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This paper has been accepted for publication in *Engineering, Construction & Architecture, Management.* Submitted on 30 July 2020; Accepted on 27 February 2021.

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33 34	Declaration of competing interest
35 36 37 38 39	The authors whose names are listed above certify that the manuscript titled "Management control structures and performance implications in international construction joint ventures: critical survey and conceptual framework" has not been published neither is it under consideration elsewhere.
40 41	Acknowledgments
41 42 43	This paper is part of a broader-scope Ph.D. study on Determinants of success for international construction joint ventures in Ghana. The authors acknowledge that this paper
44 45	shares a similar background and methodology with other related papers published by the author, but with different scopes and objectives. The authors acknowledge the Department of

The following publication Tetteh, M.O., Chan, A.P.C., Ameyaw, E.E., Darko, A., Yevu, S.K. and Boateng, E.B. (2022), "Management control structures and performance implications in international construction joint ventures: critical survey and conceptual framework", Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 755-781 is published by Emerald and is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-07-2020-0579

- 46 Building and Real Estate of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University for funding this research.
- 47 We are also grateful to the experts who participated in the international questionnaire survey.

95 Management control structures and performance implications in international 96 construction joint ventures: critical survey and conceptual framework

9798 Abstract

Purpose – Management control is needed in international joint ventures (IJVs) for successful 99 management and performance. While IJV management control and performance concept has 100 been widely explored, in the construction sector, the core understanding of the design of the 101 two concepts is still lacking. This has resulted in the neglect of important questions and 102 directions for research and practice improvement. This study aims to conduct a critical survey 103 of prior studies addressing the conceptualization of management control and performance in 104 IJVs and to propose a framework for studying the performance implications of management 105 control in international construction joint ventures (ICJVs). 106

- 107 Design/methodology/approach Using Scopus database and search terms, a systematic
 108 desktop search was conducted to retrieve empirically related peer-reviewed papers for this
 109 study.
- 110 Findings Drawing on the transaction cost, institutional and relational logic, the first inclusive
- hypothetical model for studying the relationship between different dimensions of management
- 112 control mechanism and multiple performance criteria in ICJVs is presented. The model 113 proposes a measurement method for both the management control and performance and
- explains how they can be established in ICJVs.
- **Practical implications** The proposed framework provides a methodology to understand the dynamics of management control and performance implications in ICJV. Specifically, uncovering the critical paths will assist ICJV front-liners to approach management control in a more holistic and systematic way to promote achievement of ICJV goals.
- 119 **Originality/value** The study gives a firm ground to the construction industry, which is 120 accurate and educational for related fields concentrating on several other forms of cooperative 121 relationships.
- 122
- Keywords: Construction management, international joint venture, international construction
 joint venture, management control; performance measures.
- 125

126 **1. Introduction**

127

International joint ventures (IJVs) are a hybrid collaborative form considered as an efficient 128 entry mode to an overseas or highly competitive market (Chen and Messner, 2011; Liu et al. 129 130 2020). An IJV is defined as a marriage between two or more legally distinct firms with their headquarters dispersedly located (Geringer and Herbert, 1989). Once the parties engage to 131 undertake Architectural, Engineering, and Construction (AEC) projects, then we have an 132 international construction joint venture (ICJV) (Girmscheid and Brockmann, 2010; Hong and 133 Chan, 2014). ICJV adoption enables the hybridization of partnering firms' technology, an 134 opportunity to learn, minimize potential risks and challenges, access to low-cost production 135 factors, etc. (Ozorhon et al. 2010a; Chan et al. 2020). Despite their myriad benefits and 136 opportunities, they often do not perform as expected and fail to achieve both strategic and 137 financial goals of partnering firms (Lin and Ho, 2012; Han et al. 2019). Their poor performance 138 139 could be connected to key challenges in the complex interorganizational relationships - for example, the control structures available for use (Wang et al. 2017; Han et al. 2019). Studies 140 have shown that with management control, firms can improve performance (Ghauri et al. 2013; 141 142 Magsoom et al. 2020), manage risks effectively (Bing and Tiong, 1999), bring to success strategic goals (Yan and Gray, 2001b), and exploit completive advantage (Ozorhon et al. 143 2010b). Thus, management control acts as a significant determinant of performance in ICJVs. 144

Management control characterizes a process through which an entity influences the behaviour
 and performance of another entity to varying degrees through bureaucracy, power, or informal
 mechanisms (Geringer and Herbert, 1989).

The concept of management control and performance relationship within IJVs is not new. 148 While varied definitions and conceptualizations of management control and performance 149 criteria exist, numerous frameworks and models exhibiting the correlation between the two 150 concepts have been developed (Yan and Gray, 1994; Ding, 1998; Lin and Ho, 2012). Hence, 151 inconsistent results have proliferated. For example, while Ding (1998) provided outcomes 152 evidencing the altercation for one-partner-dominant, Yan and Gray (1994) found evidence 153 supporting the shared management argument. The transaction cost and strategy-structure 154 theoretic logic proposed by Geringer and Herbert (1989) has been adopted in many studies for 155 investigating the performance implications of management control in IJVs, yet there exist some 156 157 controversies today (Le Nguyen and Larimo, 2008; Ghauri et al. 2013). The lack of a common theoretical background has contributed to the empirical inconsistencies (Yan and Gray, 2001b). 158 Arguably, due to the multidimensional nature of management control and performance criteria, 159 researchers are exposed to different dimensions and measures, which makes it difficult to 160 161 assess the contributions of related studies.

In ICJVs, aside from the limited number of studies, the core understanding of the design of 162 the two concepts is still lacking. Prior related studies have transferred findings from the 163 management field, but then failed to define, position and characterized ICJVs performance 164 measures and management control (Luo, 2001; Ho et al. 2009a; Girmscheid and Brockmann, 165 2010). Besides, the conceptualized management control models borrowed from the 166 management field present some limitations when applied to ICJVs. Thus, the models are too 167 theoretical which Kamminga and Meer-Kooistra (2007) described as "abstract models" 168 because they failed to consider the operational characteristics of organizations. Accordingly, 169 170 an integrated perspective of mapping diverse management control to multiple performance dimensions has yet to be accomplished (Tetteh and Chan, 2019). The duration precision 171 coupled with the complex contractual, environmental, organizational, and technical 172 characteristics of an ICJV means different performance and management control views. 173 Against this background, this paper aims to conduct a critical survey of prior studies addressing 174 the conceptualization of management control and performance in IJVs, and to propose a 175 framework for studying the performance implications of management control in ICJVs. The 176 proposed framework has been carefully discussed to demonstrate its innovation and 177 applicability. 178

This study contributes to and extends the literature examining management control and 179 180 performance relationships in both IJVs and ICJVs. Drawing on the transaction-costeconomizing, institutional and relational characteristics, this study adds up to knowledge by 181 revealing that the exercise of management control does not solely depend on transaction cost 182 and relational characteristics; but, also rooted in the societal or institutional custom of 183 corporations. Thus, it increases the understanding of how different mechanisms of management 184 control can be established by drawing on these theoretical grounds. The framework proposes 185 an assessment method for ICJV management control and performance and explains how they 186 can be established. The first inclusive hypothetical framework for studying the interrelationship 187 between different dimensions of management control and multiple performance criteria in 188 ICJVs is presented. This will stimulate future research and enhance the debate on the 189 performance implications of different management control structures of an ICJV. Specifically, 190 subjecting the hypothetical framework to empirical tests in different locations will bring to 191 192 light the critical paths that can guide managers and practitioners who are operating or intend to pursue ICJVs build their management control structures accordingly to improve their 193 performance goal. Corollaries from obtaining this will ultimately provide support for ICJVs 194

during the creation and negotiation process. Further, this study may potentially help reconcile the controversy related to the management control and performance relationship in ICJVs as it would offer researchers and practitioners a framework and a methodology to understand the dynamics of the two concepts in ICJV application. Finally, the study gives a firm ground to the construction industry, which is accurate and educational for related fields concentrating on several other forms of cooperative relationships.

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202 1.1 Structure of an IJV and ICJV

In the international business literature, an IJV is defined as a long-term arrangement between 204 two or more firms from different countries who combine complementary resources to a semi-205 autonomous legally separate entity in pursuit of a common goal (Geringer, 1988). An IJV takes 206 the form of an equity joint venture and independent of its parent company through the 207 establishment of a corporate and a joint venture contract (Girmscheid and Brockmann, 2010). 208 209 The goals of the venture (i.e. contract duration, amount of equity, the IJV objective, etc.) are described in the joint venture contract. With this arrangement, the key features are the long-210 term relationship and single (mutual) goal. Therefore, the opportunistic behaviour of corporate 211 firms is reduced as they engage to realize a common goal and with a long-term focus. On the 212 other hand, an ICJV is temporary and primarily used for undertaking mega infrastructure 213 projects (Cui et al. 2019). Kreitl et al. (2002) argued that it can also be formed with a limited 214 objective. However, Girmscheid and Brockmann (2010) emphasized that aside from the equity 215 contract that determines the internal relations between the parties involved, there exists also an 216 external contract signed with the client, which defines the construction contract. This contract, 217 therefore, puts pressure on the ICJV making it project-based - 'complete and dissolve' in 218 nature. In short, ICJVs directly serve two sides, the joint venture contract, and the client. 219 Opportunistic behaviour in this hybrid arrangement is very high as a result of the goal 220 incongruence between partnering firms. Responding to this critical concern is by motivating 221 the other party to achieve satisfying or predetermined objectives, which management control 222 is suggested as an important governance tool (Han et al. 2019). Certainly, this fact does not 223 allow us to transfer findings without proof (Girmscheid and Brockmann, 2010). This 224 information necessitates our discussion and reinforces the condition that diverse performance 225 dimensions and management control structures are required in ICJVs. The figure below (Figure 226 1) displays the differences between ICJVs and IJVs. For more information about the 227 dissimilarities, the reader is referred to Girmscheid and Brockmann (2010) and Tetteh and 228 Chan (2019). 229

230

<Please Insert Figure 1 here>

231

232 2. Theoretical background of management control in IJVs233

An understanding of the emergence and configuration of management control determinants in 234 235 IJVs from first principles is critical in studying the performance implications. The transaction cost economics (TCE) and relational characteristics such as parental differences, trust, 236 bargaining power, etc. have been used for providing a general knowledge base for analysing 237 management control in IJVs. According to the TCE logic of cost minimization, management 238 control in inter-firm relationships is greatly dependant on three transaction characteristics (asset 239 specificity, uncertainty, and frequency) (Williamson, 1985). Investments that have a high level 240 of asset specificity (tangible or intangible) may lose their value if the involved contracting 241 relationship is dissolved (Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Thus, parent 242

companies use management control to protect or promote their specific investments in an IJV 243 (Yan, 2000; Chalos and O'Connor, 2004). Uncertainties arising from both behavioural risk of 244 the transacting parties and erratic environment produces opportunistic behaviour, which 245 requires parents to invest more management control to mitigate any potential hazards (Han et 246 al. 2019). Transaction frequency refers to the rate of occurrence of repetitive transactions 247 (Duan, 2007). Corporations create a strong corporate culture that generates long-term 248 organizational commitment via control. Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) 249 mentioned that transaction frequency is an important feature when comparing governance 250 251 structures, as it considers whether the frequency of transactions justifies investments in 252 governance structures.

In addition to TCE logic, Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) argue that it is the 253 characteristics of the cooperating parties that shape control. Hence, four relational 254 255 characteristics are discussed: parental differences, information asymmetry, trust, and bargaining power. With regards to parental differences, as the omnipresent, goal incongruence, 256 between IJV parties, remains high, extra effort in terms of management control will be required 257 to reduce the impact (Parkhe, 1991). As different yet complementary interests of parents form 258 259 a successful IJV relationship, management control becomes relevant in explaining each other's interest and/or coordinating diverse parental contributions. According to Kamminga and Van 260 der Meer-Kooistra (2007), the result of parental difference is information asymmetry, which 261 262 extends management control. For example, the differences in knowledge and expertise often require tight control by parents at the expense of the venture's flexibility. In an environment 263 with a high level of uncertainty, for example, the loss of flexibility may be a problem, since 264 quick adjustments are highly important (Merchant, 1998). In such a case, parents must give 265 management autonomy and exercise lose control. Trust is another relational characteristic that 266 has received much attention in interfirm relationships (Fryxell et al. 2002; Boersma et al. 2003; 267 Girmscheid and Brockmann, 2010). It is a useful mechanism employed to cope with 268 uncertainty creating behavioral risks and reduce the costs of coordination in interfirm 269 relationships (Madhok, 2006). Any interfirm relationship that is built on trust possess the spirit 270 of awareness to become aware of rules, routines, and procedures as Gulati and Singh (1998) 271 point out. Lastly, the extent to which parents can exercise management control over an IJV is 272 regarded as an outcome of a bargaining process (Lu and Hebert, 2005; Li et al. 2009). 273 According to Yan and Gray (1994), the bargaining power of a parent can be divided into two 274 groups: context-based, and resource-based. The first derivative of the power dependency theory 275 stresses the context-dependent relationships between the bargaining parties. It argues that the 276 relative bargaining power of a party depends on the mutual dependence of the parties, 277 278 especially, the exclusivity of the dependence; and this power is determined by the alternatives 279 available to it, as well as the relevance of the stakes possess in the present relationship, and the potential outcome of the bargaining (Yan and Luo, 2016). In an IJV relationship, the partner 280 281 having more potential or alternative for entering a market has greater bargaining power. The resource-dependent concerns the contributions or control of critical resources by parties in the 282 venture. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the critical the resources provided by a 283 parent to a venture, the ability to control and direct organizational action, and vice versa. 284 Therefore, a partner's contribution to critical resources will enhance its management control. 285 It is important to mention that these critical resources could be capital or noncapital resource-286 based power. Whereas capital resource-based power includes financial or their equivalent in 287 physical or proprietary properties, noncapital resource-based bargaining power is made up of 288 critical tacit resources like technology, management expertise, political networks, marketing 289 290 channels, etc.

Notwithstanding the above, the institutional characteristics of the venture operation country also offer explanations for the levels of management control that investing companies will seek

when forming IJVs (Knoke, 2001). According to Meyer and Scott (1992), institutionalization 293 proceeds by the amplification of legal regulations and processes in which individuals must 294 comply to have the mandate and legitimacy. In the developing countries, for example, several 295 factors such as regulation constraints (Local Content Policies), partner culture and strategy, 296 and numerous contextual variables underlying the negotiation of partner's relative bargaining 297 power influences the operational control structures. Foreign firms are forced to accept a 298 299 minority position which is a frequently observed phenomenon in developing countries (Lee et al. 2003). For example, in Ghana, the Local Content and Local Participation, Regulation 2013 300 L.I 2204, afford the local firms maximum equity participation. Similar practices exist in Libya, 301 where foreign companies are required to enter into joint ventures with local entities and where 302 the foreign company is only allowed to hold a maximum of 49% equity stake. This serves them 303 the dependence that enhances their power over the venture. 304

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306 3. Research Methodology

307 This study employed the systematic mapping technique to critically survey prior studies 308 309 addressing the conceptualization of management control and performance implications in IJVs and proposed a framework for studying the performance implications of management control 310 in ICJVs. Systematic mapping is "an approach that allows for relatively high procedural and 311 interpretive objectivity and replicability" (Ghobadi, 2015). Thus, results are easily traceable 312 313 and can be reproduced. Four major sequences were followed: 1) planning the study, 2) identifying relevant publications for the study, 3) critically reviewing to survey the state-of-314 the-art of management control and performance implications, including gaps and future needs, 315 and 4) propose a framework for studying performance implications of management control in 316 ICJVs. The methodological framework for this present research is illustrated in Figure 2. 317

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- 319 320

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321 *3.1 Planning the study*

322 Due to the broad nature of IJV studies, a review protocol that clarified the phenomenon of 323 interest was defined as "research that empirically examines the link between management 324 control and performance within IJVs and ICJVs" following the goal of the study. To identify 325 related papers and develop a new model for studying management control and performance 326 relationship in ICJVs, a preliminary review of seminal works including that by Geringer and 327 328 Hebert (1989) and Luo (2001) in the construction domain was undertaken to identify relevant and common terms. Next, a list of search terms was developed and then revised by consulting 329 three scholars in the area of ICJV with at least two papers. This increased the 330 331 comprehensiveness and minimized hypothetical preferences.

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333 *3.2 Publications retrieval*

With the help of Scopus, articles capturing both management control and performance in IJVs 335 and ICJVs were analyzed in this study. The Scopus database contains many scientific 336 337 publications (Hong and Chan, 2014) as compared to the other databases such as Web of Science, PubMed, Engineering Village, Google Scholar, etc. Similarly, Scopus has a comparatively 338 quicker indexing process, widening the likelihood of obtaining current publication (Meho and 339 340 Rogers, 2008), and has been extensively used in earlier review studies (Darko and Chan, 2016; Nasirian et al. 2018). Keywords used for the search was: "management control" OR "control 341 mechanism" OR "control" OR "governance" AND "performance" and "International joint 342

venture" OR "Joint venture" OR "International construction joint venture", and the search
domain specified as "title/abstract/keywords". The date range was set to "1990 to 2020". Note
that IJVs gained prominence both in practice and academia in the early 90s (Hwang et al. 2017).
As for the "document type and language", it was limited to "Article" and "English",
respectively. This returned 138 papers (searched on April 24, 2020). However, not all the
returned papers empirically presented studies on the management control and performance link
in IJVs.

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351 *3.2.1 Selection of Relevant Papers*

Articles resulting from the combination were filtered initially with title, abstract, and keywords 353 and. When needed, the introduction and the conclusion were closely examined to determine 354 355 whether they served the purpose of this review. Likewise, duplicated papers were eliminated. Note that solely peer-reviewed articles were considered for this study. Thus, book reviews, 356 conference papers, editorials, etc. were discarded as they do not go through a comprehensive 357 examination, and thus, limit their wider dissemination in the academic community (Drott, 358 359 1995, Tetteh and Chan, 2019) Peer-reviewed articles characterize the most influential and reputable research (Silva et al. 2019) and have been classified as "certified knowledge" 360 (Ramos-Rodríguez and Ruíz-Navarro, 2004). They are largely recognized in the academic 361 certain and useful for first-hand researchers to assess and gain knowledge of research 362 advancements on a selected research interest for exploration (Tsai and Lydia Wen, 2005). After 363 this preliminary screening, a total of 98 articles were retained for further analysis. To facilitate 364 the identification of the most relevant articles, the criteria were that: 1) exclusively and wholly 365 published papers examining the connection between management control and performance in 366 IJVs were considered, and 2) articles must be grounded on empirical arguments (i.e. articles 367 must be based on either qualitative and/or quantitative data collection from the industry via 368 questionnaire survey, case studies and interviews). Literature review grounded on empirical 369 papers provide an understanding of the real-life situation as they are based mainly on the 370 opinions of experts and/real-world issues (Darko et al. 2017). A total of 26 papers were found 371 valid following the above inclusion parameters. The next step involved the snowballing 372 sampling technique (i.e. checking the reference lists of the retained papers against the selection 373 criteria to identify papers that were not found using the search string previously). Note that 374 already identified papers were not included in this round. This resulted in including an 375 additional five papers. Therefore, 31 papers were used in this study. Table 1 provides the 376 journal information of selected papers for the review. 377

378 The 31 papers objectively stand in a better position to provide an understanding of 379 management control and performance relationship in IJVs, as it is comparable to other literature review studies in the construction management field. For instance, using 26 articles, 380 381 Yu et al. (2018) developed a conceptual framework for analyzing key issues of social responsibility in PPP projects. Similarly, Dwaikat and Ali (2016) analyzed empirically related 382 issues of green building costs using 17 papers. Also, using 27 publications, Osei-Kyei and Chan 383 (2015) methodologically reviewed studies on the critical success factors for implementing PPP 384 projects. Therefore, it merits the attention that the 31 papers reliably and conclusively provided 385 knowledgeable information and gaps in this study. 386

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<Please Insert Table 1 here>

- 390 4. The hypothetical model configuration
- 391 *4.1 Background of management control patterns in IJVs*
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The conceptualization and operationalization of management control in IJVs is problematic, 393 due to the unparalleled and multivariate nature of the control concept. Generally, management 394 control in IJVs' studies can be viewed from two different perspectives. Whereas some scholars 395 investigate the determinants of management control (e.g., Tomlinson, 1970; Stopford and 396 Haberich, 1976; Yan and Gray, 2001b; Chalos and O'Connor, 2004), the mechanisms of 397 management control have also been studied (e.g., Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Flamholtz et al. 398 1985; Geringer and Herbert, 1989). Geringer and Herbert (1989) conclude that IJV 399 management control has been studied from three different perspectives: mechanism of control, 400 the focus of control, and extent of control. The mechanism refers to how control is exercised. 401 From this perspective, earlier research stressed the control determinants (e.g., ownership and 402 voting rights), and other non-equity mechanisms which include cultural, behavioral, and 403 outcome control (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Whitelock and Yang, 2007). Also, subsequent 404 405 works have widened the breadth of control mechanisms to include socialization practices, IJV board of directors' role, staffing, etc. (Yan and Gray, 2001b; Chalos and O'Connor, 2004). 406 Several studies have defined these as either positive or negative mechanisms depending on the 407 purpose of control (Schaan, 1988; Kamminga and Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Geringer and Herbert 408 409 (1989) further classified the mechanisms of control into three groups. They include contentoriented mechanisms - more direct and reliant on top managers or key members on board; 410 context-oriented mechanisms - informal and cultural means to achieve strategic objectives of 411 firms; and process-oriented mechanisms - influencing IJV planning and decision-making 412 process by supporting and reporting relationships. Huang et al. (2015) represented these 413 mechanisms as formalization, socialization, and centralization, respectively. Ghauri et al. 414 415 (2013) concluded that aside from the direct reliant on key personnel, strategic institutional or systematic implanted strategies, which are partially reliant on the individuals themselves 416 (policy mechanisms), can relate to the process or way the IJV is conducted. 417

The *focus* of control represents the area or scope of activities over which an IJV partner exercise control. The application is either in a broad aspect or more specific, i.e. narrow, focus (Ghauri et al. 2013). Kauser and Shaw (2004) viewed the focus of control as either strategic or operational. Whereas strategic control focuses on specific activities at the IJV management level, operational control focuses on the day-to-day activities, making decisions at the operational level, regulating across functional areas, etc. (Whitelock and Yang, 2007).

The degree of control exerted over a specific control mechanism denotes the extent of 424 control. Thus, for each specific or operational area individual partners may exercise control on 425 a range from "none" to "total" or "loose" to "tight". Following this definition, Killing (1983) 426 defined joint ventures (JVs) grounded on the amount of control shared with an IJV partner. 427 428 They include management shared by the parents, management dominated by a single parent, and management independent of both parents. Split control was added by Choi and Beamish 429 (2004) to represent the control over distinct functional activities. Recognizing the complex, 430 431 dynamic and multidimensional nature of management control, Geringer and Herbert (1989) concluded that studying IJV control as an integrative concept in which the three dimensions 432 incorporated could provide a solid explanation to the performance implications of control. 433 434 Figure 3 shows the interrelationships between the three dimensions of control.

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438 4.2 Management control and performance relationship in IJVs439

440 The control exercised by corporate firms over an IJV significantly determines its performance
441 (Yan and Child, Liu et al. 2014). Aside from the direct impact of management control on
442 performance within IJVs, there is also a realization of competitive advantage by partnering

firms within their market (Le and Nhu, 2009). Management control becomes particularly 443 important when studied in parallel with performance as the structures implanted by corporate 444 firms provide the direction of the venture. Where control is lacking over an IJV can limit, 445 respectively, partners' ability to completely exploit and successfully implement their resources 446 and strategy (Ghauri et a. 2013). Thus, management control in IJVs is very important in 447 explaining IJVs performance and success. Performance implications of management control 448 have been an extremely interesting topic for researchers and practitioners alike. However, the 449 complete understanding and design of the two concepts have yet to be achieved. Consequently, 450 this has yielded conflicting and non-comparable results. The interpretation of this situation is 451 452 a result of the use of different constructs of management control and performance measures (Table 2 summarizes a list of research on management control and performance relationship 453 within IJVs). Also, previous studies have partially considered the three control dimensions 454 455 (Luo, 2001). Another questionable concern is from whose perspective (general managers, foreign or local partners), and which type of industry is studied. Interestingly, even studies in 456 the same country have produced noncomparable results. For example, in Taiwan, Lee et al. 457 (2011), Lin and Ho (2012), and Huang and Chiu (2014) found results supporting the 458 459 performance implication of control, however, with different constructs and from different perspectives. Whereas some used jointly and separately managed JVs as control constructs, 460 and client satisfaction as performance construct, others employed desired and exercise control, 461 and overall satisfaction, respectively. Similarly, in China, while Yan and Gray (1994) found 462 evidence supporting the shared management argument, Ding (1997; 1998) provided results 463 supporting the argument for one-partner-dominant. Further, some studies have also built their 464 argument using different theoretical underlying concepts, which makes it difficult to compare 465 results. Geringer and Herbert (1989); Zhang and Li (2001) and Choi and Beamish (2004) 466 elaborate more on these critical issues in previous studies. 467

468 In the construction environment, aside from the very few related studies, the core design of management control and performance is incomplete. For example, Luo (2001) examined the 469 interconnection between management control and performance in Sino-foreign construction 470 joint ventures in China by mapping management control to performance goals (profitability, 471 and government satisfaction) condemned to be inappropriate in reflecting the overall ICJVs 472 success. Grounded on Ho et al.'s (2009) contingency factor approach in determining the 473 governance structure (jointly and separately managed JVs) of ICJVs, Lin and Ho (2012) 474 empirically examined its impact on client satisfaction as the major proxy for the performance 475 in ICJVs, which is also judged to represent a minute of ICJVs performance. In short, a complete 476 understanding of the performance implication of management control within ICJVs has yet to 477 478 be established, tested, and explained.

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482 *4.2 IJVs performance evaluation*

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484 The incomplete picture of IJV performance evaluation criteria coupled with the fragmented status of related studies co-exists, yielding a unanimous conclusion. The case is worse in the 485 construction setting due to the complex contractual structures and dynamic environmental 486 487 conditions. Researchers and practitioners always find it difficult to assess the performance of ICJVs. Whereas practitioners find it difficult considering the angle from which measure 488 performance, researchers are always challenged with factors to use as indicators (Ozorhon et 489 490 al., 2007a). Earlier studies used either subjective, objective, or both measures for evaluating 491 ICJVs performance (Mohamed, 2003; Lin and Ho, 2012). Yet, these indicators poorly mirror the overall goal of ICJVs (Ozorhon et al., 2007). Important exceptions are that by Ozorhon et 492

al. (2010a; 2010b) which is considered the multidimensional goal of ICJVs. These studies
classified ICJVs performance measures into four constructs, namely: company/partner
performance, the performance of ICJV management, perceived satisfaction, and project-based
performance. Overall, while these indicators may partially or wholly reflect the operational
success of ICJVs, Tetteh et al. (2019) argued that a holistic ICJVs performance assessment is
still lacking. They proposed a fifth dimension called socio-environmental performance
(corporate sustainability measures) to reflect an all-inclusive performance goal of ICJVs.

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501 *4.3 Conceptual model development*

Of critical importance to the management of IJVs are how control is acquired, how it is 503 exercised, and how it influences IJV performance (Yan and Gray, 2001a). Notwithstanding, in 504 505 the management domain, previous studies have laid a rich conceptual foundation on which management control and performance link research in IJVs has increased. Drawing on these 506 theoretical grounds to provide an explanation for related issues in the construction industry is 507 not wrong as the literature of existing construction-related studies is firmly grounded or 508 509 established on these studies (e.g., Luo, 2001; Girmscheid and Brockmann, 2010; Ozorhon et al., 2010a; 2010b). It is important to note that IJV is a generic concept. Thus, it could be adopted 510 by different industries focussing on diverse operations or services such as research, 511 manufacturing, agriculture, etc. In the construction industry, the only difference is that it is 512 project-based - 'complete and dissolve' in nature as explained in detail (see, Section1.1). 513 Generally, borrowing a theory from a different field with a clear definition and position of its 514 applicability in a different context to explain a phenomenon important to the field is not wrong 515 (Murray and Evers, 1989). The IJV concept has long existed and practiced in the management 516 fields and theories abound within these settings and the youth of interdisciplinary fields such 517 518 as construction or the infrastructure sector has benefited more from such disciplines. An integrative approach for studying management control and performance relationship in ICJVs 519 from first principles is presented. 520

The exercise of management control and performance implication in IJV has been studied 521 from the following theoretical backgrounds: transaction-cost, , strategy-structure approach, and 522 relational characteristics (resource dependency, bargaining power). For instance, an early 523 framework by Geringer and Herbert (1989) was built on the transaction-cost and strategy-524 structure approach. From the perspective of power dependence, agency and transaction cost 525 theories, and theories about trust, Yan and Gray (2001a) proposed a model of control in IJVs. 526 Likewise, from an integrated view, Kamminga and Meer-Kooistra (2007) proposed a 527 528 management control model by considering four relational characteristics (parental differences, information asymmetry, trust, and bargaining power - both context- and resource-based) and 529 transaction cost approach. Although these studies have provided much theoretical insight into 530 IJV management control, they overlooked the fact that a complete theoretical explanation for 531 the determinants of control in IJV also relies on the institutional or the environmental context 532 in which the venture operates. Exceptional studies include the one by Luo et al. (2001) and Lee 533 et al. (2003) which considered the regulatory constraints and state-owned firms in host 534 countries as an institutional norm to determine management control in IJVs. These studies, 535 however, ignored the integrated view of the other theoretical stance in explaining management 536 537 control.

Practically, the need for control is not symmetric as Lee et al. (2003) emphasized. The institutional norms and environment setting interact to create a unique set of managerial values and control (Luo et al. 2001). In developing countries, for example, apart from the government restrictions on ownership divisions, the local content and local participation regulation ensure that the number of the local workforce in IJVs operations exceeds that of the foreign firms. This regulation is more pronounced in the construction industry and often makes the level of management control and performance more predictable. Acknowledging that both management control and performance are multidimensional phenomena, relying on this fundamental idea, a theoretical framework of management control determinants and performance in ICJVs is first presented (Figure 4).

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<Please insert Figure 4 here>

551 4.3.1 Constructs definition

By focusing on zone B of the theoretical framework presented above (Figure 4), a practical 553 translation of (the relationship between management control and performance) has been 554 555 presented in figure 5. In this study, the dimensions of control proposed by Geringer and Herbert (1989) provided a useful understanding of management control dynamics in IJVs (i.e., 556 mechanism, focus, and extent). Also, since performance in ICJVs is a multivariate construct 557 and cannot be represented by a single indicator, a multidimensional performance criterion 558 559 established by Tetteh et al. (2019) was adopted. In considering the legal, physical, or administrative means that a partner uses to provide direction, personnel, and policy-driven 560 mechanisms proposed by Ghuari et al. (2013) were adopted. Fryxell et al. (2002) pointed out 561 that the most common or likely response to a fall in performance expectations is an adjustment 562 of the control mechanisms. Thus, the control mechanism represents an important dimension of 563 management control of an IJV by determining who is perceived to be in control of which 564 function (scope/area of activities). Primarily, in IJVs, as Giacobbe and Booth (2009) 565 highlighted, partners normally agree on the operational areas that they can control effectively, 566 and some critical areas in construction include procurement, general management, and 567 operation, supervision, etc. Above all, the tightness, or loose extent of control within IJVs 568 present to be subjective and overlooked in extant literature. To stimulate future research 569 studies, the extent of control could represent the number of people and how experienced they 570 are in every specific operation. This may give a direct linkage to measurements that are precise 571 and objective in ICJVs. Consequently, the interwoven between the two concepts as proposed 572 remains to be tested and discussed in the global construction environment, to further enhance 573 the development of the IJV theory. 574

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576 *4.3.1.1 Personnel driven mechanisms*

578 Ghuari et al. (2013) defined this construct as the staffing of key members on board, or place in 579 positions from which they can exercise direct influence, both managerial and operational. Generally, most direct, and persuasive positions are on the board of directors, and through 580 strategic, organizational, and operational decisions, they provide directions and facilitate 581 monitoring and coordination, which determines the IJV position. As rooted under managerial 582 control functions, the knowledge and skill-sets ability (both technical and managerial) of 583 partners play an important role in deciding on who should exercise this role (Park, 2010). In 584 the construction environment, for example, apart from staffing top management positions, key 585 functional and operational areas that are based upon the daily routines and performance-based 586 587 activities influence the venture goal massively. Certainly, this is one key area that does not need or relate to the majority position in the venture, however, contingent on a clear area of 588 focus to be managed and influenced by the partners (e.g., daily supervision of construction 589 590 work, and workers on-site).

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- 592 *4.3.1.2 Policy-driven mechanisms*

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Ghauri et al. (2013) concluded that aside from the direct reliant on key personnel, strategic 594 institutional or systematic implanted strategies that are less reliant on the individuals 595 themselves are used. This creates a natural separation between the personnel provided to the 596 IJV and the manner or process in which the venture is operated. This construct is defined by 597 support in the policy and planning process, as well as training and learning opportunities. In 598 the construction environment, providing support in making development plans, human right 599 policies during project planning, monitoring and reporting project performance, reporting on 600 construction progress and schedules, provision of knowledge about host country's culture and 601 government issues, etc. can be captured under Geringer and Herbert's (1989) process-oriented 602 and context-oriented mechanisms. 603

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605 *4.3.1.3 Project-based performance*

Because ICJVs are launched on a project basis, project goal indicators are normally used to 607 measure their operational success (Ozorhon et al. 2007). The most commonly recognized 608 609 project goals indicators include cost, time, quality, and client/customer satisfaction (Ozorhon et al. 2010a). Moving beyond the traditional measures of assessing project performance, 610 McLeod et al. (2012) mentioned that other premeditated objective measures such as excellent 611 records related to management, profits, etc. should be included. In this regard, maintaining 612 excellent safety performance, excellent risks and issues management, and financial stability 613 (profitability) has become relevant to organizations. Likewise, Almohsen and Ruwanpura 614 (2016) pointed out that the number of occurrences of dispute resolution in an organization may 615 represent a sustainable measure, which cannot be influenced by human perception at the project 616 level. 617

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619 *4.3.1.4 Company/partner performance*

The conflicting goals of partnering firms in ICJV clearly show that ICJVs performance relates 621 directly to the partner firms (Han et al. 2018). Therefore, this perspective is viewed as the extent 622 to which pre-set company's goals are successfully realized dependent on the ICJV project 623 undertaken (Ozorhon et al., 2010a). Apart from bringing to success the traditional project 624 objectives including operational or financial objectives, distinct firms join hands to learn from 625 each other, become local champions, to be internationally recognized, share financial risks, 626 acquire both technical and managerial skills, build a strong company reputation, (Girmscheid 627 628 and Brockmann, 2010), etc. An empirical investigation showed that partner performance remains critical among the other constructs defining the multidimensionality of ICJV 629 performance. 630

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632 *4.3.1.5 Performance of the ICJV management*

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This perspective of measuring ICJVs performance characterizes the success of controlling 634 ICJVs operation (Ozorhon et al. 2010b). Thus, the power of participating in official duties 635 related to management and contingent on superiority in management and technical skills of 636 partners. Based on Yan and Gray (2001a) definition of management control, Ozorhon et al. 637 (2010b) used operational control which defines control at the general management level, 638 strategic control at the board of directors' level, and organizational control by the daily routines 639 640 and processes. While many studies view strategic control to be influenced by dominant ownership (Fryxell et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2011), operational and organizational control does 641 not require dominant ownership within the IJV. 642

643 644

<Please Insert Figure 5 here>

645

4.3.1.6 Perceived satisfaction

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This is one of the most frequently adopted performance measures in IJV literature. It measures 647 the extent of attaining the overall objectives of an ICJV (including survival, monetary, or 648 growth, or any other objectives) (Ozorhon et al., 2007). This construct is treated as a 649 compilation of IJV performance measures in extant literature. Nonetheless, Ren et al. (2009) 650 emphasized that this measure of success for an ICJV is biased towards objectivity because a 651 stand-alone entity raises the threat of validity. This is because different respondents perceive 652 653 satisfaction differently. Hence, reflecting firms' representative perception about the IJVs, Ozorhon et al. (2010b) proposed that "overall satisfaction" may represent the satisfaction of 654 corporate organizations with the venture. Thus, it gives an overall impression of an ICJV 655 success beyond all monetary and objective measures. 656

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658 *4.3.1.7 Socio-environmental performance*

Among the five constructs, this construct measures the extent to which an ICJV organization 660 has realized its corporate sustainability potentials (Tetteh et al. 2019). Whereas the social 661 feature reflects the satisfaction of the community, stakeholder engagement, sustainable job 662 creation, labour practice/relation, capacity development, health, and safety performance, etc., 663 environmental focus underlines compliance to environmental performance, environmental 664 reporting, pollution, etc. The pressure on corporations to embrace social and environmental 665 development in their operational routines necessitate great attention and must form part of 666 ICJVs' goal. 667

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669 *4.4 The innovation of the proposed framework*

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Generally, in IJV studies, the complete design of management control and performance 671 relationship is limited, and a worse case is seen in the construction domain. The innovativeness 672 of this study is that it provides a conceptual model to systematically address these three issues. 673 Thus, this study helps to project what functions would be most critical to a venture's overall 674 success. First, the model helps to overcome the controversy and extend extant literature about 675 how management control is acquired, how it is exercised, and how it impacts ICJV 676 performance by building on the transaction cost, institutional, and relational logic. Second, an 677 678 integrative definition and measurement method of the two concepts practically reflect the 679 nature of management control dynamics and performance implication in ICJVs. Third, the paper proposes hypotheses regarding multiple performance implications of diverse 680 management control in ICJVs, which remains to be tested and discussed. This may stimulate 681 future research and enhance the debate on the performance implication of different 682 management control aspects of an ICJV. Invariably, more generalizable findings may be 683 achieved, which may potentially help reconcile the controversy related to the management 684 control and performance relationship. 685

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687 **5. Future research directions**

As a key direction for future research, the established hypotheses are yet to be tested and explained. Thus, future studies could empirically test and analyze the performance implications of management control with complete measurement items to understand and build up the objectivity of the research findings. This could be achieved through multiple case studies and

quantitative research designs while incorporating a greater volume of secondary data from 692 multiple completed and ongoing ICJV projects to drive a better triangulation of the results. By 693 doing so, more rigorous statistical methods and analytical tools such as the Partial Least 694 Squares – Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), etc. 695 could also be employed in testing and validating the established framework. Second, the 696 stagewise progression of ICJVs growth means dynamic control mechanisms and performance 697 implications. Therefore, in future research, it may be interesting to examine the management 698 control and performance link against the dynamic growth stages using simulation-based 699 700 techniques such as system dynamics. Third, the existing literature empirically presents many 701 views on this study from the foreign partners' perspective and has neglected the overall influence of local partners in ICJVs operations. Therefore, considering the views of the local 702 partners in ICJVs studies is a promising research focus. This would help draw objective 703 704 conclusions, to develop a comprehensive framework that provides guidelines and reference to construction stakeholders on how best to control ICJVs operations to enhance the overall 705 performance. Finally, the nonlinear link of management control and performance in IJV studies 706 can also suggest that it is influenced by other moderating variables. Thus, exploring their 707 708 moderating roles would probably refine the understanding of the linkage between management control and performance. 709

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711 6. Conclusions and Limitations

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713 The lack of a complete understanding of management control and performance concept in 714 ICJVs, explains the increasing controversy in the extant literature on their interrelation. In this study, an extensive review of the pertinent literature was conducted to synthesize prior studies 715 addressing the conceptualization, and interrelationship between management control and 716 717 performance in IJVs. Also, a conceptual model for studying the performance implications of management control in ICJVs is presented. The model shows how control is acquired, how it 718 is exercised, and how it impacts ICJV performance. This study contributes to knowledge and 719 practice. Drawing on the transaction cost, institutional, and relational logic, this study adds to 720 knowledge by revealing that the exercise of management control does not solely depend on 721 transaction cost and rational characteristics; but, also rooted in the societal or institutionalized 722 custom of corporations in IJVs. The first inclusive hypothetical model for studying the 723 relationship between different dimensions of management control and multiple performance 724 criteria in ICJVs is presented. This study also has important implications for ICJV front-liners 725 - policymakers to keep up and improve overall performance. The assessment of the 726 727 hypothesized model will bring to light the control structures having the greatest paths that can be employed to boost the performance of ICJVs. Thus, uncovering the critical paths will assist 728 front-liners to approach management control holistically and systematically to promote the 729 730 achievement of ICJV goals, and enhance the understanding of the decisions they make about the activities to control and mechanisms to use. This will not only provide a strategic advantage 731 by helping them to understand the complexities of their venture but will also allow them to 732 733 critically evaluate their current management practices and policies and to develop alternatives for improving overall performance and increasing the chances of success. 734

This study is not without limitations. First, whereas the process of identifying relevant publications may be considered a restriction, the cross-systematic mapping technique warranted wide exposure of the relevant literature. The method also contributed to the validity of extensive coverage of high-impact peer-reviewed journals. Second, the keywords used may be regarded as another limitation. However, based on the methodological approach and the criteria for selecting relevant papers, the review highly stands in a better position to provide an understanding of the management control and performance concept in ICJVs. Third, while this

study puts forward a hypothetical framework for studying management control and 742 performance relationships, critical variables operationalizing the measurement and evaluation 743 of the developed constructs are needed before the usefulness of the framework can be fully 744 appreciated. Although drawing on the transaction cost, institutional and relational logic the 745 framework appears particularly relevant for examining this relationship, there could be other 746 relevant theoretical bases which this study did not touched on. It is, therefore, in the remit of 747 further research to identify other relevant theories to support and enhance the development of 748 ICJV theory. Finally, another limitation worth mentioning is the validation of the framework. 749 750 As validation is key in demonstrating the applicability of the established framework; however, 751 it must be clarified that this is a conceptual study, which aims to develop a framework for studying management control and performance implications in ICJVs. This limitation of the 752 study is, therefore, acknowledged and demonstrated how such a move could be achieved in the 753 754 previous section. 755

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1035 Figure 2. Research methodological framework



1037 1038 Figure 3. Dimensions of IJV control (adapted from Giacobbe and Booth, 2009)



Figure 4. A theoretical framework of management control determinants and performance in ICJVs



Overall ICJV performance criteria

1042 Figure 5. A conceptual model for control and performance relationship within ICJVs

1043 Table 1. Journal information of selected p	bapers
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Selected journal	Number of papers
nternational Business Review (IBR)	4
ournal of International Marketing (JIM)	3
ournal of International Business Studies (JIBS)	3
Asia Pacific Management Review (APMR)	2
ournal of Business Research (JBR)	2
Financial Management (FM)	1
ournal of Cleaner Production (JCP)	1
Critical Perspectives on International Business (CPIB)	1
The Service Industries Journal (TSIJ)	1
ournal for Global Business Advancement (JGBA)	1
European Management Journal (EMJ)	1
Organization Science (OS)	1
Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics (APJML)	1
Construction Management and Economics (CME)	1
ournal of Asia-Pacific Business (JAPB)	1
Management International (MI)	1
ournal of Management Studies (JMS)	1
ournal of construction engineering and management (JCEM)	1
ournal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship (JAME)	1
Strategy and Governance of Networks (SGN)	1
Academy of Management Journal (AMJ)	1
Managerial Finance (MF)	1
Fotal	31

Authors	Conceptualization of management control	Measures of performance	Country	Industry	Perspective/Focus area	Management control-performance relationship
Mantecon et al. (2016)	Dominant- and shared-control	Return on assets	USA	Manufacturing	Parents firms	A positive relationship, however, shared control highly correlate with performance
Huang et al. (2015)	Centralization, formalization, and socialization	Strategic goal achievement, cooperative relationship with IJV's partners, willingness to continue this cooperative relationship	China	Multiple industries including the manufacturing, machinery, etc.	Foreign partners	A direct effect of formalization and socialization on IJV performance. No significant relationship between centralization and performance.
Shah (2015)	Strategic control by equity shares, and specific control by appointments	Internal and external environmental orientation, and corporate and functional strategic focus	Trinidad and Tobago	Oil, gas and chemical sector	Top firm managers	Direct influence
Huang and Chiu (2014)	Desired and exercise control	Overall performance	Taiwan	Manufacturing, financial, and human resource management	Parent firms	Both positively influence performance.
Ghauri et al. (2013)	Personnel and policy control mechanisms	Overall satisfaction, profit, and growth	South Korea	Multiple industries	Foreign partners (CEOs)	While personnel control influence satisfaction, policy control impact both financial and growth measures.
Lee et al. (2011)	Human resource, cultural, and performance control mechanisms	Economic, competency-based, and synthetic performance	Taiwan	Service industry	Foreign parents (MNCs)	-
Porporato (2009)	Strategic, managerial, and operational control	Financial, operating, and subjective indicators	Canada	Motor/auto parts industry	IJV managers	Positive influence
Selekler-Gökşen and Uysal-Tezölmez (2007)	Strategic and operational control	Financial returns and goal achievement	Turkey	Manufacturing	Local parent	Both positively influence financial returns. No variation in terms of goal achievement.
Mjoen and Tallman (1997)	Specific and equity control	Overall IJV goal	Norway	Multi-industrial sectors including, construction, engineering, etc.	Local firms	Strongly and positively related
Whitelock and Yang (2007)	Strategic and operational control	Market-developing, efficiency- seeking, and knowledge- acquiring objectives	China	Multiple industries (machinery, textiles, electronics, etc.)	Parent firms	Direct impact
Pangarkar and Klein (2004)	Extent of control	Overall success, stability, sales growth, market share, and profitability	Singapore	-	Foreign parents	Partial support for a contingent control-performance link
Choi and Beamish (2004)	Split control, shared management, MNE-partner-dominant, and local-partner-dominant	Overall satisfaction	Korea	Manufacturing	Parent firms	A direct link between split control and performance. No significant relationships among the remaining three types of control.
Lee et al. (2003)	Asymmetry of governance structure (either local or foreign partner dominance)	Overall performance (profitability)	China	Manufacturing enterprises	Top firm managers	Asymmetry governance reveals no significant relationship with profitability compared to those operating under an asymmetric structure.

Table 2 Summary of research on management control and performance relationship within IJVs

Yan and Gray (2001a)	Strategic, operational, and structural control	Strategic objectives	-	-	-	-
Zhang and Li (2001)	Shared management, dominant type, and independent type	Productivity, product competitiveness, innovativeness, partner harmony, achieving partner's objectives, profitability, and growth and expansion	China	Manufacturing industries	Local general managers	Contingent on the evolutional control design process
Luo (2001)	Strategic, operational, and structural control	Profitability, and government satisfaction	China	Construction	Foreign partners	Positive and significant correlations were found among the three control and performance measures
Luo et al. (2001) Ramaswamy et al.	Overall, and specific control Equity control	Overall satisfaction Return on assets, return on	China India	Manufacturing industries Manufacturing industries	Parent firms Longitudinal	Strong positive relationship The curvilinear relationship between
(1998) Wang et al. (1998)	Control mechanisms	equity and return on sales Growth, profitability, and overall performance	Singapore	Multi-industrial sectors including, construction,	Local partners	Positive relationship exists
Glaister and Buckley (1998)	Mechanism, extent, and focus control	Subjective and objective measures	UK	Manufacturing and tertiary sector	Foreign partners	Objective measures significantly correlate with the dimensions of control than that of subjective measures of performance
Ding (1998)	Dominant- and shared-control	The financial, non-financial, and combined performance	China	Multiple industries	Foreign partners	Different performance impact of control among local and foreign firms
Ding (1997)	Dominant- and shared-control	Financial and non-financial measures	China	Multiple industries	Foreign partners	Dominant control positively influences performance.
Hebert (1996)	Dominant- and shared-control	Satisfaction, and business performance	Canada	Manufacturing	Parent firms	Shared-control exhibited significant higher performance than dominant- control
Yan and Gray (2001b)	Strategic, operational, and structural control	Strategic objectives	China	Multiple industries	Top firm managers	Operational control positively influences performance. No significant relationship between the two other controls and performance.
Lin and Ho (2012)	Jointly managed JVs, and separately managed JVs	Client satisfaction	Taiwan	Construction	Project managers	Jointly managed JVs correlates more positively with performance than the separately managed
Lu and Hebert (2005)	Equity control	IJV survival	International survey	-	Foreign partners	Positive
Duan and Chuanmin (2007)	Strategic and operational control	Can be measured from a different perspective of JV partners	China	Manufacturing industries	Top firm managers	Direct
Le Nguyen and Larimo (2008)	Mechanism, extent, and focus control	Overall satisfaction	Finland	-	-	Direct
Yan and Gray (1994)	Mechanism, extent, and focus control	Strategic objectives	China	Multiple industries	Parent firms	Direct
Chalos and O'Connor (1998)	Outcome and behavioural control	Strategic objectives	International survey	Manufacturing industries	Top firm managers	-