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Container Barge Network Development in Inland Rivers: A Comparison between the Yangtze River and the Rhine River

Abstract:

The formation of barge networks on rivers and associated inland port systems is subject to a complex set of influencing factors and mechanisms. This paper aims to present a comprehensive comparative empirical analysis focusing on the container shipping (barge) network in the Yangtze and the Rhine. This analysis is supported by extensive datasets on both river basins, incorporates the latest development on both rivers and is grounded on concepts and methods coming from transport geography and economic geography. We find that a large diversity might exist in how inland port systems and related gateway seaports are dealing with cargo flows and supply chains. In view of explaining this diversity, we make a distinction between geographical/nautical aspects, macro-economic factors and institutional/governance factors. In particular, we discuss the role of institutional and governance factors in barge network development by using the concepts of selection, retention and variation.

Keywords: Inland Waterway Transport, Container Barge Network, Comparative Study, Cargo Concentration, Yangtze River, Rhine River


30 **1. Introduction**

31 The Yangtze River and the Rhine River are the two most important inland rivers in the
32 world in terms of freight transport and play an increasingly important role in regional
33 economic development. The two rivers have witnessed time-specific processes of
34 containerization and associated barge shipping configuration linked to the macro-
35 economic and logistics development stage of the regions concerned, i.e. China and
36 northwest Europe respectively. *Although existing studies have addressed the barge
37 network configuration of these two rivers, few attempts have been made to compare
38 their respective development stages. This paper provides a comprehensive comparative
39 analysis on the two rivers in order to understand if there exists a general evolutionary
40 pattern of inland river container barge network development.*

41 As the mother river of China, the Yangtze River and its branches cover more than half
42 of provinces as well as population in China and play a critical role for domestic
43 transportation of China. The freight volume of Yangtze River is over 2 billion tons
44 annually (Yangtze River Shipping Administration, 2018). The Rhine basin covers 5.4%
45 of the land area of the EU 27 countries, and this area houses nearly 15% of the total
46 population of the EU 27 and generates an elevated 18.7% of the gross domestic product
47 of the EU27 (Notteboom, 2017). The Yangtze River (Figure 1) and the Rhine River
48 (Figure 2) have their unique geographic conditions. Both rivers can be divided in a
49 lower, middle and upper reach. Each reach includes a range of inland container ports
50 and terminals of different scales.

51 In the past 40 years, both the Rhine River and the Yangtze River have witnessed a
52 strong growth of container traffic and dynamics in the barge network configuration.
53 This rapid increase and development of container traffic has changed the spatial and
54 functional configuration of the respective container shipping networks in these river
55 basins. The container shipping network in turn reshaped shipping practices and
56 supported regional economic development.

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Figure 1. The different reaches of the Yangtze River




Figure 2. The different reaches of the Rhine River

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63 The container barge network development on the Rhine River has been investigated by
 64 many researchers. The early works include Notteboom (2001) and Notteboom and
 65 Konings (2004). These studies explore the organisational changes in the European
 66 container barge industry and its impact on the spatial dynamics in the European
 67 container barge network. They distinguish four separate phases in barge network
 68 development, focusing on growth, concentration and dispersion of inland container
 69 terminals in the network in connection to port system development. The potential role
 70 and spatial configuration of a container barge network is also strongly entwined with
 71 the availability and navigability of the inland waterways and canals, the cargo
 72 dispersion patterns along the waterway system and the distances between the gateway
 73 ports and the economic centers in the hinterland. Also, Frémont et al. (2009) present a
 74 four-phased model on barge network development. By focusing on the Seine basin
 75 (linked to gateway port Le Havre) and the Rhône River (in combination with seaport
 76 Marseille) in France, their model explicitly considers the interdependence between the
 77 setting up of combined waterway-road services, and the competition between ports and
 78 the competition between shipping lines. They argue that infrastructure, characteristics
 79 of the market, services and terminals, end-haul road transportation and market
 80 organization are the key factors affecting the development of container transport by
 81 barge. More recently, Notteboom (2017) conceptualized the interdependency between

82 port systems and barge networks and presented a life-cycle approach to barge network
83 development, using the barge connectivity between the Benelux seaport system and the
84 Rhine basin as a case study. The study underlines that barge networks have to meet the
85 cargo demand and requirements of global supply chains, but are also affected by
86 operational considerations of barge operators in terms of service network configuration
87 and barge scale and utilization levels.

88 Academic works on the Yangtze River are of more recent date. In a study on seaport
89 system development in China in the period 1990-2005, Rimmer and Comtois (2009)
90 point to the penetration of containerization inland along the Yangtze River, strongly
91 facilitated by state-owned COSCON, as one of the main growth factors for the port of
92 Shanghai. The spatial dynamics of container barge network in Yangtze has also been
93 widely examined. Veenstra and Notteboom (2011) presents a containerized cargo
94 concentration analysis for the inland ports on the Yangtze River for the period 2002-
95 2010 and link it to the port regionalization concept introduced by Notteboom and
96 Rodrigue (2005). They argued that the Yangtze River container transportation system
97 is going through a regionalization phase. This process started on the lower Yangtze
98 River but is now also moving upstream. Based on the previous findings, Wang and
99 Ducruet (2012) examine the impact of the Yangshan port on the spatial pattern of the
100 Yangtze River Delta since the 1970s, and they identify the noticeable development
101 deviations between Yangtze River and the general port system spatial evolutionary
102 models. With strong national policy support, Shanghai-Yangshan has taken the form
103 and function of a dual hub and gateway for ports along Yangtze River. Zheng and Yang
104 (2016) discuss the possible hub-and-spoke container barge network on the Yangtze
105 River to exploit the economies of scale within the existing Yangtze River transport
106 network. Their findings support the trends toward cargo concentration and port
107 regionalization along the Yangtze River. Some recent papers explore the influencing
108 factors shaping the port system. Li et al. (2014) argue that the development of the
109 Yangtze River shipping network is strongly influenced by institutional changes at
110 different levels of government in line with the path dependent transformation of the
111 Chinese central planning economy. Yang et al. (2017) suggest that geographical
112 conditions, institutional factors and national policy, industrial agglomeration, and
113 changes in market supply and demand along with technology updates drive the
114 reshaping of the shipping network in the Yangtze River.

115 We only find one study providing a comparative analysis of the Yangtze and Rhine
116 rivers. Notteboom (2007) presents a qualitative assessment of similarities and
117 dissimilarities between the spatial and the functional development of the container river
118 service networks of the Yangtze River and the Rhine River. While such developments
119 are location-specific and time-specific, the study reveals the Yangtze service network
120 has the tendency to converge, in more than one aspect, with the (historical) development
121 pattern of inland container services in the Rhine basin.

122 A few conclusions can be drawn when examining extant literature on barge network
123 and inland port development.

124 First, extant literature basically analyzes two aspects. The first aspect relates to the
125 development of (inland) port systems in terms of configuration transformation, e.g. by
126 measuring cargo concentration or deconcentration patterns. The second aspect explores
127 the factors which can explain the transformation of a river's network configuration. In
128 a number of studies both aspects are combined to present models on the spatial and
129 functional development of container barge networks on rivers (e.g. Notteboom and

130 Konings, 2004; Frémont et al., 2009; Veenstra and Notteboom, 2011; Wiegmans et al.,
131 2015; Notteboom, 2017; Yang et al., 2017), which are largely inspired by similar
132 models found in seaport system development literature.

133 Second, the existing spatial models on inland port system development portray a high
134 degree of path dependency in the development of inland ports at a regional scale. Path
135 dependence explains how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is
136 limited by the decisions one has made in the past. Future events are not independent
137 from past events and the sequence of events makes a difference for the outcome. The
138 focus on path dependency seems to suggest that inland port systems as well as the
139 container barge shipping network would follow a similar evolutionary development
140 path. It can be argued, however, that development processes also show a certain degree
141 of contingency. Strategies and actions of market players and other stakeholders may
142 deviate from existing development paths. This might lead to path disruption, a concept
143 that has only received some attention in the context of the more institutional aspects of
144 container barge network development (see e.g. Li et al., 2014).

145 Third, the empirical research found in existing literature focuses on single river systems
146 in a specific part of the world, e.g. the Rhine, the Yangtze, the Seine, etc. Except for
147 the qualitative work of Notteboom (2007), there are no comparative studies analysing
148 development patterns in inland port systems in different parts of the world. While
149 existing studies rightly argue that the development path of a barge network is location-
150 specific and time-specific and subject to a specific economic system with a different
151 mix of economic actors and the government, it is not clear how differences in such a
152 mix across regions might lead to some level of disparity among inland port systems.
153 For example, some inland port systems might be subject to a careful (central) planning
154 by policy makers and investors, while others might be more the result of ad hoc
155 decisions and investments fuelled by “windows of opportunity” that arise (see Jacobs
156 and Notteboom, 2011).


157 This paper is the first study to present a comprehensive comparative empirical analysis
158 focusing on the container shipping (barge) network in the Yangtze and the Rhine. This
159 analysis is supported by extensive datasets on both river basins, incorporates the latest
160 development on both rivers and is grounded on concepts and methods coming from
161 transport geography and economic geography. The novelty of this study lies in the
162 combination of descriptive and explanatory methods to analyse and compare the
163 dynamics in the barge networks in both river basins. By following this approach, this
164 paper can help readers to comprehensively and thoroughly understand the general
165 evolution model of container shipping (barge) networks in inland river systems.

166

167 **2. Research design and methodology**

168 We present and apply a two-step methodological approach to analyse and compare
169 container barge network development on the Yangtze and Rhine Rivers (Figure 3).
170 First, we conduct a descriptive analysis to compare the overall evolutionary patterns of
171 the two rivers. Following this, we further provide an explanatory analysis to figure out
172 the factors which affect the evolutionary patterns of two rivers. The descriptive analysis

173 thus helps to uncover the differences in their evolutionary patterns and the explanatory
174 analysis explains these differences.



175

176

Figure 3. Research design

177 2.1 Descriptive analysis

178 We present a **descriptive analysis** of barge network development on the two rivers.
179 These networks consist of nodes (the inland ports) located laterally along the respective
180 rivers. We analyse spatial cargo distribution in these networks by analysing and
181 comparing the overall evolution of the container throughput in both rivers and its
182 respective reaches, and cargo concentration and deconcentration patterns in the inland
183 port systems of both rivers. The term ‘cargo’ thus refers to container throughput in this
184 study. A detailed analysis of scheduled container liner services on the rivers falls
185 beyond the scope of the descriptive analysis, although liner services are also a feature
186 of container barge networks.

187 The measurement of cargo concentration/deconcentration is a common theme in
188 seaport geography literature (Ng et al., 2014). Ducruet et al. (2009) identified 34
189 academic studies on port system concentration published between 1963 and 2008. A
190 more recent study is Wilmsmeier et al. (2014) on port system evolution in Latin
191 America and the Caribbean. The most used measures in extant literature include C4
192 index (i.e. the combined market share of the four largest ports in the system), the
193 Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI), Lorenz curves and the Gini coefficient and the
194 associated Gini decomposition analysis (Notteboom, 2006).

195 While the analysis of cargo concentration patterns is a mature research area in (sea) port
196 geography literature, there are hardly any studies applying concentration measures to
197 inland port systems. A notable exception is the study by Veenstra and Notteboom
198 (2011) which examines cargo concentration levels on the Yangtze River in the period
199 2002-2010 using a combination of Gini coefficients and Teil indices (Theil-T and
200 Theil-L redundancies). However, as the dataset only relates to the short time frame of
201 2002-2010, the study could only detect medium term concentration dynamics in the
202 Yangtze River.

203 The virtual absence of studies on cargo concentration in inland port systems is partly
 204 due to data availability issues. Container throughput data for seaports are widely
 205 available as they are made public by seaport authorities, (national) statistical offices
 206 and international or regional port associations (such as International Association of
 207 Ports and Harbors and European Sea Ports Organisation). While a number of inland
 208 ports and public agencies publish cargo throughput data online, there is a general lack
 209 of publicly available inland port data, both in Europe and China. In Europe, the existing
 210 gap between seaports and inland ports in terms of data collection and publication
 211 cultures was confirmed during the European Commission’s Portopia project (Portopia,
 212 2016).

213 In this study, we apply the HHI index to measure cargo concentration patterns along
 214 the two rivers, since the HHI index can reflect changes in barge networks including
 215 amongst smaller ports. The HHI index is a commonly accepted measure of market
 216 concentration, by means of comparing the share of an individual company in relation
 217 to the industry. In this study, it is calculated as:

$$218 \quad H_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} TEU_{ij}^2}{(\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} TEU_{ij})^2}, \quad \frac{1}{n} < H_j < 1 \quad (1)$$

219 where H_j is the HHI index of inland port system j , n is the number of inland ports, and
 220 TEU_{ij} is the TEU throughput of inland port i in inland port system j . The value of the
 221 HHI index ranges from $1/n$ to 1. Since the number of inland ports may differ between
 222 inland port systems, the Normalized HHI is used when the concentration levels of two
 223 inland port systems are compared:

$$224 \quad H_j^N = \frac{HHI_j - \frac{1}{n}}{1 - \frac{1}{n}} \quad (2)$$

225 A high HHI value denotes a high level of concentration and vice versa (Rhoades, 1993).

226 **2.2 Explanatory analysis**

227 *2.2.1 Factors driving the inland river barge network*

228 We present the **explanatory analysis** of barge network development on the two rivers
 229 by examining the factors that might explain the observed throughput development and
 230 the similarities and differences between the barge network development paths of the
 231 Yangtze River and Rhine River. Seaport geography literature has commented on the
 232 drivers of cargo concentration and deconcentration paths in port systems. Wiradanti et
 233 al. (2018) updated the work of Ducruet et al. (2009) on the concentration and
 234 deconcentration factors in seaport system development and show how these factors
 235 emerged in the time periods 1970-1990, 1990-2008 and post-2008. These factors relate
 236 to port city dynamics, congestion/lack of space, (dis)economies of scale, dynamics in
 237 foreland and inland connectivity, technological developments, changes in investments
 238 patterns and government policy (e.g. export-led policies and regional development
 239 plans). Research on factors affecting the development path of inland port systems is
 240 sparse. Based on extant literature (see section 1), we cluster the factors affecting barge
 241 network development paths in three categories (see also Figure 3):

- 242 • *geographical/nautical factors*: these relate to the nautical accessibility of a river
 243 basin or river stretches, the geographical setting of the service areas of inland

244 ports and the spatial interdependencies between the inland port system and the
245 associated seaports;

246 • *macro-economic factors*: these refer to the functional and spatial organisation
247 of the economic system in and around the river basin, the growth of cargo-
248 generating activities and the containerisation process of trade flows between the
249 river basin's service area and other economies in the region and around the
250 world;

251 • *institutional and governance factors*: Institutions consist of a set of formal or
252 informal rules (North, 1990; Strambach, 2010). A distinction can be made
253 between the institutional environment (i.e. legally enforced rules and
254 regulations, but also informal conventions, customs, routines and norms) and
255 institutional arrangements referring to organizational forms (firms, state
256 bureaucracies, governance systems, etc.). Inland port systems are subject to
257 institutions and governance settings in which a variety of actors and interests
258 from various territorial scales interact, conflict and form coalitions.

259

260 2.2.2 Selection, Retention and Variation

261 There is an extensive literature on 'institutions' and 'governance' in a seaport setting
262 (see e.g. the edited works of Brooks and Cullinane, 2006 and Brooks et al, 2017). The
263 seaport-related literature suggests that institutions enable, constrain and refract
264 industries and economic development in spatially differentiated ways. The notion of
265 path dependence has been used to explain the unique development trajectories of ports
266 and the diversity of governance structures.

267 Because of the place specific nature of rivers and inland ports, institutional differences
268 in the way inland ports are owned, managed and developed persist. Still, the role of
269 institutions and governance in barge transport and inland port development has received
270 only limited attention. Notable exceptions include the works of Li et al. (2014) and Li
271 et al. (2017) analysing the impact of changes in institutional and governance practices
272 at different levels of government in China on the development of inland waterway
273 transport in the Yangtze River and the Pearl River respectively.

274 To factor in institutions and governance as explanatory factors for inland port system
275 development in the Rhine and Yangtze basins, we use concepts and insights from
276 economic geography literature. We argue that the outcome of inland port system
277 development is dependent on a mix of path dependency and contingency. We
278 conceptualize those mechanisms that lead to path dependency and those that lead to
279 path disruption or even path destruction by identifying three basic principles driving
280 evolutionary inland port systems: selection, retention and variation (see also Nelson
281 and Winter, 2002 and Glückler, 2007 for the terminology used).

282 **Selection** relates to the competitive process that selects winners and losers in inland
283 port systems and to the formation of competitive and or cooperative linkages between
284 the actors in an inland port system. The outcome of selection processes is not only
285 depending on the external selective environment (exogenous), but also on the strategic
286 intentions and actions of the actors involved (endogenous). Exogenous developments
287 affecting ports are well documented in literature: macro-economic developments,

288 globalization and trade patterns, supply chain dynamics and logistics integration and
289 transport deregulation to name but a few. Endogenous factors can relate to e.g. inland
290 terminal awarding procedures and decisions, internal market competition or the
291 strategies of inland port players. Selection processes can occur among incumbent actors
292 in the inland port system (e.g. established inland terminal operators) but also in relation
293 to new entrants with no previous links to the inland port system (e.g. a deep-sea terminal
294 operator acquiring an inland terminal facility).

295 **Retention** refers to the structural mechanisms that cause new developments to reinforce
296 the existing hierarchy in an inland port system. Past choices have a structural effect on
297 the natural inclination for new tie selection to reproduce and reinforce an existing
298 system. Path dependency in the development of an inland port system might be
299 increased by some behavioural mechanisms influencing the interaction among actors
300 in the inland port system. One of these mechanisms is preferential attachment. The
301 actors in a specific inland port system with many ties are more likely to receive new
302 ties in the future. For example, an inland terminal operator with a strong track record
303 has a good position to establish new customer relationships or relationships with other
304 actors in the market. Embedding is another mechanism strengthening path dependency.
305 The mechanism of embedding assumes that future ties form around existing strong ties
306 by processes of trust. Preferential attachment and embedding can lead to self-
307 reinforcing effects whereby established inland ports become even more dominant in an
308 inland port system.

309 The concept of **variation** relates to both exogenous and endogenous mechanisms that
310 enable novelty and path disruption in the development of an inland port system.
311 Variation is strongly linked with contingency as it countervails against existing
312 trajectories and against the retention mechanisms outlined above. It is strongly
313 influenced by ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘critical junctures’ (Jacobs and Notteboom,
314 2011) and action-reaction patterns in strategic behavior of public and private agents.
315 Variation can lead almost overnight to a new hierarchy in an inland port system or to a
316 new competitive setting among inland terminal facilities.

317 [In the following sections 3 and 4, we identify similarities and differences between the](#)
318 [development patterns of the two rivers, and we summarize the general development](#)
319 [pattern with evidences led by three influencing factors.](#)

320 **3. Descriptive analysis of inland port system development on Rhine and Yangtze**

321 In this section, we review the evolution of the total container throughput along the
322 Rhine and Yangtze Rivers, the changes in cargo traffic distribution along the river
323 stretches and also the changes in the cargo concentration levels. By doing so, we aim
324 to identify the similarities and differences in the rivers’ development trajectories, and
325 to examine if a general development pattern exists.

326 **3.1 Container throughput evolution**

327 To achieve our research objective, total container throughput data per inland port along
328 the Yangtze and Rhine were collected. The Rhine container traffic dataset covers 26
329 inland ports for the period 1970-2016. The throughput dataset for the Yangtze River
330 includes 1995-2016 figures for 22 ports. The collection of historical data proved to be

331 particularly difficult, so additional data had to be obtained through an extensive search
 332 of media archives (specialized transport and logistics newspapers and magazines) and
 333 personal contacts with actors involved in inland ports.

334 A wide range of data sources was used to compile throughput statistics (table 1):


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Table 1 Data sources for this study

Data Sources	Rhine River	Yangtze River
National statistical offices	Destatis (2018) for Germany	National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018); Ministry of Transport of China (2018).
Regional statistical offices	Information und Technik Nordrhein-Westfalen (2017) for the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen	Nil
Individual public or private inland port authorities and inland terminal operating companies	Duisport (Duisburg), Swissterminal and Rhine Europe Terminals	Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG)
Inland port associations and co-operation schemes	European Federation of Inland Ports (EFIP) and Upper Rhine Ports	Nil
Statistics and reports published by organizations	Central Commission of the Navigation on the Rhine (see e.g. CCNR, 2018), European Barge Union (EBU), Inland Navigation Europe (INE), Verein für europäische Binnenschifffahrt und Wasserstraßen (VBW)	Fifty Year Statistics Compilation of New China Traffic (1949-1999), Compilation of National Transport Statistics of China (2001-2018)

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
337 Figure 4 shows the total container throughput evolution and year-to-year growth figures
 338 for the Yangtze River (part a) and the Rhine River (part b). Although strong fluctuations
 339 in year-to-year growth figures exist, both rivers experienced a steep growth in the early
 340 stages of their development followed by a much weaker growth pattern.



341

342

(a) Yangtze River



343

344

(b) Rhine River

345

Figure 4. Total container throughput and growth of Yangtze River and Rhine River

346

As for the Yangtze River, since at the turn of the century when port decentralization started and China joined WTO, the average growth rate has increased significantly with an average annual growth rate of approximately 30% which reached a peak of more than 40% in 2006. In 2009, the shipping industry was heavily affected by the global financial crisis and the growth rate fell to only 2.1%. But it rebounded to over 20% from 2010 to 2012, which was mainly due to the four-trillion-RMB investment from the Chinese central government in response to the financial crisis. Then it fell to close to 0% in 2013 again when the economy of China turned from high-speed development to medium-speed and stable development. The GDP growth rate of China dropped from more than 10% to less than 8% since 2013 (IMF). Since 2015, the container throughput in the Yangtze basin resumed growth, although the growth rate never reached 10%.

357

The Rhine River achieved its fastest growth during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1970s early 1980s, barge operators started to offer scheduled liner container services


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359 on the Rhine. For this purpose, operators divided the Rhine into three navigation
 360 stretches, namely the Lower Rhine (as far as Cologne/Bonn – only limited number of
 361 services at that time), the Middle Rhine (from Bonn up to Karlsruhe) and the Upper
 362 Rhine (from Karlsruhe up to Basel in Switzerland). This operational division of the
 363 Rhine in three navigation areas is still used today. Once punctuality could be guaranteed
 364 by fixed departure schedules for each navigation area, with exceptions only occurring
 365 in case of low water levels, barge transport quickly gained in competitiveness. No less
 366 than twenty new Rhine terminals (mostly on the upper and middle sections) were
 367 opened in the period 1980-1987, mainly by barge operating companies who saw the
 368 operation of their own single-user terminals as a way to guarantee success of their liner
 369 services. The introduction of many new scheduled container services between gateway
 370 ports Rotterdam and Antwerp and the Rhine basin led to a growth of Rhine traffic from
 371 20,000 TEU (1976) to about 311,000 TEU ten years later. In the mid-1980s, barge
 372 carriers started to operate joint liner services on the different navigation areas of the
 373 Rhine in order to raise the service level and prevent destructive competition (e.g. the
 374 Fahrgemeinschaft Oberrhein or Upper Rhine transport collective, Konings, 1999). In
 375 1998, the container volume reached over 1 million TEU for the first time. The number
 376 of terminals along the Rhine basin continued to increase in the new millennium. This
 377 was partly the result of new terminal operators arriving on the market (such as
 378 Rotterdam-based deepsea terminal operator ECT in Duisburg in 1999) and the
 379 emergence of entirely new terminal areas along the Rhine and its tributaries, e.g.
 380 Aschaffenburg, Krefeld and Mannheim. The growing volume base led, where possible,
 381 to scale increases in vessel size. For example, larger barges were being introduced on
 382 the lower reach such as the Jowi ship class with a slot capacity of up to 500 TEU and
 383 push convoy combinations of up to 600 TEU. In the period 2005-2008, total container
 384 throughput stabilized at 1.8-1.9 million TEU. Crisis year 2009 brought a volume drop
 385 of approximately 9% followed by a strong recovery in 2010. After a stagnation of the
 386 throughput between 2010 and 2013, growth resumed in recent years to reach a record
 387 throughput of 2.28 million TEU in 2016.

388

389 3.2 Traffic distribution along the river stretches

390 The direction of spatial development over time differs between the Yangtze River and
 391 the Rhine River. This is illustrated by Figure 5 which shows the total container
 392 throughput of the different reaches in the Yangtze and the Rhine.



393

394 *Figure 5. Total container throughput of different reaches in the Yangtze (left) and the*
 395 *Rhine (right)*

396 The Yangtze River witnessed a development pattern initiated downstream and moving
397 upstream. In the Yangtze River, containerization first occurred at the lower reach in the
398 early 1990s. The manufacturing activities started along the lower reach as this was the
399 first region to be opened to foreign trade and is easy to be accessed by ships. The lower
400 reach of the Yangtze River has always accounted for the majority of the Yangtze river
401 container traffic over the investigated period, although its share decreased from 91% in
402 1996 to 72% in 2006, and finally to 67% in 2016. The quick growth of the middle and
403 upper reaches is attributed to the implementation of the western and central
404 development strategy in China since 2000 (the so called ‘Go West’ and ‘Rise of
405 Central’ strategies) and the transfer of manufacturing activities from East China to West
406 China in recent years.


407 In contrast, the containerization process along the Rhine River found its origins in the
408 middle Rhine section in the early 1970s with the lower Rhine and upper Rhine reaches
409 only playing a very modest role throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. At the time,
410 barge operators took the view that barge container transport on the Rhine could only
411 effectively compete with road transport over distances of at least 500 km (distance
412 between gateway port and inland port), given the comparatively high fixed costs and
413 low variable costs of barges. This was not the case for the Yangtze River, because the
414 surface transport infrastructure in China was poor in the early stage. In the second half
415 of the 1980s, the lower Rhine area generated more and more containerised trade flows
416 which enabled the deployment of larger vessels and higher service frequencies. This
417 created more favourable market conditions for barge transport also on shorter distances
418 from the gateway ports. It also brought a surge in large-scale terminal initiatives and
419 scheduled barge services to the lower Rhine from 1985 onwards. In 1986, the middle
420 reach of the Rhine still handled 59% of the total Rhine container traffic compared to
421 31.5% for the lower Rhine. By 2001, the container throughput levels on both river
422 sections were of the same magnitude. In 2016, the lower Rhine handled 44% of the total
423 Rhine throughput, compared to 41.4% for the middle reach. The upper Rhine section
424 has always been the smallest in volume terms, with its containerised cargo share
425 fluctuating between 10 and 16% of total Rhine volume.

426 The development difference among stretches between the two rivers can also be
427 explained by the inequality of economic development. The developed region (e.g. lower
428 reach of the Yangtze) generally has a higher maritime transport demand and well-
429 developed port facility as they adopted containerisation early.

430

431 **3.3 Cargo concentration patterns on Yangtze and Rhine**


432 Figure 6 shows the normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of total container
433 throughput for the Yangtze and the Rhine. It can be observed from Figure 6 that both
434 rivers have experienced a strong cargo deconcentration trend in their early development
435 stages followed by a somewhat diverging development path. The Rhine river reached
436 its lowest concentration level in 1995 after two decades of continuous cargo
437 deconcentration. Since then, the Rhine is witnessing a modest but continued increase
438 in its cargo concentration level to reach a normalized HHI of around 0.06 in 2016. The
439 Yangtze underwent a strong cargo deconcentration phase between 1995 and 2005,
440 followed by an equally strong concentration trend between 2005 and 2012. In the past
441 few years, the normalized HHI fell back to a level of 0.11-0.12, which is higher than
442 the value of 0.05-0.06 for the Rhine.



443

444 *Figure 6. Comparison of the normalized HHI between Yangtze and Rhine*

445 When comparing Figures 4 and 6, we find the two rivers show a similar development
 446 in the deconcentration stage (i.e. the period 1975-1995 for the Rhine and 1995-2005 for
 447 the Yangtze): high annual growth figures are combined with a decrease in cargo
 448 concentration levels. This is because, in both rivers, more inland ports were developed
 449 during the respective periods and the whole port system expanded in spatial terms over
 450 different reaches. Afterwards, the development paths of the two rivers clearly diverged.
 451 Since 1995, the Rhine River combines a modest concentration trend with, on average,
 452 a decreasing tendency in annual growth rates. In the Yangtze, both growth rates and the
 453 normalized HHI values have fluctuated strongly since 2005.



454

455 *Figure 7. Normalized HHI for navigation areas of the Rhine and Yangtze*

456 To provide a more detailed insight on the underlying dynamics, Figure 7 presents the
 457 values for the normalized HHI for the six navigation areas under consideration. The
 458 Yangtze River is much longer than the Rhine River and its reaches are at different
 459 economic development levels. The lower Yangtze is undergoing a concentration
 460 process since 2006, while the middle and upper reaches are confronted with a
 461 deconcentration process. Between 2005 and 2012, the former process dominated the
 462 latter, thus in those years the normalized HHI index of the whole Yangtze River was on
 463 the rise. However, from 2012 to 2016 the ports in the upper and middle reaches became
 464 more influencing in term of total container throughput, which reversed the
 465 concentration trend.

466 It is interesting to observe that the concentration levels in all three reaches of the
 467 Yangtze gradually converged to more or less the same level in 2016. This is not the case
 468 in the Rhine where the gaps between the HHI indices of the three reaches are gradually
 469 widening. The lower Rhine is clearly showing a cargo concentration trend since the
 470 mid-1990s. The HHI for the middle reach is the lowest of the three navigation areas and
 471 has a very modest tendency to decrease even further. While the upper Rhine has
 472 observed some fluctuations, the overall trend since the early 2000s points towards a
 473 stabilization of the concentration level. The clear concentration trend in the lower Rhine
 474 dominates the concentration patterns in the other navigation areas, thus contributing to
 475 the modest but continued concentration trend in the Rhine since 1995.

476

477 **4. Explanatory analysis of inland port network development on Rhine and** 478 **Yangtze**

479 From the above analysis, multiple influencing factors might explain the observed
 480 container throughput evolution and concentration patterns in the river basins, as shown
 481 in Table 2.

482 *Table 2. Summary of influencing factors on inland river development patterns*

Descriptive analysis	General development pattern	Influence factors
Container throughput	A steep growth followed by a decrease, but with fluctuation	Macro economic factors (economic development, global crisis, etc.); Institutional and governance factor (national investment, market entry of port operators, etc.)
Traffic distribution	From downstream to upstream (Yangtze River); From middle stream to two ends, particularly downstream (Rhine)	Geographical and nautical characteristics; Institutional and governance factors (opening up of market initiated from downstream of Yangtze; China western and central development strategy, competition from road transportation, employment of large vessel, etc.)
Cargo concentration patterns	Deconcentration trend in early development stages followed by a diverging development path	Geographic characteristics (reaches are at different economic development levels, transshipment, etc.); Institutional and governance factor (port system expansion in spatial terms, port integration, etc.)

483 Following the previous section, in this section, we investigate these influencing factors
484 and how they exerted their influence on shaping the barge shipping networks in the two
485 rivers. As indicated in section 2, we make a distinction between geographical/nautical
486 aspects, macro-economic factors and institutional/governance factors.

487 **4.1 Geographical and nautical characteristics**

488 The nautical conditions of the river and the geographical features of seaports and inland
489 ports play a critical role in shaping the container shipping network along both the
490 Yangtze and the Rhine. Unlike rail networks, rivers typically have a treelike structure
491 with limited or no lateral connections between the different branches or tributary rivers.
492 Vessel capacity that can be deployed is restricted and not homogeneous due to varying
493 draft limitations and other physical conditions in various parts of the river basin.


494 The development of the shipping network in the Yangtze River has been heavily shaped
495 by its geographic characteristics. The Yangtze basically can be divided into three
496 reaches in terms of water depth. Ships as large as 10,000 TEU can only call the ports at
497 the mouth of Yangtze River, such as Taicang and Zhangjiangang. Container ships with
498 a capacity of 5,000 TEU can sail at farthest to Nanjing, thus from Taicang to Nanjing
499 is recognized as the lower reach of Yangtze River. The Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge
500 and Three Gorges Dam lock are generally regarded as the dividing lines for the different
501 stretches of the Yangtze River. Only ships with a capacity of less than 1,100 TEU can
502 sail to the middle reach which starts from Nanjing (due to the height limitation of the
503 Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge) and ends in Yichang, close to the Three Gorges Dam.
504 Only container barges of less than 350 TEU can pass the Three Gorges Dam lock
505 system to sail to the upper reach of Yangtze River. The ships sailing along Yangtze
506 River are mostly barges, which are not allowed to sail in the sea and coastal waters.
507 Thus, the container transport from ports at the middle and upper reaches to any seaport
508 outside the river basin (for example the island container terminal complex of Yangshan)
509 typically requires a barge-deepsea transshipment operation at one of the ports of the
510 lower reach or the mouth of the Yangtze.

511 The reaches are divided by two big chokepoints in the Yangtze River, i.e. the Nanjing
512 Yangtze River Bridge divides the lower Yangtze River from the middle and upper River
513 and the three Gorges Dam only allows very small ships to reach ports in the upper reach
514 of the river. Since big ships are restricted by the two chokepoints, the ports located
515 before the chokepoints, such as, Wuhan (note that Yichang is the closest port to the
516 three Gorges Dam, however Hubei province has invested more resources in developing
517 Wuhan because it is the capital city of Hubei) and Nanjing (also the capital city of
518 Jiangsu Province) have taken great advantage of their locations. Container
519 transshipment operations via these ports bring cost savings to the carriers as they can
520 stretch the voyages of the larger ships. Recently, the ports located at the mouth of
521 Yangtze River, such as Taicang and Nantong also achieved a very quick increase of
522 container throughput, because deep-sea container vessels are not allowed to go deeper
523 into the Yangtze river. In 2012, the Ministry of Transportation and the National
524 Development and Reform Commission has categorized Taicang as a seaport and
525 cancelled the compulsory pilotage for the ships that would call Taicang port after 2013.
526 The container throughput of Taicang increased by almost 25% from 244,000 TEU in
527 2013 to 439,000 TEU in 2016.

528 Given the existence of two chokepoints, a double transshipment pattern has been
529 formed in the Yangtze River. The ports close to chokepoints such as Wuhan at the

530 middle reach, Nanjing at the lower reach and Taicang at the mouth of the Yangtze River,
 531 gradually attract more container cargo and become the river hub ports, which also
 532 drives up the concentration level of the Yangtze River after 2005.

533 Figure 8 shows the current typology of container barge network configurations on the
 534 Yangtze River.



535

536 *Figure 8. Current typology of container barge network configuration of the Yangtze*
 537 *River*

538 A similar situation also exists in the stretches of the Rhine River which features different
 539 nautical conditions imposing limitations to ship size.

540 The lower Rhine (Emmerich to Cologne/Bonn) has the best draft and river width profile
 541 allowing motor barges of up to 500 TEU and push convoys of up to 600 TEU to reach
 542 the ports along this reach. While all ports in principle share these nautical conditions,
 543 the port of Duisburg, the largest inland port of Europe in volume terms, has been the
 544 most successful in leveraging on these conditions. Duisburg is the most important port
 545 of call for large barges coming from Antwerp and Rotterdam. The inland port is
 546 currently home to five barge container terminals, extensive logistics and warehousing
 547 facilities and has developed itself into a key hub for intra-European and Asia-Europe
 548 railway services. The ports on the middle Rhine (from Bonn up to Karlsruhe) have a
 549 slightly less favorable draft profile compared to the lower Rhine and the nautical
 550 conditions further diminish on the Upper Rhine (from Karlsruhe up to Basel in
 551 Switzerland).

552 In recent years, the middle and upper Rhine sections have increasingly been confronted
 553 with low water level conditions caused by draught. The summer of 2018 brought the
 554 lowest rainfall ever in the Rhine basin leading to record low levels at several points
 555 along the river. On the river stretches that were still navigable, the lower water level
 556 actually led to increased shipping traffic, as barges had to reduce the cargo load per
 557 sailing to reduce vessel draft and thus make more roundtrips to carry the same amount
 558 of freight. Low water levels increase barge freight rates and undermine service
 559 reliability, two major factors shaping competition with other transport modes. If low
 560 water level situations become even more frequent in the future, cargo owners and barge
 561 operators might revise the current barge network configuration in view of increasing
 562 supply chain reliability and resilience. Such a reconfiguration eventually could also
 563 affect the cargo concentration level on the Rhine and the respective throughput shares
 564 of the three river stretches.

565 4.2 Macro-economic factors

566 Shipping network transformation has a strong correlation with the macro-economic
567 development of the regions and provinces along the river. We argue that these macro-
568 economic factors particularly affect the cargo distribution pattern among the navigation
569 areas of the respective rivers (upper, middle and lower), but have less impact on the
570 cargo concentration levels among the inland ports belonging to the same river stretch.

571 Yang et al. (2014) found that political and economic events, such as the port reform and
572 China's accession to the WTO exerted the biggest influence on the evolution of port
573 traffic. Lee et al. (2018) summarized the impact of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) on
574 maritime transport. These also seems to be applicable to Yangtze River ports.

575 During the 1990s, Jiangsu Province at the lower reach of Yangtze River seized the
576 opportunity of the reform and opening-up policy and international industrial division
577 adjustment, undertook the manufacturing transfer and many processing industrial parks
578 were built. With the accession to WTO, the central government decentralized the port
579 management to stimulate the growth of capacity to meet the rapidly increasing trade
580 demand. Therefore, the container port network along the Yangtze River firstly
581 experienced a process of decentralization in the early stage led by the ports along the
582 lower reach. As more and more ports were built, the port capacity started to exceed
583 demand since 2005 and the growth of the number of ports decreased. In the meanwhile,
584 carriers increasingly opted to transship their cargo via a few ports, such as port with a
585 good location with deep water (at the interface between two river segments) or with
586 good port facilities. From 2006 to 2012, an opposite trend appeared: the growth pace
587 slowed down and the concentration of container traffic among the ports was rising. Due
588 to industrial upgrading and rising labor costs in the eastern region, the Chinese
589 government implemented the "Western Development" strategy and "Rise of Central
590 China" successively during the 2000s, which drove a move of manufacturing activities
591 from the lower Yangtze River to middle and upstream locations. This consequently led
592 to a strong growth of container traffic in the upper and middle Yangtze, and lowered the
593 overall concentration level again. In contrast, with the slowdown of economic
594 development in the lower Yangtze River, the latest inversed trend in the concentration
595 level of the Yangtze can mainly be attributed to a wave of port integration processes in
596 this region, see Zheng and Yang (2016) and the "Plan for the Overall Layout of Inland
597 and Sea Ports in Jiangsu Province: 2015–2030".

598 The inland terminal network along the Rhine emerged in the early 1970s to facilitate
599 container transport by barge between large industrial centers in Germany, France and
600 Switzerland and the large seaports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. The middle Rhine is
601 home to large cargo-generating chemical and pharmaceutical production sites such as
602 the headquarters of chemical company BASF in Ludwigshafen, but also serves as
603 gateway to some of the largest automotive clusters in Europe (e.g. Stuttgart). These
604 industrial clusters generate large container flows and where among the first to adopt
605 containerization in the early 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, the lower Rhine region -
606 the Ruhr area in particular - was the industrial heartland of Germany with a strong focus
607 on steel production and mining activities, which do not bring large container flows.
608 However, the lower Rhine region gradually underwent a transformation process by
609 developing itself into a prime region in Europe for modern supply chain management
610 practices and European distribution activities. This partly explains the growing
611 container volumes and stronger position of the lower Rhine reach in more recent
612 decades. The inland port of Duisburg has been very instrumental in shaping this

613 transformation process, but also other inland platforms benefited from the changing
614 dynamics in European logistics.

615

616 **4.3 Institutional and governance factors**

617 Li et al., (2014) ascertained that the development of inland water transportation, as part
618 of a socio-economic system, is significantly influenced by related government policies
619 and institutional frameworks. There are both similarities and differences in the
620 institutional structures and environment of the Yangtze River and Rhine River. For
621 example, both rivers flow through different countries/provinces which have different
622 laws, regulations and development plans. Administrative and political borders can
623 increase inter-port competition and facility duplication and might undermine network
624 concentration and rationalization. On the contrary, China has a strong central
625 government and can easily implement a holistic strategy. In this section we discuss the
626 role of institutional and governance factors in barge network development by using the
627 concepts of variation, selection and retention as defined in section 2 of this paper.

628 **4.3.1. Selection**


629 The selection mechanism is a competitive process that selects winners and losers in the
630 inland port network and triggers the formation of competitive and or cooperative
631 linkages between the agents in a barge network. Large logistics groups, shipping lines,
632 seaport-based container terminal operating companies and other public or private
633 parties might compete for controlling important inland terminals. When comparing
634 selection processes on the Rhine and the Yangtze, some important differences are
635 revealed.

636 Logistics groups have a strong position in barge terminals on the Rhine. Figure 9 shows
637 the strong position of Contargo and Neska along the Rhine.

638 Contargo has a strong position in all three navigation areas. With a yearly throughput
639 of 2.2 million TEU, Contargo is one of the leading container hinterland logistics
640 networks in Europe. Contargo was founded in 2004 by the logistics group Rhenus AG
641 & Co. KG. Contargo concentrated the activities of various Rhenus subsidiaries, mainly
642 as a result of the 2006 merger between Combined Container Service GmbH & Co. KG
643 (CCS) and Interfeeder BV. The beginnings of activities go back to 1976. Rhenus
644 developed its position on the Rhine by combining greenfield terminal developments
645 (such as Dortmund in 1989 and Duisburg-Rheinhausen in 2003) with the acquisition of
646 existing operators. In 2012, Contargo took over six Wincanton terminals. Some other
647 examples include the Unikai terminal in Wörth (1977) which was taken over in 2004
648 and the terminal of Alpina in Basel (1985) which came to Rhenus in 2001 with the
649 takeover of all the activities of the SRN Alpina Group.

650 The neska group has a strong presence on the lower Rhine. Since 2015, neska is fully
651 owned by Häfen und Güterverkehr Köln AG (HGK), which is owned by the Cologne
652 Public Services Group (Stadtwerke Köln GmbH, part of Stadt Köln) 54.5%; Stadt Köln
653 39.2% and Rhein-Erft-Kreis 6.3%. HGK is one of the most important German railway
654 companies. The strong position of logistics groups in terms of ownership of Rhine
655 terminals is not new. Notteboom (2001) reported that the vast majority of the Rhine
656 terminals have always been owned by large logistics players or their barge operating
657 subsidiaries. Combined Container Service (CCS), one of Contargo's predecessors, was

658 a key player on the Rhine which started up its first terminal in Ginsheim in 1976. This
 659 was followed by terminals in Ludwigshafen (1983), Koblenz (1986), Emmerich (1995),
 660 Valenciennes (1996), Frankfurt-Höchst (1998), Aschaffenburg (1999), Krefeld (2000)
 661 and B ethune (2004).



Note: Duisburg (5) implies there are five barge container terminals in Duisburg

662

663

Figure 9. Ownership of terminals on the Rhine (situation mid-2018)

664 Only few deep-sea terminal operators have a presence along the Rhine. Dubai-based
 665 DP World has developed a small terminal network on the Middle Rhine while Hong-
 666 Kong based Hutchison Ports operates one of the terminals in Duisburg, the involvement
 667 of these deep-sea terminal operators in river ports is mainly driven by a port
 668 regionalization strategy characterized by the establishment of ‘extended gates’ in the
 669 hinterland connected to their deep-sea terminals in Antwerp (DP World case) or
 670 Rotterdam (DP World and Hutchison Ports) using an integrated logistics service
 671 provision to cargo owners (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2009; Veenstra et al., 2012).
 672 Other terminal operators with at least two terminals along the Rhine include
 673 Swissterminal AG, an independent family-owned logistics company and terminal
 674 operator based in Switzerland; Rhine Europe Terminals, the fully-owned terminal
 675 division of the Port Autonome de Strasbourg, controlled by the city of Strasbourg;
 676 and Duisburger Hafen AG (also known as the Duisport group) which has stakes in two of

677 the five container terminals in Duisburg. The latter group is owned by the province of
678 Nordrhein-Westfalen (66.6%) and the city of Duisburg (33.3%).

679 While the vast majority of the Rhine terminals is controlled by private companies with
680 their proper logistics strategy and investment/divestment activities, the majority of the
681 Yangtze River inland ports are owned by local public port corporations.

682 The case of lower reach of the Yangtze River is different from the middle and upper
683 reaches. All the ports at the lower reach are under administration of Jiangsu Province
684 and the density of ports is high at this reach. The port integration process in Jiangsu
685 province is affected by the expansion of state-run Shanghai International Port Group
686 (SIPG). For example, SIPG has invested in Taicang and already built it as a hub port
687 for transferring containers from the upstream parts of the Yangtze River to the
688 Yangshan deep-water terminal complex. SIPG has also invested in many river ports not
689 only in Jiangsu province but all along the Yangtze River, in order to build its own
690 container transshipment system. Table 3 shows the investments of SIPG in ports along
691 the Yangtze River.

692 To realize the strategy, a batch of river-and-ocean intermodal ships is now under
693 construction. The first type of the river-and-ocean intermodal ship can load 1,140 TEU
694 and will sail from Shanghai to as far as Wuhan. These investments and technologies
695 will reinforce the role of Shanghai as a gateway hub on the Yangtze River. Considering
696 that more than 90% of Yangtze River containers are transshipped from Shanghai,
697 SIPG's strategy is strongly shaping the Yangtze River container shipping network.

698 *Table 3. SIPG investment in ports along Yangtze River*

City	Company	Major business	Share Ratio	Year
Wuhan	Wuhan Port Group	Handling Storage,Transportation	36%	2005
Wuhan	Wuhu Port Container Terminal Co., Ltd.	Handling, Storage	56%	2005
Nanjing	Nanjing Port Co., Ltd	Terminal	51%	2005
Jiangyin	Jiangyin Sunan International Container Terminal Co.Ltd.	Terminal operation	97%	2006
Jiujiang	SIPG Jiujiang Port Co., Ltd.	Handling, Storage	68%	2008
Chongqing	Chongqing International Container Terminal CO., Ltd	Handling, Storage	76%	2011
Taicang	Taicang Port SP Zhenghe Container Terminals Co, Ltd	Handling	68%	2014
Wuhu	Wuhu Port Co., Ltd	Handling, transshipment	31%	2014
Chongqing	Chongqing Port Guoyuan Container Terminal Co., Ltd.	Handling	60%	2014
Yueyang	Hunan Chenglingji International Port Group	Handling, Transportation	74%	2014
Yibin	Yibin Port International Container Terminal Co., Ltd.	Handling, Storage, Delivery, Transportation	96%	2017

699 Source: Annual report of SIPG

700 In summary, the selection processes shaping terminal ownership vary greatly between
701 the two rivers. The investment dynamics along the Rhine River are primarily led by
702 large private logistics groups which often control barge operating companies. Seaport-

703 related companies such as DP World have also acquired positions in the inland terminal
704 landscape, although on a much smaller scale. The Yangtze River ports are run by (local)
705 public port groups often in partnerships with SIPG, the public deep-sea port operator
706 of Shanghai. This implies that the Yangtze River is characterized by a more direct and
707 stronger link between seaport interests (i.e. the port of Shanghai) and the investment
708 strategies in the inland terminal network. The different selection processes also can
709 explain the different cargo concentration levels of the two rivers. Compared to the
710 multiple stakeholders of the Rhine river case, SIPG has a dominant position in the
711 Yangtze River. This market position enables the operator to influence cargo traffic
712 distribution along the Yangtze River by selecting certain ports as its transshipment ports.
713 Since 2014, SIPG has built Taicang as its inland container transshipment hub to
714 Yangshan port by launching container shuttle services between Taicang and Yangshan.
715 In 2018, the container throughput of Taicang ranked first in Jiangsu province. The cargo
716 concentration level in the lower Yangtze shows an increase since then.


717 It should be noted that selection mechanisms at work in seaport systems can also affect
718 the development trajectory of a container barge network. Barge networks are typically
719 directly fed by only a few seaports, e.g. Rotterdam and Antwerp are the main seaports
720 feeding the container network on the Rhine. The strategic actions of market players
721 using these ports (e.g. in terms of choice of inland transport mode) and the
722 competitiveness of these seaports affect the magnitude of barge container flows. Some
723 examples applied to the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, the two largest container ports
724 in Europe in volume terms:

- 725 • Over the past decades, container barge transport has developed into a very
726 competitive hinterland transport mode for the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. The
727 modal split figures in Antwerp's container transport in 2017 amounted to 38% by
728 barge, 56% by road and 6% by rail (Port of Antwerp statistical booklet 2017). The
729 container modal split figures in Rotterdam are quite similar: 36%, 53% and 11%
730 respectively (Port of Rotterdam statistics). Both ports have developed strategies to
731 significantly increase the share of rail in inland transport. While these modal shift
732 strategies are mainly aimed at reducing the reliance on trucks, a stronger
733 competitiveness of rail can lead to a change in modal choice by users which might
734 also negatively affect the growth potential for container transport by barge in
735 relation to the hinterland regions in the Rhine basin;
- 736 • Port selection dynamics also play a role. In the past decade, Rotterdam and Antwerp
737 have succeeded in significantly increasing their market share in container
738 throughput, partly at the expense of north German container ports (Notteboom and
739 De Langen, 2015). In case Rotterdam and Antwerp would lose container hinterland
740 traffic to north German ports (Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Wilhemshaven) in the
741 future due to changes in cargo routing and port choice behavior of actors involved
742 in the container supply chains, then part of the flows to the hinterland regions along
743 the Rhine would shift from barge transport to rail and or truck as the German ports
744 do not have competitive barge links to the Rhine area. This would lower the growth
745 potential for river container traffic on the Rhine. However, the impact of such
746 changing competitive dynamics in seaport systems on the cargo concentration
747 levels on the Rhine is difficult to measure as this will largely depend on which
748 hinterland regions along the Rhine might move more cargo via the German ports
749 instead of using Antwerp/Rotterdam.

750 **4.3.2. Retention**

751 Retention is a structural mechanism that causes new developments to reinforce the
752 existing hierarchy in the barge network. Both barge networks are subject to retention
753 mechanisms in the form of “preferential attachment” or “embedding”. The strong
754 position of SIPG on the Yangtze River reinforces a process of retention. First, SIPG
755 can use its strong credentials, experience and network effects to position itself as
756 preferred partner each time a new inland terminal investment opportunity becomes
757 available. Secondly, it would be very difficult for other public or private players to
758 develop a terminal network of a similar scale or magnitude along the river. Therefore,
759 SIPG’s position on the Yangtze remains unrivalled for the foreseeable future. Only a
760 major government decision at central or Shanghai level (e.g. a merger of SIPG with
761 another public entity) could lead to a new inland terminal landscape on the Yangtze.

762 The retention mechanism can lead to self-reinforcing effects whereby established
763 inland ports become even more dominant in a barge network. The position of Duisburg
764 on the Rhine provides a good example. Figure 10 shows the growing market share of
765 Duisburg on the Rhine. This trend was initiated in the late 1990s when Duisport
766 developed an aggressive and highly successful strategy to attract logistics activities and
767 to forge partnerships with major gateway ports in Belgium, the Netherlands and
768 Germany. This strategy and the associated marketing efforts led to strong preferential
769 attachment processes among private investors in favor of Duisburg. In more recent
770 years, Duisport has complemented its strategy by developing a strong focus on the
771 growing China-Europe rail business in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
772 of the Chinese government (Oltermann, 2018), as also reported by *South China*
773 *Morning Post* in August 2018¹. Duisport’s successful strategy has resulted in strong
774 volume growth since the late 1990s which has greatly contributed to the observed strong
775 increase of the concentration level in the lower Rhine. The prime position of Duisburg
776 in the Rhine basin has generated preferential attachment and self-reinforcing effects
777 whereby Duisburg can deploy its many ties with a wide range of market players to
778 receive new ties. This process has contributed to the increase of the concentration level
779 in the Rhine river.



780

781 *Figure 10. The market share of Duisburg in barge container traffic on the Rhine*

¹ <https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/2158959/germanys-china-city-how-duisburg-became-xi>

782 4.3.3 Variation

783 Variation refers to mechanisms that enable novelty and path disruption in the
784 development of an inland port system. The strategic behavior of and market-related
785 possibilities offered to public and private agents are key triggers for variation to occur
786 in an inland port system. Public (or state) agents can trigger variation processes by
787 implementing major changes in spatial planning, terminal awarding processes, financial
788 incentive schemes, etc. Private agents can significantly change the spatial and
789 functional configuration of an inland port system through alliance formation and M&A
790 activity.

791 It is interesting to observe that the European Union and its Member States advocate free
792 market dynamics in inland port development characterized by little government
793 guidance and intervention. In contrast, the central government of China exerts much
794 stronger control over the spatial development of the inland port network along the
795 Yangtze River to enhance economies of scale in inland terminal exploitation and to
796 avoid destructive competition between terminals. This remarkable difference in
797 approach has an impact on the inland port system. There are more inland ports on the
798 Rhine than on the Yangtze, despite clear differences in navigable river length and in
799 total container throughput handled (see earlier Figure 4). Consequently, inland
800 terminals on the Yangtze on average handle much more cargo: an average of 777,000
801 TEU per inland port for the Yangtze in 2016 (426,000 TEU when Taicang and Nanjing
802 are excluded) compared to a modest 88,000 TEU per inland port on the Rhine. The
803 existence of more but smaller inland ports on the Rhine contributes to the overall lower
804 cargo concentration level on this river when compared to the Yangtze River (see earlier
805 Figure 6).

806 In 1998, China started a port system deregulation reform. Until March 2002, all the
807 ports were under local administration, which meant that the local administration could
808 determine if they needed to build new terminals. In 1998, 394 million RMB was
809 invested into port construction along the Yangtze River, which was 7.6% more than in
810 1997 (China Ports Yearbook). With the appearance of more new ports and a slowdown
811 of shipping traffic growth along the Yangtze River, the resource waste and
812 environmental pollution gradually attracted great attention from the society. Given this
813 background, the state council of China issued the “*Opinions on Promoting the Yangtze
814 River Economic Belt (YREB) Development Based on the Golden Waterway*” and “*The
815 National Plan for the Yangtze River Economic Belt Development*” in 2014 and 2016,
816 respectively, in order to integrate the Yangtze River into a holistic economic and
817 environmental governance. In response to this, a series of policies, regulations and
818 measures regarding port integration have been issued by regional governments. For
819 example, Jiangsu Province started to implement the “*Jiangsu Province Port Layout
820 Plan 2015 – 2030*”. The goal of the plan is to optimize the port resource in Jiangsu
821 Province. In the plan, Nanjing is defined as the “regional shipping logistics center”,
822 while Taicang is “an important component of Shanghai international shipping center”.
823 In addition, the Belt and Road Initiative stimulated the development of transcontinental
824 rail in deep hinterland (Lee, 2018; Wei et al., 2018). All these policies imply that the
825 middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze River will continue to see few ports, and that
826 the relationship among these ports is of complementary nature (Liu et al., 2018). The
827 provincial governments in principle coordinate the resource allocation so that only one
828 or two hub ports can develop in the same river segment, such as Chongqing in the upper
829 reach (with two very large terminal complexes, i.e. Cuntan and Guoyuan), Wuhan in

830 middle reach and Nanjing on the lower Yangtze. Table 4 shows the major policies with
 831 regard to port integration. These measures boost the increase of container cargo
 832 centralization along the Yangtze River after 2012, as listed in Table 4.

833 *Table 4. Integration measures implemented by governments in China*

Policy maker	Measures	Objectives	Year
State Council	Opinions on Promoting the Yangtze River Economic Belt (YREB) Development Based on the Golden Waterway	Integration of the Inland Waterway Transportation (IWT) into a holistically economic and environmental governance	2014
	The National Plan for the Yangtze River Economic Belt Development		2016
Chongqing Municipality	Opinions of Chongqing Municipal Government on Speeding up the Construction of Chongqing Shipping Center	An integrated port cluster centered by Chongqing	2014
Sichuan Province	Opinions of Sichuan Provincial Government on the Implementation of National Strategy of YREB	Integrate Yibin and Luzhou as transshipment hub	2014
Hunan Province	Formation of the Chenglingji International Port Corporation	Integrate Yueyang port and Changsha port	2016
Hubei Province	Formation of Wuhan new port Administration Committee	Integrate the ports of Wuhan, Ezhou, Huanggang, and Xianning	2010
Anhui Province	Plan for Waterway Construction in Anhui Province	Integrate port resources by building a unified platform for port management and operation	2017
Jiangsu Province	Plan for the Overall Layout of Inland and Sea Ports in Jiangsu Province	Integrate municipal state-owned port companies.	2015

834
 835 The concentration of container traffic is further catalysed by the strategies of Shanghai
 836 International Port Corporation (SIPG) at the mouth of the Yangtze River. As it grows,
 837 SIPG started to invest in ports in different reaches of the Yangtze River.

838 The majority of terminal operators on the Yangtze are state-run companies, which
 839 further facilitates the practical implementation of policies designed by government
 840 entities at various geographical scales (central, provincial, local). Each Chinese
 841 governmental department makes its own five-year plan subordinated to that of the
 842 central government. In each five-year transportation plan made by the Ministry of
 843 Transportation, the port development of the Yangtze River is planned, and its strategy
 844 of development is addressed. Besides these plans, two policies, “*Opinions on*
 845 *Promoting the Yangtze River Economic Belt (YREB) Development Based on the Golden*
 846 *Waterway*” in 2014 and “*The National Plan for the Yangtze River Economic Belt*
 847 *Development*” in 2016, were issued. Within this government-oriented environment, the
 848 development of the Yangtze River does not primarily follow the market, and the
 849 ‘windows of opportunity’ are created by the government. One of the most important
 850 critical junctures, the deregulation reform of the port management structure, was led by
 851 the central government and influenced ports of the Yangtze River profoundly.

852 The Chinese controlled approach to inland network development contrasts with the
 853 Rhine River where broadly defined spatial development plans at provincial or national

854 level give ample room to local port authorities and private actors to roll-out investment
855 strategies in anticipation of specific market opportunities. Many private actors show
856 ambitions to engage in inland port activities and to develop associated terminal
857 networks. The interplay among market players during consecutive waves of ‘windows
858 of opportunities’ for inland terminal development up to now resulted in 38 inland
859 container terminals in 22 different inland ports, as shown earlier in Figure 8. However,
860 variations exist in the institutional settings among inland ports of the Rhine. For
861 example, a growing dualism is observed between larger inland ports managed by full-
862 fledged port authorities (such as Duisburg) and a large set of smaller inland terminal
863 facilities often developed by local and international logistics players. This dualism has
864 particularly affected the cargo concentration level on the lower Rhine, where Duisport
865 has succeeded in establishing itself as the hub port for the entire region.

866 **5. Conclusions**

867 With this paper, we presented a comparative empirical analysis focusing on container
868 shipping (barge) network development in the Yangtze and the Rhine in order to
869 understand if there exists a general evolutionary pattern of inland river container barge
870 network development.

871 The contribution of this paper can be extracted when examining the current state of
872 barge network research as presented in the literature review in this paper.

873 First, only few studies combine the development of (inland) port systems in terms of
874 configuration transformation with an explanatory analysis of this transformation. This
875 study asserted that the formation of barge networks on rivers and associated inland port
876 systems is subject to a complex set of influencing factors and mechanisms. By
877 presenting both descriptive and explanatory approaches to barge network development,
878 this paper identified and empirically demonstrated the factors influencing cargo
879 dynamics in barge networks. By following this dual approach, this paper can help
880 readers to comprehensively and thoroughly understand the general evolution model of
881 container shipping (barge) networks in inland river systems.

882 Second, the existing spatial models on inland port system development portray a high
883 degree of path dependency in the development of inland ports at a regional scale and
884 suggest that container barge shipping networks would follow a similar evolutionary
885 path. The analysis of the Yangtze and Rhine rivers demonstrates that, while similarities
886 can be observed, development processes also show a certain degree of contingency due
887 to differences in nautical/geographical conditions, macro-economic settings and
888 strategies and actions of public and private actors. More than once, path disruption in
889 cargo concentration levels was observed.

890 Third, with the exception of the largely qualitative work of Notteboom (2007), extant
891 literature focuses on single river systems in a specific part of the world. This paper is
892 the first study to present a comprehensive comparative empirical analysis focusing on
893 the container shipping (barge) network in the Yangtze and the Rhine, thereby supported
894 by extensive datasets on both river basins. While the results are location-specific and
895 time-specific and subject to a specific economic system with a different mix of
896 economic actors and the government, it sheds light on how differences in such a mix
897 across regions might lead to some level of disparity among inland port systems. Further
898 research on other (smaller) barge networks around the world can be grounded on these

899 insights in view of further specifying and explaining differences between regional
900 development trajectories.

901 We obtained the following findings through both descriptive and explanatory analysis.

902 The descriptive analysis revealed that, although the container traffic flows of the
903 Yangtze and the Rhine have a similar overall development trend, the traffic distribution
904 along different river stretches is different. For the Yangtze River, the sequence of port
905 development is from downstream to upstream, whereas for the Rhine the development
906 started on the middle reach. The relative importance of the ports in the middle and upper
907 reaches is rising in the Yangtze River, but declining in the Rhine River. In the early
908 stage, the two rivers showed a similar concentration pattern. However, the development
909 paths of the concentration levels clearly diverged afterward.

910 The explanatory analysis focused on three groups of factors influencing barge network
911 development, i.e. nautical/geographical, macro-economic and institutional/governance
912 factors. The geographical features of both rivers determined their container shipping
913 networks and cargo concentration levels. The overall and regional economic
914 development affect the cargo distribution patterns among various stretches but only
915 have minor impacts on the cargo concentration levels of the ports in the same stretch.
916 The different institutional structures and environments between the Yangtze and the
917 Rhine led to respective development trends and concentration levels in recent years.

918 We identified selection, retention and variation mechanisms as instrumental to the mix
919 of path dependency and contingency in the development of the barge networks of both
920 rivers and to the similarities and differences between the development paths in both
921 rivers. The selection process resulted in a significant difference in terminal ownership.
922 The ports along the Rhine are primarily operated by large private logistics groups, while
923 the Yangtze River ports are run by public port groups. Also, seaport competition
924 dynamics and modal choice/selection considerations in hinterland traffic can affect the
925 development trajectory of inland barge networks. The retention mechanism leads to
926 self-reinforcing effects leading to dominant positions, such as the position of Duisburg
927 along the Rhine. The variation mechanism is mostly triggered by public agents. Due to
928 the strong governmental influence in the case of the Yangtze River, the variation forces
929 are more obvious than in the Rhine River.

930 The three mechanisms sometimes imposed their impacts simultaneously. For example,
931 Shanghai has been given a priority in developing container transshipment in the Yangtze
932 River through national strategy. Due to the policy backstop, SIPG dominates the
933 transshipment of container cargo in the Yangtze River. After the dominant position is
934 confirmed, SIPG further utilized various strategies including investment in inland ports
935 to maintain its position, which also has a great impact on the development in and cargo
936 concentration levels of the Yangtze River.

937 While the scope of the study was restricted to the two largest container barge networks
938 in the world, the three explanatory factors and the interplay among them are expected
939 to also shape the development trajectory of smaller inland rivers. The external validity
940 of our findings can be tested in future research by focusing on other rivers. We expect
941 that smaller rivers will feature some distinctive characteristics in their development path.
942 For example, their smaller cargo base might lead to smaller container terminals or fewer
943 (but relatively large) terminals, partly also depending on the distribution pattern of
944 economic activity along the river stretches. As regards governance, it might be
945 interesting to analyse whether there are differences in terminal ownership when

946 comparing large rivers and smaller rivers, for example in terms of local vs. global
947 players, multi-terminal ownership vs. single-terminal ownership and the involvement
948 of deepsea terminal operators in inland terminals.

949 This paper increases the understanding of inland port system development. We hope
950 the findings of this paper can help relevant inland river stakeholders, including policy
951 makers, port operators and so on, with strategy formulation and implementation in the
952 field of inland port system development. As a future extension, New Economic
953 Geography (NEG) can be a notable method to quantify the mechanism of the evolution
954 of river port systems. The existing NEG models relevant to continuous space consider
955 a one-dimension space, which is applicable to the river system. The NEG models based
956 on the general equilibrium approach have a higher explanation power than the
957 conceptual model but would need massive data to validate.

958

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