptional studies have documented some significant but inconsistent cross-
4 national differences in the predictive power of social norms. However, it is challenging, if not
5 impossible, to pinpoint the exact driver(s) behind any observed differences. Although the
6 countries in most of these studies were carefully selected by the authors on some conceptual
7 grounds (e.g., individualistic culture versus collectivistic culture), the effect of culture on the
8 observed cross-national differences can only be assumed rather than empirically
9 demonstrated, as culture was not explicitly measured (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).

10 To truly compare the strength of association between social norms and pro-
11 environmental behavior across countries, first of all, a dataset with a standardized set of
12 variables (including the two types of social norms and behaviors), as well as representative
13 samples of respondents from a sizable number of countries, is required. In addition, indicators
14 of the hypothesized contextual factors (e.g., individualism-collectivism) are needed. With
15 these data, multilevel analysis can be performed, wherein the effects of the various contextual
16 factors on the between-country variability of the norms-behavior associations can be modeled
17 (Tam & Milfont, 2020; Tam & Chan, 2017). The present investigation follows this suggested
18 approach. More specifically, using a combined dataset with country-level indicators and
19 individual-level responses from a 31-country survey, the present study empirically examines
20 the extent to which the strength of the associations between the two types of norms and
21 people's support for the renewable energy transition varies across the countries, and explains
22 the observed variations, if any, with reference to theoretically derived contextual factors.

23 **1.3 Hypotheses**

1 That the strength of social normative influence varies across situations and contexts
2 has been widely recognized in social psychology and cross-cultural psychology (Gelfand et
3 al., 2017). The focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990; 1991) states that
4 social norms are influential only when they fall into or are brought into one's attentional
5 focus, which, in turn, is situation and context dependent. Savani et al. (2015) put forward the
6 same norms-different adherence motivation account, which states that even when the content
7 of social norms is similar across two cultures, there could still be cultural differences in
8 behavior because of cultural differences in the strength of people's motivation to conform to
9 social norms. In the domain of pro-environmental behavior, there have been some
10 preliminary findings showing between-country variations in the association between social
11 norms and behavior (e.g., Ando et al., 2007; Eom et al., 2016). We thus have the two
12 following hypotheses.

13 H1: Perceived descriptive norms has a positive association with support for renewable
14 energy transition, and the strength of this association varies across countries.

15 H2: Perceived injunctive norms has a positive association with support for renewable
16 energy transition, and the strength of this association varies across countries.

17 We propose to explain the hypothesized cross-national variations through two perspectives:
18 cultural emphasis of norm-compliance, and exposure of environmental risks.

19 ***1.3.1 Culture: Individualism-collectivism and tightness-looseness***

20 The first perspective concerns the influence of culture on norm compliance.
21 Specifically, the individualism-collectivism dimension is relevant to the understanding of
22 normative influence as it represents how members in a culture see their relationship with
23 other people (Hofstede et al., 2010). In individualist cultures, there is a clear boundary
24 between the self and others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Individuals are encouraged to

1 pursue personal agency and goals. Consistency between one's personal views and behavior is
2 also expected and valued. On the contrary, in collectivistic cultures, there is a more
3 permeable boundary between the self and others. Behavior is largely determined by shared
4 goals, social roles, and social obligations. It is desirable to prioritize collective goals over
5 personal goals. People are also expected to behave according to context; thus, inconsistency
6 between one's personal views and behaviors, and inconsistency across situations, is
7 acceptable (Suh et al., 2002).

8 Empirical studies have found support for the role of individualism-collectivism. For
9 example, the seminal meta-analysis by Bond and Smith (1996) demonstrated that conformity
10 to group norms was stronger among countries with higher levels of collectivism (or lower
11 levels of individualism). Savani et al. (2015) found that individuals from India, a supposedly
12 collectivistic society, were more responsive to normative cues than Americans, whose culture
13 is supposedly individualistic. Similarly, Eom et al. (2016) found that perceived prevalence of
14 environmentally friendly behaviors among members of society was predictive of the pro-
15 environmental choice of products only among Japanese participants (supposedly collectivistic)
16 but not American participants.

17 Another possible cultural factor that determines the emphasis of norm compliance in a
18 society is cultural tightness-looseness. The recent works by Gelfand and colleagues (Gelfand
19 et al., 2011; Gelfand et al., 2017) showed that due to different socio-ecological features (e.g.,
20 ecological threat, population density), societies differ in terms of the strength of social norms
21 and sanctioning of deviant behavior. Tight cultures are characterized by strong, pervasive
22 social norms, and afford a restricted range of appropriate behavior. In these cultures,
23 individuals tend to enact behavior that is characteristics of conformity. By contrast, loose
24 cultures have weak norms and afford a high tolerance of individuals' discretion (Gelfand et
25 al., 2006). Cultural tightness-looseness thus is expected to influence how much people adhere

1 to social norms when making behavioral decisions. Supporting this view, Siemens et al.
2 (2020) found that their Korean participants adhered more to descriptive norm messages on
3 donation requests than their American counterparts did. The authors attributed such observed
4 differences to the higher cultural tightness in Korea than in the United States. Also, in tight
5 cultures, variations in personalities and innovation are smaller, whereas conformity and
6 sanctions of deviance are stronger (Uz, 2015).

7 Based on the above discussion, we expect the strength of the association between
8 social norms and support for renewable energy transition to be stronger among countries with
9 a stronger cultural emphasis on norm-compliance (i.e., higher collectivism and tightness). We
10 thus have the following two hypotheses.

11 H3: The relationship between perceived descriptive norms and pro-environmental
12 behavior is stronger among societies with a higher cultural emphasis on norm
13 compliance.

14 H4: The relationship between perceived injunctive norms and pro-environmental
15 behavior is stronger among societies with a higher cultural emphasis on norm
16 compliance.

17 It is noteworthy that these hypothesized effects are not consistent with some recent
18 meta-analytic findings. In their meta-analysis of social norms-based field experiments,
19 Bergquist et al. (2019) observed that normative interventions actually had a stronger effect on
20 behavioral change in more individualistic countries, which was contrary to their expectation.
21 In a meta-analysis on theory of planned behavior in the environmental domain, Morren and
22 Grinstein (2016) hypothesized that subjective norms would have a stronger association with
23 pro-environmental intention and behavior in collectivistic countries; yet, they did not observe
24 such an effect. It remains doubtful as to how reliable these meta-analytic findings are, as both

1 groups of authors cautioned that their meta-analytic findings are limited because the studies
2 meta-analyzed came from a concentrated range of countries. For example, in Morren and
3 Grinstein's (2016) analysis on the subjective norms-behavioral intention link, only three of
4 the nineteen countries compared were collectivistic.

5 ***1.3.2 Environmental risks***

6 Our second perspective focuses on the role of environmental risks. The impacts of
7 environmental problems such as climate change are unevenly distributed across geographical
8 regions (Althor et al., 2016; Arnell et al., 2016). Some countries are more exposed to such
9 impacts than other countries. For example, the Global Climate Risk Index (Greenwatch, 2018)
10 revealed that death tolls and economic losses attributable to extreme weather events vary
11 hugely across continents and countries. Even within Europe, some countries (e.g., France)
12 face stronger climate risks than do others (e.g., Sweden). Because of differences in coping
13 and adaptive capacities (e.g., environmental governance, public health infrastructure),
14 countries facing similar levels of risks may be vulnerable to the impacts of environmental
15 problems to different degrees (Adger et al., 2005). However, it is yet to be understood
16 whether the level of environmental risks a country faces has any implications on its citizens'
17 compliance with social norms when they respond to environmental problems.

18 We refer to the threat management function of social norms to address this issue.
19 Conformity to social norms helps individuals cope with existential threats (Fritsche et al.,
20 2010; Gelfand et al., 2011). When a group faces a threat, be it ecological (e.g., natural
21 disasters) and human-made (e.g., wars and conflicts), social coordination is essential in the
22 service of individual and collective survival. For example, when there is an outbreak of
23 infectious disease, the risk of infection can be reduced when all members of the society
24 follow the suggested disease-preventive practices shared in the group. Similarly, to survive a

1 natural disaster, people must cooperate with each other in terms of sharing coping resources
2 (e.g., food, shelter) and recovering from the aftermaths (e.g., rebuilding a community). Norm
3 compliance by individual group members should be able to facilitate such social coordination
4 in the group (Baumeister, 2005). Research findings have indeed shown that when a threat is
5 brought to people's attention, stronger emphasis on norm compliance and more negative
6 evaluations of social deviants typically result (Gelfand et al., 2017). Also, cross-nationally,
7 cultural emphasis on conformity to norms and intolerance of deviance is stronger in countries
8 facing more natural disasters (e.g., Oishi & Komiya, 2017), prevalence of diseases or
9 pathogens (e.g., Murray et al., 2011), harsh climate (e.g., Van de Vliert, 2013), or territorial
10 conflicts with neighboring countries (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011).

11 Undeniably, environmental problems pose an existential threat to individuals and
12 groups (Fritsche et al., 2012). For example, pollution and resource depletion could put a
13 strain on food, water, or energy security in some countries. With respect to climate change,
14 continuing sea-level rise threatens coastal communities and islandic countries around the
15 world. In some extreme cases, such as Kiribati, an entire country is going to disappear (Weiss,
16 2015). Environmental problems (e.g., air pollution) can cause severe health problems and
17 premature deaths. A recent paper by Parncutt (2019) estimated that every 1,000 tonnes of
18 carbon burned would result in one future premature death. Based on the threat management
19 function of social norms, we hypothesize that the association between social norms and
20 support for the renewable energy transition would be stronger in countries facing higher risks
21 of environmental problems. We refer to climate change risks and air pollution in the present
22 study, as these issues are closely relevant to the burning of fossil fuels (versus the use of
23 green energy).

24 H5: The relationship between perceived descriptive norms and pro-pro-environmental
25 behavior is stronger among societies with higher levels of environmental risks.

1 H6: The relationship between perceived injunctive norms and pro-pro-environmental
2 behavior is stronger among societies with higher levels of environmental risks.

3 We acknowledge that the two types of social norms are distinct from each other and
4 influence pro-environmental behavioral decisions via different psychological mechanisms.
5 However, few studies have compared whether the behavioral influences of the two types of
6 social norms are similar or different between societal and cultural contexts. For example,
7 cross-cultural psychology studies have elaborately investigated the influence of cultural
8 factors (e.g., individualism-collectivism) on normative considerations; yet, these studies
9 seldom differentiate the role of perceived descriptive norms from that of perceived injunctive
10 norms. We contend that the theories and findings discussed earlier apply to both types of
11 normative influence; that is, perceived descriptive norms (normative information) and
12 perceived injunctive norms (normative approval) could both be important in guiding
13 behavioral decisions in societal contexts with stronger cultural emphasis on norm-compliance
14 and environmental risks. We thus derive a similar set of hypotheses for the two types of
15 social norms.

16 **1.4 Overview of the Present Study**

17 To test the above hypotheses, we referred to two levels of data. The first level
18 involved individual-level data that had a representative sample of participant collective from
19 multiple countries. We adopted the ECHOES International Survey (Reichl et al., 2019),
20 which covered 31 European countries. The second level involved country-level data that
21 captured the characteristics of a country in terms of individualism-collectivism, cultural
22 tightness-looseness, and exposure of environmental risks associated with climate change and
23 air pollution. We compiled this country-level data from the cross-cultural psychology
24 literature (e.g., Hofstede et al., 2010; Uz, 2015) and multiple public databases (e.g.,
25 Greenwatch, World Bank).

2. Method

2.1 Individual-level data

2.1.1 Participants

We adopted the ECHOES International Survey data (Reichl et al., 2019). This survey was administered in 2018 and aimed to recruit nationally representative samples. In total, the data consisted of 18,037 participants from 31 European countries. In the original design of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to respond to group-based questions that referred to either the municipality (N = 5,919), the country (N = 6,007), or Europe (N = 6,111). As we did not have an apriori assumption about how the effect of social norms would differ between the three levels, we used the pooled sample in all our analyses.

2.1.2 Measures

Support for renewable energy transition. We identified two items that captured people's support for renewable energy transition. The first item captured people's intention to use energy in a way that would benefit the transition ("I intend to use energy in a way that helps bringing the transition to a renewable energy"). The second item captured people's support for energy policies that would encourage the transition ("I would accept energy policies that protect the environment even when these induce higher costs (e.g., policies that increase the prices of fossil fuels)"). Respondents reported on a 5-point scale for each item. We created an average score based on the two items to capture people's overall support for renewable energy transition (Spearman-Brown's $\rho = .52$; standardized Cronbach's $\alpha = .68$).

Perceived descriptive norms. We identified two items that captured perceived descriptive norms of supporting renewable energy transition. The first item captured perceived descriptive norms of energy-saving behavior: "A growing number of people in [group] try to save energy (e.g., using public transport instead of a personal car, turning off

1 lights when leaving the room, using technical appliances which help to save energy).” The
2 second item captured perceived descriptive norms of support for renewable energy transition
3 policy: “A growing number of people in [group] favor energy policies that support the energy
4 transition.” For each item, the [group] would be replaced by either “my municipality,” “the
5 country I live in,” or “the EU.” Respondents reported on a 5-point scale for each item (1 =
6 strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). We computed an average score of perceived
7 descriptive norms based on the two items (Spearman-Brown’s $\rho = .57$; standardized
8 Cronbach’s $\alpha = .74$).

9 *Perceived injunctive norms.* We identified two items that captured perceived
10 injunctive norms. The first item captured perceived injunctive norms of energy-saving
11 behavior: “Many people in [group] would support it if I used less energy.” The second item
12 captured perceived injunctive norms of support for renewable energy transition policy: “Man
13 people in [group] would support it if I favored energy policies that support the energy
14 transition.” For each item, the [group] would be replaced by either “my municipality,” “the
15 country I live in,” or “the EU.” Respondents reported on a 5-point scale for each item (1 =
16 strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). We computed an average score of perceived
17 injunctive norms based on the two items (Spearman-Brown’s $\rho = .47$; standardized
18 Cronbach’s $\alpha = .66$).

19 *Demographic variables.* We included demographic variables as the covariates in our
20 analyses. These variables include gender, age (1 = 18-34 years, 2 = 35-44 years, 3 = 45-54
21 years, and 4 = 55 years or above), education level: 1 = elementary or secondary school, 2 =
22 professional training (practical skills), 3 = A-levels (qualification for university), and 4 =
23 university or college degree, and household’s monthly net income (1 = less than 1st quartile-
24 income threshold, 2 = between 1st quartile and the median, 3 = between median and the 3rd
25 quartile, 4 = between 3rd quartile and 90th percentile, 5 = higher than 90th percentile).

1 **2.2 Societal-level data**

2 2.2.1 Measures

3 *Individualism-collectivism.* We adopted the cultural individualism-collectivism index
4 from Hofstede et al. (2010). This index has been widely used in previous studies that
5 compared the cross-national differences in the relationship between environment-related
6 constructs (e.g., Chan, 2020; Eom et al., 2016). A higher score represented a higher level of
7 individualism (or lower level of collectivism).

8 *Cultural tightness-looseness.* We adopted the cultural tightness-looseness index from
9 Uz's (2015) 68-country study. This index has been used in past studies in the cross-cultural
10 environmental psychology literature as well (e.g., Tam & Chan, 2017). A higher score
11 indicated a higher level of cultural looseness (or lower level of tightness).

12 *Air pollution.* We adopted the level of PM_{2.5} exposure (mg per cubic meter) as a proxy
13 of air pollution exposure to individuals (World Bank, 2020), as previous studies on air
14 pollution revealed that PM_{2.5} was related to reduced physical health (e.g., Burnett et al., 2018).
15 Studies also estimated that around 74% to 81% of the European urban population was
16 exposed to PM_{2.5} at a level that exceeds the World Health Organization air quality guideline
17 (Sicard et al., 2021). The European Environmental Agency also reported that in 2015, about
18 83% of air pollution-related death was attributable to PM_{2.5} (European Environmental Agency,
19 2018). We thus considered PM_{2.5} as an appropriate proxy of air pollution. We log-
20 transformed the original index to reduce the level of skewness and kurtosis of the data, with
21 higher scores indicating higher levels of air pollution exposure.

22 *Climate risk.* We identified multiple climate risk indexes, including (1) the Climate
23 Risk Index (CRI; Greenwatch, 2018), (2) the World Risk Index (WRI; World Risk Report,
24 2019), and the (3) Climate Vulnerability Index of the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation

1 Initiative (ND-GAIN; see Chen et al., 2015). CRI captured the impact of weather-related loss
2 events (e.g., heatwaves, floods) on a country from 1998 to 2017, with higher scores
3 indicating lower levels of climate risk. WRI involved two sub-dimensions of measure –
4 vulnerability and exposure. The vulnerability dimension measured the extent to which a
5 country had the capacity to cope with the harm brought by climate risks, including the
6 susceptibility of suffering damage, capacities for adaptation, and capacities to reduce
7 negative consequences. The exposure dimension measured the amount of exposure to natural
8 hazards. For both sub-dimensions of WRI, higher scores indicated higher levels of climate
9 risk. Lastly, the Climate Vulnerability Index of ND-GAIN measured levels of exposure,
10 sensitivity, and capacity to adapt to the harmful effects of climate change in six sectors (e.g.,
11 food, water; for technical details, see Chen et al., 2015). To test the convergence between
12 WRI and ND-GAIN index, we also extracted the exposure sub-scale for the ND-GAIN
13 vulnerability index. Higher scores represented higher levels of vulnerability to climate risks.

14 **2.3 Data Analysis Plan**

15 We tested our hypotheses by conducting a series of multilevel linear regression
16 analyses. We conducted two sets of analyses for the two predictor variables (i.e., perceived
17 descriptive norms and perceived injunctive norms) separately. For each set of analysis, we
18 first constructed the random-coefficient model to estimate the main effect of the predictor
19 variable, the random effect of the intercept, and the random effect of the slope (i.e., the main
20 effect of the predictor variable). Next, we constructed a series of slope-as-outcome models to
21 test the hypothesized effect of the country-level predictor on the slope of the individual-level
22 predictor (i.e., cross-level interaction; e.g., perceived descriptive norms \times individualism-
23 collectivism). In each model, we included the predictor separately, given that we have only a
24 small sample size in the country-level ($N = 31$). For all individual-variables, we centered each
25 variable by the mean within each country (except for gender). As the country-level variables

1 were measured in different units, we standardized them at the country level to allow easier
2 interpretation. To examine the unique effect of the two social norms predictors, we also
3 repeated the multi-level analyses with the two individual-level predictors included
4 simultaneously. Our analysis plan has been pre-registered on the Open Science Framework:
5 https://osf.io/bv52a/?view_only=18a0275662a74bb6b1c5993a04ea6dfc¹. Table 1 shows the
6 descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis. Supplementary Figures S1 and
7 S2 illustrate the relationship between the two perceived social norms and support for
8 renewable energy transition across the 31 countries. Supplementary Table S1 presents the
9 zero-order correlations between the country-level variables.

10 **3. Results**

11 **3.1 Perceived Descriptive Norms**

12 We first included perceived descriptive norms as the individual-level predictor of the
13 random-coefficient model. As expected, perceived descriptive norms were a positive and
14 significant predictor of support for renewable energy transition. The variance of the slope at
15 the country-level was .010 ($SE = .003$), with a $Wald-Z = 3.33, p < .01$. We also conducted the
16 likelihood ratio test to compare the model with the random effect of the slope versus the
17 model with a fixed effect of the slope. The finding also supported a random slope model ($\chi^2 =$
18 $157.89, df = 2, p < .001$). Together, these findings support the notion that the strength of the
19 perceived descriptive norms-support for renewable energy transition link varied between
20 countries (Hypothesis 1) (see also Figure S1).

21 Next, we constructed a series of slope-as-outcome models to examine the effect of
22 each country-level predictor on the random intercept of support for renewable energy
23 transition and the slope of perceived descriptive norms. Table 2 shows the results. As for the
24 main effect of each country-level predictor, individualism and cultural looseness were

1 negatively related to support for renewable energy transition, and PM_{2.5} exposure and
2 vulnerability sub-index of WRI were positively related to it. It implies that people, on average,
3 showed stronger support for renewable energy transition in countries with higher levels of
4 collectivism, cultural tightness, air pollution exposure, and vulnerability to environmental
5 risks. Unexpectedly, individualism and cultural looseness were a positive and significant
6 predictor of the slope of perceived descriptive norms. It indicates that perceived descriptive
7 norms had a stronger association with support for renewable energy transition among
8 countries with higher levels of individualism or cultural looseness (See also Figures 1 and 2).
9 These findings were inconsistent with Hypothesis 3. Also, PM_{2.5} exposure, the vulnerability
10 sub-index of WRI, and the vulnerability index of ND-GAIN were a negative and significant
11 predictor of the slope of perceived descriptive norms. These findings suggest that perceived
12 descriptive norms had a weaker association with support for renewable energy transition
13 among countries with higher levels of air pollution or vulnerability to climate risks (See also
14 Figures 3 and 4). Furthermore, the exposure sub-index of WRI, the exposure sub-index of
15 ND-GAIN, and CRI were unrelated to the slope of perceived descriptive norms. Together,
16 these findings were inconsistent with Hypothesis 5. We did not find evidence that the effect
17 of perceived descriptive norms on support for renewable energy transition would be stronger
18 in countries with higher levels of environmental risks.²

19 **3.2 Perceived Injunctive Norms**

20 Similar to the above, we first included perceived injunctive norms as the individual-
21 level predictor of the random-coefficient model. As expected, perceived injunctive norms
22 were a positive and significant predictor of support for renewable energy transition. The
23 variance of the slope at the country-level was .008 ($SE = .002$), with a $Wald-Z = 3.30, p < .01$.
24 We also conducted the likelihood ratio test to compare the model with the random effect of
25 the slope versus the model with the fixed effect of slope. The finding also supported a

1 random slope model ($\chi^2 = 128.99$, $df = 2$, $p < .001$). Together, these findings support the
2 notion that the strength of the perceived injunctive norms-support for renewable energy
3 transition link varied between countries (Hypothesis 2) (see also Figure S2).

4 Next, we constructed a series of slope-as-outcome models to examine the effect of
5 each country-level predictor on the random intercept of support for renewable energy
6 transition and the slope of perceived injunctive norms. Table 3 shows the results.
7 Unexpectedly, individualism and cultural looseness were a positive and significant predictor
8 of the slope of perceived injunctive norms. It indicated that perceived injunctive norms had a
9 stronger association with support for renewable energy transition among countries with
10 higher levels of individualism or cultural looseness. These findings were inconsistent with
11 Hypothesis 4. Also, PM_{2.5} exposure, the vulnerability sub-index of WRI, and the vulnerability
12 index of ND-GAIN were a negative and significant predictor of the slope of perceived
13 injunctive norms. These findings suggested that perceived injunctive norms had a weaker
14 association with support for renewable energy transition among countries with higher levels
15 of air pollution or vulnerability to climate risks. Furthermore, the exposure sub-index of WRI,
16 the exposure sub-index of ND-GAIN, and CRI were unrelated to the slope of perceived
17 injunctive norms. Together, these findings were inconsistent with Hypothesis 6. We did not
18 find evidence that the effect of perceived injunctive norms on support for renewable energy
19 transition would be stronger in countries with higher levels of environmental risks.²

20 **3.3 Including Both Social Norms Predictors Simultaneously**

21 Lastly, we simultaneously included the two individual-level predictors into the slope-
22 as-outcome models. Same as the above, we included each country-level predictor variable
23 separately. Table 4 shows the results. Individualism was a positive and significant predictor
24 of the slope of perceived descriptive norms only, while cultural looseness was positively

1 related to the slope of perceived injunctive norms only. As for environmental risks, the level
2 of PM_{2.5} exposure and the vulnerability index of WRI were a negative and significant
3 predictor of the slope of perceived descriptive and injunctive norms. The vulnerability index
4 of ND-GAIN was negatively related to the slope of perceived injunctive norms but not
5 perceived descriptive norms (though still in the same direction). It appears that some indexes
6 of environmental risks had a unique effect on the relationship between the two perceived
7 social norms and support for renewable energy transition.

8 **3.4 Supplementary Analysis – Including All Societal-level Predictors Simultaneously**

9 In the previous analyses, we considered the societal-level predictors individually and
10 separately; that is, their moderating effects were tested one at a time in separate models.
11 Considering the moderate to strong correlations between these country-level predictors, these
12 models do not necessarily speak of the independent effect of each country-level predictor.

13 To address this issue, we additionally constructed two slope-as-outcome models to
14 examine the unique effects of the country-level predictors by simultaneously including all
15 eight country-level factors as the predictors of the intercept of support for renewable energy
16 transition and the slope of perceived descriptive norms or perceived injunctive norms. We
17 also included national wealth (measured by gross domestic income (GDP) per capita) as the
18 societal-level covariate for the intercept. Supplementary Tables S2 and S3 show the results.
19 Only individualism-collectivism remained to be a negative and significant predictor of
20 support for renewable energy transition. It indicates that European countries with higher
21 levels of collectivism, on average, showed stronger support for renewable energy transition.
22 None of the remaining cross-level interactions were significant.

23 These findings also need to be interpreted with caution, however. First, given the
24 small number of countries involved, the analysis may not have enough statistical power to

1 detect the unique effects of the eight country-level predictors when considered
2 simultaneously. Second, given the conceptual overlap between some of these predictors,
3 including them simultaneously in the statistical model may unwantedly partial out the very
4 variance of these predictors that explains the cross-national variation of the effect of the two
5 perceived social norms. In this case, the results may not reflect the true meaning of the
6 country-level predictors in their original form and make the results difficult to interpret (e.g.,
7 Becker et al., 2014; Carlson & Wu, 2012). We thus opted to base our conclusions on the
8 models reported in the earlier sections (i.e., the ones that considered the societal-level
9 predictors individually and separately).

10 **4. General Discussion**

11 The present study examined the relationship between perceived social norms and
12 support for renewable energy transition and explored how this link varied between 31
13 European countries. There are three sets of observations that are worth attention.

14 First, we observed a robust positive link between perceived descriptive norms or
15 perceived injunctive norms and support for renewable energy transition. Perceived social
16 norms inform people what behaviors are adaptive and socially desirable. People are thus
17 more likely to behave in ways consistent with social norms. That is, overall, individuals who
18 perceive support for transition to green energy sources to be widely adopted and approved of
19 in the society are themselves more supportive of such transition. This observation confirms
20 the significant role of normative influences in pro-environmental behavior (Cialdini &
21 Jacobson, 2021). Our findings imply that garnering public support for renewable energy
22 transition can be facilitated by social norms-based behavioral interventions. Notably,
23 previous research has also suggested the possibility of changing social norms via policies and
24 facilitative infrastructures (Nyborg et al., 2016). For example, the increase in electric vehicle

1 chargers may signal the increase in the prevalence of electric vehicles. Arguably, the
2 implementation of carbon taxes, for instance, may signal the widespread disapproval of
3 carbon emissions from both industries and individuals, and thereby encourage people to
4 transit to green energy sources.

5 Second, we observed that the strength of the norms-behavior link varied significantly
6 across countries. These findings are novel and singular. As noted earlier, large-scale multi-
7 country comparisons of the strength of normative influences in pro-environmental behavior
8 have been lacking in the literature. It is relatively unknown whether social norms are more
9 predictive of pro-environmental behavior in some societies than others and, if so, what
10 explain such cross-national variability. Taking advantage of the 31-country survey dataset in
11 ECHOES, we were able to address this issue empirically. Our findings are consistent with
12 previous ones in two ways. First, it has been documented that the effects of individual-level
13 dispositional factors (e.g., values, attitudes) on pro-environmental behaviors typically vary
14 between countries (e.g., Chan, 2020; for reviews, see Tam et al., 2021, Tam & Milfont, 2020).
15 The present findings extend these studies by demonstrating that the cross-national variation
16 was applies to not only dispositional factors but also perceptual social factors (in this case,
17 social norms). Second, meta-analytic research has also revealed between-country
18 heterogeneity of the efficacy of social norms-based behavioral interventions (e.g., Bergquist
19 et al., 2019). Our findings thus attest that the effects of social norms on pro-environmental
20 behaviors vary between countries, regardless of whether they are subjectively perceived or
21 experimentally induced or reminded. From these findings, we put forward that researchers
22 and practitioners should acknowledge that social norms have different levels of efficacy as a
23 driver of pro-environmental behavior in different socio-ecological contexts. Although social
24 norms as an intervention or nudge are effective in general, there could be boundaries for such
25 effectiveness residing in the socio-ecological context. That is, social norms would be less

1 effective to induce change in intention or actual behavior in some contexts than in other
2 contexts. Overall, our findings also suggest that other predictors of PEB that have recently
3 attracted research attention (e.g., identity, Udall et al., 2020; Udall et al., 2021; connectedness
4 to nature, Mayer & Frantz, 2004; Tam, 2013) may show similar between-country variability.
5 This notion is worth testing in future research.

6 Third, when trying to explain the cross-national variability of the effects of social
7 norms, we found that perceived social norms (both descriptive and injunctive ones) were
8 more predictive (rather than less predictive) of support for renewable energy transition in
9 countries with a higher level of individualism and cultural looseness or a lower level of air
10 pollution and vulnerability to climate risk. The effects appear small ($|b/s$ ranged from .04
11 to .07; see Tables 2 and 3), and this pattern is opposite to what we hypothesized based on
12 cross-cultural psychological theories. That is, these findings stand in stark contrast with the
13 notions that norm compliance is less emphasized in individualistic or loose cultures and that
14 conformity is more adaptive in societies facing impending existential threats. Nevertheless,
15 our findings are in line with what Bergquist et al.'s (2019) meta-analysis showed. Their meta-
16 analysis included a comparison of effect sizes associated with social norms-based behavioral
17 interventions from 18 countries. They observed that the effect sizes were positively related to
18 individualism: Norms-based interventions have stronger effects in encouraging pro-
19 environmental behavior in individualistic countries than collectivistic ones. Considering
20 together Bergquist et al.'s (2019) meta-analytic findings and our 31-country findings, social
21 norms appears to have a stronger influence on pro-environmental behavior in countries with a
22 weaker emphasis on norm-compliance and a lower level of environmental risks. That being
23 said, it is crucial to note that the differences in the behavioral influence of perceived social
24 norms among countries with different cultural and environmental risk factors are small in

1 effect size. Perceived social norms remain to be a robust predictor of pro-environmental
2 behavior cross-nationally.

3 We can only speculate the reasons behind this unexpected but persistent pattern in a
4 post-hoc manner. First, we conjecture that conforming to social norms is not necessarily in
5 conflict with the exercise of personal agency prioritized by people from individualistic
6 cultures. Descriptive social norms can signal what behaviors are most instrumental to the
7 achievement of certain personally relevant goals (Davis et al., 2018). For example, the
8 popularity of energy-efficient appliances may indicate that such appliances are better
9 products than alternative ones. Thus, following the norms by choosing energy-efficient
10 appliances may therefore represent an effective way to fulfill one's goal of making a wise or
11 correct purchase. Similarly, compliance with injunctive norms can represent a way to boost
12 one's self-image, as the behavior prescribed by such norms implies high social desirability
13 and approval. Arguably, this goal-fulfillment function of social norms could be less salient in
14 collectivistic or tight cultures, wherein people are inherently expected to follow or even
15 internalize social norms, regardless of their personal goals (Bergquist et al., 2019). Future
16 studies would benefit from considering the various motivations underlying people's norm
17 adherence and how these motivations play out differently in different socio-ecological
18 contexts.

19 Second, with respect to our findings regarding environmental risks, we speculate that
20 high levels of air pollution and vulnerability to climate risk could be taken as an indication of
21 poor environmental performance and hence ineffective governance in a country (Thomas et
22 al., 2019). It follows that support of renewable energy transition would be seen by individuals
23 living in such a political context to be inefficacious in driving meaningful societal changes,
24 despite perceived prevalence support of such transition. For this reason, in countries that are
25 vulnerable to climate and other environmental risks, pro-environmental social norms are

1 associated with behavior to a smaller extent. Future studies could scrutinize this speculative
2 account by systematically manipulating research participants' perception of governance
3 quality and hence probability of systemic societal changes and observing how the influence
4 of social norms on pro-environmental behavior varies subsequently.

5 Third, it is possible that individuals living in countries with exposure to high levels of
6 environmental risks are already highly supportive of renewable energy transition; as a result,
7 in these countries, the role of perceived social norms becomes less prominent. This
8 interpretation is consistent with the notion that people become environmental conscious and
9 support environmental actions because they objectively face serious environmental problems
10 (e.g., Inglehart, 1995). Similarly, individuals living in countries with high levels of
11 collectivism and cultural tightness may already have a strong preference on promoting the
12 wellness of the group and therefore be readier to support renewable energy transition (e.g.,
13 Parboteeah et al., 2012), hence the weaker effect of perceived social norms. This
14 interpretation implies that certain societal conditions (high collectivism, cultural tightness,
15 and environmental risks) can foster support for renewable energy transition even when a
16 supportive social norm is lacking. This possibility warrants future research attention.

17 We also argue for the need to consider the difference between prescriptive and
18 proscriptive social norms (Farrow et al., 2017). Prescriptive social norms refer to perceptions
19 of what other people do or approve of doing, whereas proscriptive norms are prohibitive,
20 referring to what other people do not do or disapprove of doing. It is speculated that our
21 hypothesized effects (that is, the behavioral influence of social norms is stronger in
22 collectivistic and tight cultures) are more applicable to proscriptive norms than prescriptive
23 norms. Given their prohibitive nature, proscriptive social norms could be more important for
24 successful adaptation in socio-ecological contexts that emphasize norm-compliance, as
25 deviance from social norms is likely to be considered to be a serious social offense there. Put

1 it differently, individuals from collectivistic or tight cultures could be more sensitive to
2 proscriptive social norms than prescriptive social norms, as the former type of norms is more
3 potent in guiding them to avoid social sanctions. Indeed, recent studies showed that
4 respondents from tight cultures (e.g., Germany) tended to exhibit stronger defensive reactions
5 than did their counterparts from loose cultures (e.g., Russia) after they had recalled an event
6 of violation of social norms (e.g., Eriksson et al., 2021; Prentice et al., 2020). It seems
7 reasonable to expect that in contexts with a strong emphasis on norm compliance,
8 proscriptive social norms rather than prescriptive social norms are more important in
9 determining people's pro-environmental behavior. Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis study
10 on disease-preventive behaviors during the coronavirus-2019 pandemic revealed that
11 subjective norms had a stronger effect on behavioral intention and behavior among countries
12 with higher levels of collectivism and cultural tightness (Fisher & Karl, 2021). Their findings
13 once again highlight the potential influence of the type of social norms in the understanding
14 of cross-national variability of behavioral influences of social norms. The present research
15 only measured prescriptive social norms. It is therefore crucial for future studies to test the
16 effects of culture and environmental risks on the relationship between proscriptive social
17 norms, subjective norms, and pro-environmental behavior.

18 Lastly, as the purpose of the present study is to examine the cross-national variations
19 in the influence of social norms, we focused on the societal-level variables. It is noteworthy
20 that the influence of culture can also be mediated through individual-level psychological
21 characteristics (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Individuals may develop a self-construal that
22 reflects their internalized cultural values and beliefs (e.g., independent versus interdependent
23 self; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They may also form their own perceptions of normative
24 cultural practices (perceived descriptive norms of culture; Chiu et al., 2010). Future studies

1 can thus inquire into how these individual-level, culturally shaped or informed factors relate
2 to the link between social norms and pro-environmental behavioral decisions.

3 The present study has several limitations. First, we only included European countries.
4 It is thus uncertain to what extent our findings are generalizable to non-European countries.
5 Nevertheless, we believe that our results are still informative, as we observed that the
6 European countries are not as similar to each other as often assumed. Our national-level
7 indicators showed that these European countries have meaningful variations in individualism-
8 collectivism, cultural looseness, and environmental risks. For example, in terms of
9 individualism-collectivism, the scores of our countries ranged from collectivistic (e.g., score
10 = 27, Slovenia) to medium (e.g., score = 55, Austria) to individualistic (score = 89, the
11 United Kingdom). This range is comparable to that among the widely used countries in cross-
12 cultural comparisons (e.g., score = 20 for China; score = 46 for Japan; score = 91 for the
13 United States). That said, future studies would benefit from sampling countries in different
14 continents. Second, although we have included multiple measures to capture cultural and
15 environmental risk factors, these measures do not capture all types of cultures and socio-
16 ecological contexts. For example, recent studies have shown that there are seven forms of
17 independence versus interdependence, and their correlation with individualism-collectivism
18 varies (Vignoles et al., 2016). Some of these forms (e.g., self-direction versus receptiveness
19 to influence) are strongly related to individualism-collectivism and could exert a similar
20 influence on the effect of perceived social norms. Other forms, however, are barely related to
21 individualism-collectivism (e.g., self-reliance versus dependence on others); their effects on
22 the behavioral effect of perceived social norms are uncertain. Future studies will benefit from
23 considering this multitude of cultural factors. Third, support for renewable energy transition
24 was captured by intention items only. It is well-established that intention may not translate
25 into actual behavior. It would be crucial for future studies to demonstrate the observed cross-

1 national differences on the social norms-actual behavior link. Lastly, all our findings are
2 correlational in nature and primarily based on models that include one country-level predictor
3 at a time. As noted earlier, because of the small sample size at the country level ($N = 31$), our
4 data did not have sufficient statistical power for testing the unique effect of each country-
5 level predictor. As a result, our findings should be interpreted with caution. We suggest that
6 future studies would benefit from including a larger number of countries, although this
7 suggestion is subject to data availability. We also argue that an experimental design wherein
8 the socio-ecological context is manipulated or simulated will be useful. Such a design would
9 allow researchers to examine the independent causal effects of the country-level factors on
10 the link between social norms and pro-environmental behavior.

11 **5. Conclusion**

12 Social norms are known to be one of the strongest driving factors behind pro-
13 environmental behavior. With data from 31 European countries, we replicated this effect in
14 the domain of transition to renewable energy. Most importantly, riding on this large-scale
15 cross-national dataset, we observed significant between-country variability in terms of the
16 social norms effect. We further found that this effect was stronger in socio-ecological
17 contexts with higher levels of individualism and cultural looseness or lower levels of air
18 pollution and vulnerability to climate risks. Although these observed effects appear small and
19 contrary to our pre-registered hypotheses developed based on the cross-cultural psychology
20 literature, they speak of the imperative for researchers and practitioners to acknowledge that
21 the behavioral influence of social norms is sensitive to contextual factors. We hope this
22 research can help draw theorists' attention to the intricacy of the social norms-related
23 processes behind pro-environmental behavior.

24 **Endnote**

1 1. In our pre-registration, we also mentioned the analysis that would explore the relationship
2 between personal norms and pro-environmental behavior. We are not reporting results from
3 this analysis in the present main text, as they are outside the scope. In brief, we observed that
4 personal norms were positively related to support for renewable energy transition. We also
5 observed that this relationship was weaker in societies with higher levels of air pollution and
6 vulnerability to climate risks.

7 2. Our findings remained consistent when we included national wealth (GDP per capita) as a
8 covariate variable in predicting the intercept of support for renewable energy transition,
9 except for the main effect of the vulnerability sub-index of WRI, which became non-
10 significant ($b = .12$, $SE = .06$, $p = .055$, 95% $CI = [-.002, .24]$), while GDP per capita was
11 also a non-significant predictor of support for renewable energy transition ($b = .03$, $SE = .06$,
12 $p = .613$, 95% $CI = [-.09, .15]$). Given that GDP per capita was unrelated to the outcome
13 variable, we opted to report the findings without controlling GDP per capita in the main text.

14

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Range
<i>Individual-level variables</i>				
Perceived descriptive norms	18037	3.37	0.86	1-5
Perceived injunctive norms	18037	3.38	0.88	1-5
Support for renewable energy transition	18037	3.52	0.87	1-5
Age	18037	3.30	1.17	2-5
Education	17670	3.08	1.06	1-4
Income	18037	3.68	1.39	1-5
Gender				
Male	8930	-	-	-
Female	9099	-	-	-
<i>Country-level variables</i>				
Individualism-Collectivism	30	58.57	17.56	5-110
Cultural looseness-tightness	28	66.68	24.27	12.50-119.8
Air pollution (level of PM _{2.5} exposed) (log transformed)	31	2.53	0.41	1.77-3.79
Climate risk (climate risk index 98-17)	31	85.11	36.86	38.00-155.67
Climate vulnerability (ND-vulnerability Index)	31	0.33	0.04	0.27-0.41
Climate exposure (ND-exposure index)	31	0.37	0.05	0.27-0.45
Vulnerability to environmental risk (World risk - vulnerability index)	31	27.79	4.48	20.97-40.33
Exposure to environmental risk (World risk - exposure index)	31	11.85	5.11	1.84-31.86

Note. Higher values of the societal-level factors indicate higher levels of individualism, higher levels of cultural looseness, higher levels of PM_{2.5} exposed, lower levels of climate risk (indexed by climate risk index 98-17), higher levels of climate vulnerability (indexed by ND-vulnerability index and world risk - vulnerability index), and higher levels of climate risk exposure (indexed by ND-exposure index and world risk - exposure index).

Table 2. Results of the multilevel analyses on the relationship between perceived descriptive norms and support for renewable energy transition

DV: Support for renewable energy transition	Effect on intercept			Effect on slope of perceived descriptive norms		
	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI
<i>Main effect of perceived descriptive norms</i>	.38 (.02)	.000	[.34, .42]	-	-	-
Culture						
Individualism-collectivism	-.12 (.03)	.000	[-.18, -.06]	.06 (.02)	.000	[.03, .08]
Cultural looseness-tightness	-.08 (.04)	.039	[-.15, -.00]	.05 (.02)	.006	[.01, .08]
Environmental risk						
Air pollution (level of PM _{2.5} exposed)	.09 (.03)	.010	[.02, .15]	-.06 (.02)	.000	[-.09, -.03]
Climate risk (climate risk index 98-17)	-.04 (.03)	.284	[-.11, .03]	.02 (.02)	.366	[-.02, .05]
Climate vulnerability (ND-vulnerability Index)	.03 (.04)	.435	[-.04, .10]	-.05 (.02)	.004	[-.09, -.02]
Climate exposure (ND-exposure index)	.04 (.04)	.292	[-.03, .11]	.01 (.02)	.772	[-.03, .04]
Vulnerability to environmental risk (World risk - vulnerability index)	.09 (.03)	.006	[.03, .15]	-.07 (.01)	.000	[-.10, -.05]
Exposure to environmental risk (World risk - exposure index)	.02 (.04)	.651	[-.05, .09]	.01 (.02)	.697	[-.03, .05]

Note. Variance of the slope effect = .010, SE = .003, 95% CI = [.006, 019]. Each societal-level factor was included separately in the slope-as-outcome model. Higher values of the societal-level factors indicate higher levels of individualism, higher levels of cultural looseness, higher levels of PM_{2.5} exposed, lower levels of climate risk (indexed by climate risk index 98-17), higher levels of climate vulnerability (indexed by ND-vulnerability index and world risk - vulnerability index), and higher levels of climate risk exposure (indexed by ND-exposure index and world risk - exposure index).

Table 3. Results of the multilevel analyses on the relationship between perceived injunctive norms and support for renewable energy transition.

DV: Support for renewable energy transition	Effect on intercept			Effect on slope of perceived injunctive norms		
	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI
<i>Main effect of perceived injunctive norms</i>	.45 (.02)	.000	[.41, .48]	-	-	-
Culture						
Individualism-collectivism	-.12 (.03)	.000	[-.18, -.06]	.04 (.02)	.013	[-.01, .07]
Cultural looseness-tightness	-.08 (.04)	.039	[-.15, -.00]	.04 (.01)	.006	[.01, .07]
Environmental risk						
Air pollution(level of PM _{2.5} exposed)	.09 (.03)	.010	[.02, .15]	-.06 (.01)	.000	[-.09, -.04]
Climate risk (climate risk index 98-17)	-.04 (.04)	.282	[-.11, .03]	.01 (.02)	.557	[-.02, .04]
Climate vulnerability (ND-vulnerability Index)	.03 (.04)	.433	[-.04, .10]	-.04 (.02)	.004	[-.07, .01]
Climate exposure (ND-exposure index)	.04 (.04)	.294	[-.03, .11]	.02 (.02)	.226	[-.01, .05]
Vulnerability to environmental risk (World risk - vulnerability index)	.09 (.03)	.005	[.03, .16]	-.06 (.01)	.000	[-.09, -.03]
Exposure to environmental risk (World risk - exposure index)	.02 (.04)	.647	[-.05, .09]	.00 (.02)	.778	[-.03, .04]

Note. Variance of the slope effect = .008, SE = .002, 95% CI = [.004, .014]. Each societal-level factor was included separately in the slope-as-outcome model. Higher values of the societal-level factors indicate higher levels of individualism, higher levels of cultural looseness, higher levels of PM_{2.5} exposed, lower levels of climate risk (indexed by climate risk index 98-17), higher levels of climate vulnerability (indexed by ND-vulnerability index and world risk - vulnerability index), and higher levels of climate risk exposure (indexed by ND-exposure index and world risk - exposure index).

Table 4. Results of the multilevel analyses on the relationship between perceived descriptive norms, perceived injunctive norms and support for renewable energy transition.

DV: Support for renewable energy transition	Effect on Intercept			Effect on slope of perceived descriptive norms			Effect on slope of perceived injunctive norms		
	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI	b (SE)	p-value	95% CI
<i>Main effect of perceived descriptive norms</i>	.19 (.01)	.000	[.16, .21]	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Main effect of perceived injunctive norms</i>	.35 (.01)	.000	[.32, .38]	-	-	-	-	-	-
Culture									
Individualism-collectivism	-.12 (.03)	.000	[-.18, -.06]	.03 (.01)	.005	[.01, .06]	.02 (.01)	.137	[-.01, .05]
Cultural looseness-tightness	-.08 (.04)	.039	[-.15, -.00]	.02 (.01)	.072	[-.00, .05]	.03 (.01)	.010	[.01, .06]
Environmental risk									
Air pollution (level of PM _{2.5} exposed)	.09 (.03)	.010	[.02, .15]	-.03 (.01)	.011	[-.06, -.01]	-.05 (.01)	.000	[-.07, -.02]
Climate risk (climate risk index 98-17)	-.04 (.04)	.279	[-.11, .03]	.01 (.01)	.576	[-.02, .04]	.00 (.01)	.773	[-.02, .03]
Climate vulnerability (ND-vulnerability Index)	.03 (.04)	.434	[-.04, .10]	-.02 (.01)	.155	[-.05, .01]	-.03 (.01)	.013	[-.06, -.01]
Climate exposure (ND-exposure index)	.04 (.04)	.290	[-.03, .11]	-.00 (.01)	.801	[-.03, .03]	.02 (.01)	.155	[-.01, .05]
Vulnerability to environmental risk (World risk - vulnerability index)	.09 (.03)	.006	[.03, .15]	-.04 (.01)	.001	[-.06, -.02]	-.04 (.01)	.001	[-.06, -.02]
Exposure to environmental risk (World risk - exposure index)	.02 (.04)	.643	[-.05, .09]	.00 (.01)	.910	[-.03, .03]	.00 (.01)	.762	[-.02, .03]

Note. Variance of the slope effect of perceived descriptive norms = .005, SE = .002, 95% CI = [.002, .010]. Variance of the slope effect of perceived injunctive norms = .005, SE = .002, 95% CI = [.002, .010]. Each societal-level factor was included separately in the slope-as-outcome model. Higher values of the societal-level factors indicate higher levels of individualism, higher levels of cultural looseness, higher levels of PM_{2.5} exposed, lower levels of climate risk (indexed by climate risk index 98-17), higher levels of climate vulnerability (indexed by ND-vulnerability index and world risk - vulnerability index), and higher levels of climate risk exposure (indexed by ND-exposure index and world risk - exposure index).