
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Empirical Research Paper

How safety value is exchanged in Chinese modern megaprojects: A stakeholder value network perspective

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ABSTRACT

To visualize and quantify these exchanges among primary stakeholders in megaprojects, this study introduces network stakeholder value network as the core methodology. Starting with a qualitative organizational safety behavior model encompassing 8 stakeholders and 61 value flows, it's built based on 3 organizational safety behavior categories. Moreover, questionnaire data from 356 experts quantifies the model, and the design structure matrix identifies 13845 safety value paths, including 4827 cycles. Analysis delves into critical cycles, stakeholders, flows, and organizational safety behavior types to refine safety strategies. The findings, based on Chinese megaprojects, suggest that contractors and governments must lead safety awareness efforts, with safety compliance paramount for all parties. The study's contributions are threefold: firstly, it broadens the scope to encompass organizational safety behavior; secondly, it introduces a novel approach to visualize and quantify safety value flows; and thirdly, it considers multiple types of value exchanges, underscores their significance in promoting safety value, and offers practical recommendations to strengthen construction safety performance.

1. Introduction

Megaprojects refer to transformative projects that involve massive investments, long durations, high level of complexity, and significant impacts on society, economy and environment (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Brookes and Locatelli, 2015). In the construction industry, megaprojects typically encompass large-scale infrastructure projects initiated by the government (Oiu et al., 2019), such as the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, Beijing Daxing International Airport, Hangzhou Bay Sea-Crossing Bridge, etc. Due to the distinctive characteristics, such as congested workspaces, working at heights and multi-level subcontracting (Ajayi et al., 2021; Manu et al., 2010), the construction sector has faced numerous accidents and been criticized for its high rates of safety incidents and casualties (He et al., 2016), resulting in adverse consequences for both individuals and organizations. Consequently, as the crucial part of project management, safety management has become a prominent concern in construction megaprojects. It has been shown that projects would perform better when organizations have a good safety management philosophy, such as implementing safety management system (SMS) and structuring a psychological safety climate (Yiu et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2014; Choudhry et al., 2008). Currently, the researches on safety management in the construction projects primarily focused on the individual worker behavior and organizational safety performance.

The unsafe behavior of construction workers is considered as the primary and immediate cause of safety incidents (Heinrich, 1941; Fang et al., 2016), and rectifying such behavior can help prevent accidents and enhance safety performance (Chen and Tian, 2012), particularly when the underlying factors have not been identified or eliminated. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the causes of safety incidents and effectively address safety concerns, increasing attention has been devoted to examining the organizational mechanism underlying human errors, including safety climate, organizational safety behavior, prosociality, leader-member interaction, etc. (Neal and Griffin, 2006; Cui et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2020; Meng et al., 2021). Organizational safety behavior refers to safety behavior measures and practices adopted by organizations with the primary objective of enhancing the safety performance of their projects (Griffin and Neal, 2000; Burke et al., 2002; Meng et al., 2021). The interaction of organizational safety behavior among various stakeholders can be instrumental in fostering a positive safety climate within organizations, which would further enhance safety performance by promoting individual safety behaviors (Wang et al.,

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2018).

China leads the world in large-scale infrastructure investment (Zhou et al., 2021). With the implementation of the "Belt and Road" project initiated by the Chinese government, a large number of transportation infrastructure projects have been proposed, planned and constructed in China (Luo et al., 2022). Compared with general projects, megaprojects have a greater social and economic impact, the characteristics of large scale, complex technology and far-reaching significance. This has led to a more complex network of Chinese megaprojects with more participants. The safety management experience of Chinese megaprojects will have universal reference significance for more general projects. Moreover, megaprojects are characterized by intricate challenges (Daniel and Daniel, 2019) and given the constraints on resources and the limitations of individual stakeholders, achieving a safe production goal demands collective efforts from all stakeholders involved in the project (Son and Rojas, 2011). Therefore, under the background of rapid urbanization in China, it is necessary to deeply study the organizational safety behaviors of different stakeholders in megaprojects and the safety value generated by their collaborative efforts.

Previous research has primarily focused on studying the safety behavior of one specific stakeholder, such as owners (Wu et al., 2015; Ma et al., 2020), or examining the role of a single type of organizational safety behavior in safety management, for instance, safety compliance behavior (Weichbrodt, 2015). However, these studies have ignored the interactions between different types of organizational safety behaviors involving multiple stakeholders in megaprojects. Owing to the complicated stakeholders' relationship and interactive process in megaprojects (Wang et al., 2021), it's crucial to explore the intricate interactions of different stakeholders from a perspective of network. Despite an increasing number of research utilizing social network analysis (SNA) to study interactions and value transition among multiple stakeholders, extending from a single individual stakeholder to a comprehensive network comprising various stakeholders in megaprojects (Zheng et al., 2016), current research can only take a particular sort of behavior into account within a network (Wang et al., 2020), making it difficult to capture an integrated view on the interaction of multiple behaviors and the generated value exchanges among different stakeholders. Moreover, contemporary studies primarily highlight direct behavioral interactions between dyadic stakeholders. However, multi-lateral and indirect value exchanges among multiple stakeholders widely exist in modern megaprojects. To have a thorough comprehension of the safety value exchange mechanism, it's imperative to adopt a novel qualitative and quantitative approach to develop a comprehensive network, which consists of both direct safety value exchanges and indirect value delivery paths of multiple behaviors.

In order to address these gaps of the above existing research, we adopt a multi-disciplinary approach in this study to explore and illustrate the safety value exchange mechanism within megaprojects. This is achieved using stakeholder value network (SVN) analysis, which has been previously employed to examine, comprehend, model, and manage diverse stakeholder behaviors (Zheng et al., 2019, 2021). By considering the implementation of organizational safety behavior as the multi-relational interconnections among stakeholders within megaprojects, an organizational safety behavior SVN (OSB-SVN) is developed, with the aim of unravelling the intricate value flows and driving paths associated with the implementation of organizational safety behavior among stakeholders. The findings of OSB-SVN hold promise in facilitating futural implementations and advancements in organizational safety behavior, ultimately enhancing safety performance of megaprojects.

The research contains three objectives: (a) to develop a qualitative and quantitative OSB-SVN model in which the inter-organizational connections and safety value exchanges within construction megaprojects are considered; (b) to identify critical stakeholders, safety value flows and value cycles that are critical for the implementation of organizational safety behavior based on the proposed OSB-SVN model; (c) to

provide practical and effective value-based strategies for stakeholders in megaprojects to improve safety performance from an organizational safety behavior perspective.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section comprises a literature review on organizational safety behavior and SVN. The research methodology and methods utilized in OSB-SVN analysis are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 is focused on the analysis results and findings of the OSB-SVN model, including both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Section 5 proposes safety value enhancement strategies for stakeholders based on the results of OSB-SVN model. Finally, the last section wraps up the study by summarizing the main findings, contributions, implications, and limitations. It also outlines future research directions.

2. Literature review

The literature reviewed in this section includes two aspects. The first section encompasses background factors, influencing mechanisms and improvement strategies of safety behavior of large project organizations, thus summarizing the deficiency of research on the safety value generated by the interaction between stakeholders in safety behavior of organizations. The second section summarizes the advantages of SVN analysis over other methods to analyze stakeholders' safety value delivery and exchange mechanisms, combining the characteristics of megaprojects.

2.1. Organizational safety behavior

The mainstream approach to construction safety management has long been based on the human error identification and prevention (Choudhry and Fang, 2008; Mohajeri et al., 2021). However, the effectiveness of this approach is far from satisfaction. Instead, research has found that organizationally interactive and collaborative behaviors are significantly more effective in improving safety performance (Koh and Rowlinson, 2012; Wu et al., 2016). Therefore, an increasing number of scholars have turned their attention to organizational safety behavior. Based on various theories, previous research has examined the contextual elements, influencing mechanisms and improvement strategies of organizational safety behavior in megaprojects from different perspectives.

Concerning the identification and classification of safety behaviors, previous studies have elaborated on their specific manifestations and characteristics from various contexts and perspectives (see Table 1). For instance, in terms of the degree of voluntary, safety behaviors were classified into safety compliance behavior and safety participation behavior. The safety compliance behavior, which was required, involves adherence to safety instructions and procedures, etc. While the safety participation behavior, which was volunteered, involves helping coworkers and participating in safety meetings, etc. (Kalteh et al., 2021). This classification standard is highly acknowledged in construction safety research (Xia et al., 2020). To emphasize the interaction between workers, Dong et al. (2015) further classified safety participation behavior into interactive safety behavior and structural safety behavior. However, the identification and classification of organizational safety behavior remain disorganized and fragmented. Compliance to safety rules was considered as the most basic organizational safety behavior in construction projects (Weichbrodt, 2015). Apart from it, other types of organizational safety behaviors have also been identified. For example, organizational safety behaviors of participants could be reflected from three dimensions, which were safety commitment and participation, feasibility of safety rules and perception of safety responsibilities, respectively (Fang and Wu, 2013; Hannevik et al., 2014; Jitwasinkul et al., 2016). As to inter-organizational safety behavior, organizational citizenship behavior was proved to be beneficial to safety performance (Liu et al., 2020; Yang et al., 2020).

Based on previous review and according to the extent of voluntary

 Table 1

 Identification and classification of safety behaviors.

Classification of safety behaviors	Fang and Wu (2013)	Hannevik et al. (2014)	Dong et al. (2015)	Jitwasinkul et al. (2016)	Kalteh et al. (2021)
(1)In terms of the degree of voluntary: safety compliance behavior and safety participation behavior (2)In terms of the interaction between workers: interactive safety behavior and structural safety behavior			,		•
(3)Safety commitment and participation, feasibility of safety rules and perception of safety responsibilities	•	•		•	

and inter-organizational interaction, it's proposed to classify organizational safety behavior into three types: normative, interactive, and participative. Normative organizational safety behavior refers to the safety practices that are clearly defined in laws and regulations and that project stakeholders are legally required to implement unilaterally. Interactive organizational safety behavior is also guided by laws, regulations or industry standards, but it involves an interactive process in various stakeholders. Participative organizational safety behavior refers to voluntary safety actions taken spontaneously by stakeholders and have a positive impact on safety performance.

To gain a deeper understanding of construction organizational safety behavior, several scholars have explored the influencing factors and driving paths of organizational safety behavior utilizing organizational behavior theory, institutional theory and social psychology theory as frameworks. It has been established that organizational, institutional and psychological factors such as spiritual leadership, institutional pressures and psychology contracts significantly impact both organizational safety behavior and safety performance (He et al., 2016; Newaz et al., 2019; Ali et al., 2020; Ali et al., 2021). Furthermore, Lu et al. (2020) identified the relationship between management practices and organizational safety behavior, demonstrating that effective management practices could affect organizational safety behavior, which also shed lights on the improvement of safety performance.

The enhancement of construction organizational safety behavior has always been an issue of utmost importance. In general, the related research tends to focus on either the improvement of the safety behavior itself or on the modification of the external environment, corresponding to active and inactive safety management strategy, respectively.

The active safety management strategy advocates the proactive correction or elimination of unsafe behavior within the organization. It emphasizes that when negative safety factors that influence safety behavior in the long run have not been improved or eliminated, the identification and correction of unsafe behaviors itself is the optimal choice (Chen and Tian, 2012; Li et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2017). Different from active safety management strategy, the inactive safety management strategy focuses on the contextual elements of safety behavior and emphasizes the improvement of organizational and environmental factors. It advocates taking non-mandatory measures to

eliminate unsafe behavior fundamentally, for example, fostering a better safety culture (Nævestad et al., 2021), establishing a healthy safety climate (Kim et al., 2019; Cheung and Zhang, 2020) and building positive inter-organizational relationships (Kalkman and Dewaard, 2017; Wang et al., 2021). Furthermore, numerous scholars have reported that establishing and maintaining collaborative and reciprocal relationships among stakeholders is highly effective in promoting organizational safety behavior (Beringer et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2018; Ruijter et al., 2021).

Consequently, current research on organizational safety behavior primarily focuses on three dimensions: (1) analyzing and identifying the contextual elements and categories of organizational safety behavior; (2) exploring the influencing factors and driving paths of organizational safety behavior through the invocation of various theories; (3) providing the improvement strategies for organizational safety behavior from the perspective of stakeholder and relationship governance. However, there is limited research on the safety value generated from interactions among stakeholders in terms of organizational safety behavior, particularly from a perspective of the network, thus failing to enhance the systematic safety value of the entire megaproject.

2.2. Stakeholder value network

The SVN analysis approach, firstly proposed by Cameron in 2007, is a multidisciplinary network analysis method designed to analyze stakeholders' value delivery and transaction mechanism (Cameron, 2007). Built upon social exchange theory, SVN offers a qualitative and quantitative analysis of diverse interactions among multiple stakeholders, encompassing social, economic, tangible, and intangible aspects, as well as direct and indirect connections within a unified network framework. In SVN, various stakeholder interactions concentrating on a particular issue are represented by value flows. Stakeholders and value flows, shown as nodes and links respectively, are the two basic elements of SVN model (see Table 2). A sequence of value flows can form value paths or value cycles, which are crucial for further analysis of the network.

Compared to traditional network analysis methods which can only involve one type of behavior in a network, SVN has the advantage of integrating multiple types of value exchanges among multiple stakeholders in a unified framework through subjective utility analysis. Furthermore, SVN has overcome the limitation of SNA which solely studies the influence of network structure on stakeholders' behavior, capable of capturing the impact from both value exchanges and network structure (Feng, 2013). Moreover, by adopting a system modeling approach, specifically design structure matrix (DSM) (Zheng et al., 2021; Yang et al., 2014), and the propagation rule, SVN allows researchers to identify the critical stakeholders, value flows and value paths, which are crucial for understanding on how value is created, delivered and exchanged within the substantial and complicated

Table 2 Elements of SVN model.

Element	Legend	Definition
Stakeholder/ Node	a,b,\cdots,n	Organizations that are involved in safety value exchange process directly or indirectly (including internal stakeholders and external stakeholders).
Value	$\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \cdots, \Delta_i$	Organizational safety behavior that is conducted by one stakeholder and meet needs of other stakeholders.
Value flow/ Link	$a \overset{\Delta_1}{ o} b$	The interactions between two stakeholders, through which the specific safety value Δ_1 is delivered from stakeholder (a) to stakeholder (b).
Value path	$a \xrightarrow{\Delta_1} b \rightarrow \cdots \xrightarrow{\Delta_i} n$	A string of value flows connecting a group of stakeholders via safety value delivery among them, and the stakeholder n is not stakeholder a
Value cycle	$a \xrightarrow{\Delta_1} b \rightarrow \cdots \xrightarrow{\Delta_i} a$	(n \neq a). Special value path beginning from and ending with the same stakeholder.

stakeholder network (Feng, 2013). Due to its prominent advantages, SVN has been widely applied across diverse fields, including space exploration (Cameron et al., 2011; Sutherland et al., 2012), energy conservation (Fu et al., 2011), public transportation (Pereira et al., 2018), and construction megaprojects (Zheng et al., 2019, 2021). This allows for the identification of specific needs and objectives of stakeholders, as well as the examination of their interrelations, so as to formulate effective strategies for stakeholders to maximize the potential value of the entire network.

Megaprojects have been recognized as a process for collaborative creation of value among various organizations through their temporary cooperation and collaboration (Lehtinen et al., 2019). Thus, the organizational safety interactions among stakeholders can be viewed as the process of safety value cocreation. Therefore, SVN is well suitable for the exploration and analysis of stakeholders' safety value delivery and exchange mechanisms within the megaproject settings. Furthermore, SVN can generate value-based strategies for stakeholders to enhance safety value of the stakeholder network from a holistic perspective.

3. Material and methods

Since megaprojects in China have only flourished in recent decades, there are more modern projects for study. Meanwhile, data on earlier megaprojects are difficult to obtain due to technological limits. In this study, Chinese modern construction megaprojects are used as the research sample to unveil the complicated safety behavior interactions among multiple stakeholders. Considering its applicability and adaptability, SVN is chosen as the primary research method. To clarify the mechanisms of safety value creation and delivery in megaprojects, the proposed OSB-SVN model is introduced, comprising four critical steps (Fu et al., 2011; Feng, 2013), as depicted in Fig. 1. Details of each step are further explained on in the subsequent sub-sections.

3.1. Mapping the qualitative OSB-SVN model

The stakeholder and the safety value flow are the two fundamental components of the OSB-SVN model. Therefore, it's crucial to identify the

stakeholders involved in megaprojects and safety value flows between the identified stakeholders at the onset.

The first step is the identification of stakeholders, which restricts the boundary and defines scope of the network analysis. Two types of stakeholders were considered in this study: internal stakeholders who have a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the project, and external stakeholders who are affected by the execution of megaprojects and sometimes may affect its progress (Feng, 2013; Olander, S., 2007). The final list of stakeholders was completed through literature review and semi-structure interview with seven experts possessing megaprojects safety management experiences.

The adjacent step is to identify safety value flows between each pair of the identified stakeholders. Safety value flows refer to the desirable organizational safety outcomes created by a specific stakeholder and received by another. To systematically identify these safety value flows from the massive and complex organizational safety interactions between stakeholders, the approach of stakeholder characterization template (SCT) proposed by Sutherland was adopted (Sutherland, 2009). The SCT allows us to concisely and accurately articulate the roles, objectives, specific needs of each stakeholder. Furthermore, it indicates inputs received by each stakeholder from others, which fulfill their specific needs, and all these inputs constitute exactly value flows. The adoption of SCT can not only make the value creation and delivery process traceable, but also ensure that the model captures all essential value flows indispensable to fulfill each stakeholder's needs. Content analysis was adopted to identify the detailed roles, objectives, specific needs of stakeholders. The essence of content analysis is the analysis of the amount of information contained in the content of communication and its exchanges. After collecting the data, the analysis dimension is designed, the data are preprocessed and analyzed by coding, and finally semantic analysis is carried out. The accurate meaning is inferred from the represented meaningful words and sentences. Accuracy and reliability of the identification of stakeholders and value flows were supported and supplemented by conducting semi-structure interviews.

Once the stakeholders involved in megaprojects and all the value flows between them are identified, the qualitative OSB-SVN model can be mapped.




Fig. 1. The OSB-SVN modeling framework.

3.2. Quantifying the OSB-SVN model

3.2.1. Questionnaire design

The questionnaire is designed to quantify the network by assessing attributes of every value flow. According to the summarization of Sutherland (2009), there are five key attributes of value flows: "need intensity of the resource", "source importance in fulfilling a need", "competition in fulfilling a need", "urgency in fulfilling a need", and "awareness of a need". However, it's not necessary to include all the five attributes in practice. Based on previous research (Cameron 2007; Sutherland, 2009), two or three attributes are sufficient to evaluate value flows in the network.

Each value flow received by a stakeholder comprises two fundamental elements: the value delivered by the value flow and the stakeholder who creates and outputs the value. To evaluate value flows from the two dimensions, in this study, "need intensity of the resource" and "source importance in fulfilling a need" are selected as the two attributes of value flows. Specifically, "need intensity of the resource" reflects the stakeholder's satisfaction in receiving the value flow, which indicates the significance of the safety value it delivers. Conversely, "source importance in fulfilling a need" characterizes the significance of a particular stakeholder in fulfilling a specific need, namely the importance of the stakeholder that outputs the safety value.

Once the two attributes of value flows have been determined, the questionnaire can be constructed. The questionnaire contains two sections. The first section is dedicated to collecting the demographic information of participants, while the second section aims to assess the two attributes mentioned above (as detailed in Table 3). Since each stakeholder is associated with distinct value flows, 8 kinds of distinct

 Table 3

 Questionnaire on the two attributes of value flow's utility.

a. need intensity of the resource (importance of the safety value delivered by the value flow) ${}^{\circ}$

Q: How would you characterize the presence or absence of the safety value delivered by the value flow?

Satisfaction scale	Description	Numerical value
a	Its presence satisfies me, but I would not regret its absence.	0.11
b	Its presence satisfies me, and I would somewhat regret its absence.	0.19
c	Its presence satisfies me, and I would regret its absence.	0.32
d	Its presence is necessary, and I would regret its absence.	0.54
e	Its presence is absolutely essential, and I would regret its absence.	0.99

b. source importance in fulfilling a need (importance of the stakeholder output the value flow)

Q: If the safety value is essential, how important would this specific stakeholder be in delivering the value?

Importance scale	Description	Numerical value
A	Not important – I do not need this stakeholder to provide the safety value.	0.11
В	Somewhat important – It is acceptable that this stakeholder provides the safety value.	0.33
С	Important – It is desirable that this stakeholder provides the safety value.	0.55
D	Very important – It is highly desirable that this stakeholder provides the safety value.	0.77
E	Extremely important – It is irreplaceable that this stakeholder provides the safety value.	0.99

Note: $U_s = 0.11 \times n, n = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9$. Note: $U_v = 0.11 \times 1.7^m, m = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4$. questionnaire are designed, each for one stakeholder. Participants involved in the questionnaire survey are all managers with certain years of work experience on megaprojects. They are required to score the two attributes listed in Table 3 using Likert's five-point scale, ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important).

3.2.2. Utility calculation rule

The utility score for each safety value flow (U_f) refers to the multiplicative result of two attributes: the importance of the safety value the value flow delivers (U_ν) and the importance of the stakeholder that outputs the value flow (U_s) . Using the multiplicative combination rule, which is consistent with the traditional settings in the utility theory, all value flow scores are confined within the range of [0,1]. The detailed calculation rules are shown as follows.

$$U_{v} = 0.11 \times 1.7^{m}, m = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4$$
 (1)

$$U_s = 0.11 \times n, n = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9$$
 (2)

$$U_f = U_{\nu} \times U_s \tag{3}$$

The U_{ν} is exponentially discounted, while the U_{s} is linearly calculated, which ensures that the critical value flows score significantly higher than those that are important but not essential. According to the research of Sutherland (2009), the score of value path is the multiplicative result of the score of each value flow in the path, and that is the reason why the maximal score of each attribute is set as 0.99 rather than 1.0. Assuming that the maximal score of the two attributes is 1.0, then value paths containing different numbers of stakeholders and value flows, each value flow with a score of 1.0, will get the same score, 1.0, which contradicts the reality, because delivering safety value through a chain of five stakeholders is typically harder than delivering that through a chain of three stakeholders. Moreover, the minimal score of each attribute is set as 0.11, based on the lowest response score used by Cameron in 2007. Each successive response is a factor of approximately 1.7 higher than the next-lowest response. Ultimately, the score of each attribute is kept within the range of [0.11, 0.99]. Table 4 presents the determination of value flow scores based on the two attributes.

3.3. Searching for value paths

Value path refers to a sequence of value flows connecting various stakeholders. These flows can be categorized as either value cycles, which originate and terminate with the same stakeholder, or value chains, which originate and terminate with different stakeholders. In this study, Design Structure Matrix (DSM) is adopted to identify these value paths. Following the scoring of value flows and the identification of value paths, the next step in quantifying the OSB-SVN model involves calculating scores of all value paths. As mentioned before, the value path score equals the pro duct of all value flow scores along the path (see Eqs. (4) and (5) below).

Value chain :
$$U_p = \prod_{n=1}^{x} U_{f(n)}, 2 \le x \le m-1, x \in Z$$
 (4)

Table 4Determination of value flow scores based on the two attributes.

			Uv				
			m = 0	m = 1	m=2	m = 3	m = 4
			0.11	0.19	0.32	0.54	0.99
U_s	n = 1	0.11	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.11
	n = 3	0.33	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.18	0.33
	n = 5	0.55	0.06	0.10	0.18	0.30	0.54
	n = 7	0.77	0.08	0.15	0.25	0.42	0.76
	n = 9	0.99	0.11	0.19	0.32	0.53	0.98

Value cycle:
$$U_p = \prod_{n=1}^{x} U_{f(n)}, 2 \le x \le m, x \in Z$$
 (5)

where p represents a certain value path, U_p represents the score of the value path p, $U_{f(n)}$ denotes the score of the nth value flow in the value path, x denotes the number of stakeholders in the value path and m represents the number of all stakeholders involved in the SVN model.

There are several advantages of using the multiplicative propagation rule for calculating value path scores Firstly, similar to the calculation of value flow scores, the multiplicative rule ensures that value path scores remain confined within the range of [0,1], which conforms to the utility theory. Secondly, under the multiplicative function, the score of the value path is inversely correlated to its length, reflecting the fact that as the path length increases, it becomes more challenging to engage and manage stakeholders and exchange safety value between them. Finally, the multiplicative rule aids in simplifying the calculation of value path scores.

3.4. Analyzing the OSB-SVN model

3.4.1. Analysis method of value paths

After all the value paths have been identified and their scores have been calculated, the relative importance of each path can be ranked, and high-scoring value paths will be obtained. The analysis of the formation of high-scoring value paths and their commonalities will give enlightenments to the value enhancement of the entire network.

3.4.2. Analysis method of stakeholders

The Weighted Stakeholder Occurrence (WSO) is utilized to measure the importance of each stakeholder by calculating the weighted occurrence of the stakeholder in all the value paths for the focal organization (see Eq. (6)). It can identify the most critical stakeholder in the value network. The higher the WSO, the more important the stakeholder are, and the greater value they contribute to the network.

$$WSO_s = \frac{\sum U_{ps}}{\sum U_p} \tag{6}$$

where s represents a specific stakeholder, $\sum U_{ps}$ denotes score sum of value paths containing a specific stakeholder, and $\sum U_p$ refers to score sum of all the value paths for the focal organization.

3.4.3. Analysis method of value flows

The Weighted Value Flow Occurrence (WVFO) is employed to measure relative importance of value flow through counting the weighted occurrence of the value flow in all value paths for the focal organization (see Eq. (7)). A value flow with a higher WVFO score will have more resource significance and structural edges in the network.

$$WVFO_f = \frac{\sum U_{pf}}{\sum \left(\sum U_{pf}\right)} \tag{7}$$

where f represents a specific value flow and $\sum U_{pf}$ denotes score sum of value paths containing a specific value flow.

3.4.4. Analysis method of stakeholder's value flows

The Weighted Output Occurrence (WOO) is used to measure the importance of a specific value flow output generated by a specific stakeholder. This is achieved by calculating the weighted occurrence of the specific stakeholder's output in all the value paths for the focal organization (see Eq. (8)). A higher WOO score indicates a more effective and valuable input to the value network. Therefore, WOO scores can serve as a foundation for determining the allocation order of resources when additional resources become available to the project's value network.

$$WOO_o = \frac{\sum U_{po}}{\sum U_p} \tag{8}$$

where o represents a specific output, $\sum U_{po}$ denotes score sum of value paths which contain a specific output, and $\sum U_p$ denotes score sum of all the value paths for the focal organization.

4. Results

4.1. Qualitative OSB-SVN model

Totally, 8 stakeholders are identified through interviews in this study, which are the government (G), the owner (O), the contractor (C), the investigator (I), the designer (D), the project supervisor (PS), the supplier (S), and the public (P). Their roles they play in megaproject are depicted in Table 5. The core of the megaproject is the owner, which is usually a special purpose vehicle organized by the government (Hu et al., 2015). The owner has contractual relationships with other internal organizations engaged in the megaproject, including the contractor, the investigator, the designer, the project supervisor, and suppliers. The public does not participate actively in the megaproject but will be affected by its implementation and is a key external stakeholder.

Subsequently, safety value flows were identified utilizing SCT approach. Taking the owner as an example, its stakeholder characterization template is shown in Fig. 2. Overall, 61 value flows in the whole value network have been presented and can be classified into three categories, namely normative safety behavior, interactive safety behavior and participative safety behavior.

Once the stakeholders and their corresponding value flows in megaprojects have been identified, the qualitative OSB-SVN model can be obtained. As depicted in Fig. 3, a total of 8 stakeholders and 61 value flows were ultimately determined.

4.2. Quantitative analysis of the OSB-SVN model

Research data were collected through questionnaire. The questionnaire obtained 356 valid responses, both online and field, covering all types of stakeholders, all from megaprojects. Table 6 shows value flow scores calculated from the questionnaire statistics. Based on the data collected, the OSB-SVN model can be quantified.

4.2.1. Analysis of value paths

In the OSB-SVN model, value paths serve as the foundation and focus of quantitative analysis. Table 7 details the count of value paths between

Table 5
Roles of stakeholders.

Stakeholder	Role
Government	The government is responsible for the decision-making and the supervision during the megaproject's entire life cycle construction process.
Owner	The owner is fully responsible for the construction management and the organization of stakeholders in megaprojects.
Contractor	The contractor has overall control over the schedule, quality, cost and safety of megaprojects.
Investigator	The investigator is responsible for providing detailed field data.
Designer	The designer shall provide construction drawings and the corresponding specifications and instructions based on the investigation data.
Project	The project supervisor conducts on-site supervision of
Supervisor	construction activities on behalf of the owner to help promote the project performance.
Supplier	The supplier is responsible for providing qualified construction materials and equipment to the contractor.
Public	The public has the right to report construction activities that infringe on their own rights and interests during the construction of the project.

Input:

- The investigator provides accurate and reliable investigation data.
- The designer designs according to the laws, regulations and construction mandatory standards.
- The supervisor supervises the construction process according to the laws, regulations and construction mandatory standards.
- The government conducts comprehensive supervision and management of construction safety in accordance with the laws.
- The supervisor reports safety risks to the owner in a timely manner.
- The contractor reports safety accidents to the government timely and faithfully.
- The government holds quality management committee meeting and the accident emergency plan review meeting.
- The government launches timely emergency response to natural disasters.
- The government holds safety publicity activities.
- The supervisor reports evaluation of the project and its own work to the owner.

Owner

Role:

Responsible for planning, organization, coordination and controlling during the whole life cycle of megaprojects

Objectives:

- · Avoiding safety accidents
- Ensuring the quality of megaprojects
- Controlling schedule and cost of megaprojects

Specific needs:

- Safety involvement of all stakeholders
- Implementation of safety management measures in construction activities
- Timely knowledge of project dynamics

Fig. 2. The stakeholder characterization template of the owner.

stakeholders. The numbers on the diagonal of the matrix represents the numbers of value cycles. In the whole network, a total of 13845 value paths have been identified, in which there are 4827 value cycles, accounting for 34.9%, while others are value chains, accounting for 65.1%. Due to the unidirectional delivery mechanism of value chains, stakeholders in the downstream of value chains have no reverse restraint on their upstream stakeholders, making it difficult to enhance the value of value chains. Therefore, enhancing the safety value of value cycles is the focus of this study.

Among all the eight stakeholders, the government holds the highest number of value cycles at 1128. The following is the contractor, with 1110 value cycles. The owner takes the third spot, with 1062 value cycles. The ranking indicates that the government, contractor and owner are all core stakeholders in the study of organizational safety behaviors in megaprojects.

Table 8 presents the top-scoring value cycles of each focal stakeholder (listed in the row) while also involving certain other stakeholder (listed in the column). The highest-scoring value cycle for each focal stakeholder is highlighted in bold and underlined in each row. During the ranking process, only the 774 value cycles scoring greater than 0.1 were taken into consideration.

As being derived from the calculation rule of value path scores, generally, the less stakeholders the value path contains, the higher score it will get. Among the value cycles of the contractor, $C \rightarrow C$, the highest scoring cycle is the one containing the owner, $C \rightarrow 006 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow C01 \rightarrow C$, with a score of 0.72, which can also be written as $O \rightarrow C01 \rightarrow C \rightarrow 006 \rightarrow O$. It denotes that the contractor reports safety accidents to the owner timely and faithfully (006), while the owner doesn't raise requirements violating laws and regulations to the contractor (C01). To achieve this, the two organizations are required to fully trust each other and provide timely feedback to each other.

4.2.2. Analysis of stakeholders

The importance of stakeholders in the OSB-SVN model is measured by WSO. When the contractor is taken as the focal organization, according to the definition of WSO, the WSO score of the contractor itself is 1, while other stakeholders will get different WSO scores.

As is demonstrated in Fig. 4, apart from the contractor itself, the government get the highest WSO score (0.941), followed by the owner

(0.868). The rank of WSO scores of stakeholders further confirms that the government, owner and contractor are core organizations in megaprojects. The safety attitude and behavior of the contractor have the most direct impact on the construction safety performance. From the perspective of organization, the contractor's attitude towards safety management, the safety behavior it adopts, and the safety climate it creates will fundamentally influence construction safety. From the perspective of individual, the safety behavior of construction workers will directly contribute to preventing safety accidents. Furthermore, the ranking shows that the government has a high level of involvement in megaprojects, even higher than that of the owner. This suggests that the construction safety management in China mainly relies on the coercive measures taken by the government, while the autonomous safety awareness of the owner and the contractor still needs to be improved.

4.2.3. Analysis of value flows

The key value flows have a significant impact on the value delivery in the stakeholder value network. WVFO scores are used to measure the importance of value flows. Fig. 5 shows the top 20 most significant value flows. As can be seen from Fig. 5, there are 6 value flows scoring higher than 0.03, which are the public reporting construction behaviors destroying the environment to the government (G07, with a utility score of 0.751 and WVFO score of 0.071), the contractor reporting safety accidents to the government timely and faithfully (G04, with a utility score of 0.840 and WVFO score of 0.064), the contractor registering with the government within 30 days from the date of acceptance of the construction hoisting machinery, integral lifting scaffolding and formwork and other jack-up erection facilities (G05, with a utility score of 0.811 and WVFO score of 0.062), the contractor reporting safety accidents to the owner timely and faithfully (O06, with a utility score of 0.850 and WVFO score of 0.046), the supervisor participating in quality management conferences organized by the government (PS02, with a utility score of 0.715 and WVFO score of 0.042), and the designer designing according to the laws, regulations and construction mandatory standards (O02, with a utility score of 0.901 and WVFO score of 0.035). In addition to the utility of value flows, which represents their own the importance, another common reason why these value flows get high WVFO scores is that they occupy critical structural positions in the network and are indispensable to form value cycles. For example,




Fig. 3. The qualitative OSB-SVN model containing 8 stakeholders and 61 value flows.

though the utility score of G07 is the second lowest among value flows mentioned above, it is the only value flow output by the public, earning it the highest WVFO score. Hence, to augment the whole value of OSB-SVN, it's necessary to identify organizational safety behaviors constantly, improve the structure of the network, and achieve a more balanced distribution of WVFO scores.

4.2.4. Analysis of stakeholder's value flows

The most significant value flows output by key stakeholders hold the greatest potential for creating safety value within the stakeholder network. WOO is used to measure the importance of value flows output by certain stakeholders. Fig. 6 displays the WOO scores of the contractor outputs. As can be seen in Fig. 6, among all the 9 value flows output by the contractor, three of them score higher than 0.1, which are the contractor reporting safety accidents to the government timely and faithfully (G04), the contractor registering with the government within 30 days from the date of acceptance of the construction hoisting machinery, integral lifting scaffolding and formwork and other jack-up erection facilities (G05) and the contractor reporting safety accidents to the owner timely and faithfully (O06), respectively. Although G04 and O06 are the only two safety behaviors taking place after the occurrence of safety accident, they are both high-scoring contractor

outputs, which reveals that safety management in China mainly relies on the passive handling of safety accidents rather than active prevention measures. Like key value flows with high WVFO scores, occupying critical structural positions in the network is also one of the reasons why the contractor outputs mentioned above can obtain high WOO scores.

4.2.5. Analysis of three categories of organizational safety behavior

The WSO score of the government is 0.941, with the contractor as the focal organization. This indicates that the government play a critical role in the network, which to some extent ensures the effectiveness of normative organizational safety behavior. As shown in Table 8, in all the top-scoring value cycles, there are a total of 32 value flows of normative organizational safety behavior, with only 2 value cycles not containing them. It can be inferred that value flows of normative organizational safety behavior are crucial for high-scoring value cycles, and the mandatory constraints from the government can ensure the implementation of these value cycles. However, among the top 20 most significant value flows shown in Fig. 5, only 5 are normative organizational safety behaviors. Furthermore, compared with the other two categories of organizational safety behaviors, the average WVFO score of normative organizational safety behaviors is lower. Therefore, the guidance and inspections of the implementation of normative organizational

Table 6Questionnaire statistics.

2	No.	Value Flow	Receiver	Creator	Mean	SD
3				_		0.033
4 O04 Owner Government 0.808 0.5 5 O05 Owner Supervisor 0.860 0. 6 O06 Owner Contractor 0.850 0. 7 O07 Owner Government 0.715 0. 8 O08 Owner Government 0.725 0. 9 O09 Owner Government 0.615 0. 10 O10 Owner Government 0.615 0. 11 O11 Owner Government 0.615 0. 12 C01 Contractor Owner 0.869 0. 13 C02 Contractor Owner 0.719 0. 14 C03 Contractor Owner 0.831 0. 15 C04 Contractor Supplier 0.859 0. 16 C05 Contractor Supplier 0.870 0. 17				-		0.035
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safety behavior require further enhancement.

In the top-scoring value cycles listed in Table 8, there are a total of 31 value flows of interactive organizational safety behavior, and 4 value cycles without them. This indicates that as coerciveness decreases, the implementation effect of interactive organizational safety behavior is slightly weaker than that of normative organizational safety behavior. However, as shown in Fig. 5, among the top 20 high scoring value flows, there are 11 value flows of interactive organizational safety behavior, accounting for 55%. Therefore, it's undeniable that interactive organizational safety behavior still plays a significant role in the value

Table 7Numbers of value paths between stakeholders.

Stakeholder	C	D	G	I	O	P	PS	S
С	1110	67	16	72	62	26	104	1
D	90	306	105	204	111	339	231	90
G	153	145	1128	42	42	654	71	153
I	238	303	96	138	42	334	142	238
O	100	172	95	96	1062	333	73	100
P	153	145	1	42	42	654	71	153
PS	260	500	245	324	91	895	427	260
S	2	134	32	144	124	52	208	2

network. In addition, 8 of the top 11 value flows of interactive organizational safety behavior occurring between the three core organizations, namely, the government, owner and contractor, accounting for 73%. It indicates that the occurrence of interactive organizational safety behavior between core organizations is more frequent. The frequent cooperation between core organizations fosters greater familiarity and a tendency towards greater trust, which will enhance their communication effectiveness and promote the implementation of interactive organizational safety behavior.

There are only 6 value flows of participative organizational safety behavior in all the top-scoring value cycles listed in Table 8. Furthermore, as can be seen in Fig. 5, only four of the top 20 most significant value flows are linked to participative organizational safety behavior. Besides, one of the 4 value flows has got a high WVFO score only due to its critical position within the value network, without which the value cycle cannot be established. The results indicate that the implementation of participative organizational safety behaviors is far from satisfaction. Organizations have not yet devoted enough attention to participative organizational safety behaviors and are not active in implementing them.

5. Discussion

Based on the three categories of organizational safety behavior and stakeholders involved in construction megaprojects, an OSB-SVN has been created, which provides a visual tool for stakeholders to develop intuitive strategies to enhance the holistic safety value of the entire project. According to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of OSB-SVN model, several strategies are proposed for stakeholders to promote safety value from a network perspective.

To prevent safety accidents, general compliance, which entails adhering to safety policies, laws, regulations and contract rules, is the most fundamental requirements for all stakeholders. Results show that government coercion serve as an effective deterrent against unsafe behavior, but there is still room for improvement. Given the complexity and extended duration of megaprojects, the government should not only continuously revise and clarify safety laws and regulations, but also strengthen supervision and inspection of organizational safety behavior to further promote the implementation effectiveness of normative organizational safety behavior. Apart from safety laws and regulations, contract rules are also vital constraints of organizational safety behavior. Especially in the early stage of megaprojects, for stakeholders without prior working relationship and not familiar with each other, they are inclined to rely on contractual specificity to constraint other stakeholders' safety behavior and improve safety performance of megaprojects (Luo, 2002; Lee and Chong, 2021). Formal contracts specify responsibilities and obligations of stakeholders, which can minimize opportunism and reduce safety risks (Yan and Zhang, 2020). Given high level of uncertainty in megaprojects, in addition to the specificity of contractual terms, contractual contingency adaptability should also be considered when developing contracts (Lee et al., 2020), which allows for change and tolerance when safety needs evolve, or unanticipated safety accidents occur. However, if the contract is not followed rigorously by parties, it will be just a dead letter. Therefore,

Top-scoring value cycles of each focal stakeholder (in the row) while containing certain other stakeholder (in the column).

Value	Value Stakeholder	lder						
cycle	C	D	9	I	0	Ъ	PS	S
C→C	- ⊃←O	$C \rightarrow 006 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow D01 \rightarrow D \rightarrow C14 \rightarrow C$ (0.44)	$C\rightarrow GO4\rightarrow G\rightarrow C11\rightarrow C~(0.71)$	$C - 006 - 0 \rightarrow D01 \rightarrow D \rightarrow C14 \rightarrow C C \rightarrow G04 \rightarrow G \rightarrow C11 \rightarrow C (0.71) \qquad C \rightarrow G04 \rightarrow G \rightarrow G102 \rightarrow I \rightarrow C001 \rightarrow C \rightarrow C01 \rightarrow C C \rightarrow D03 \rightarrow P \rightarrow G07 \rightarrow G \rightarrow C11 \rightarrow C (0.18) \qquad C \rightarrow C06 \rightarrow C \rightarrow C01 \rightarrow C C \rightarrow P03 \rightarrow P \rightarrow G07 \rightarrow G \rightarrow C11 \rightarrow C (0.18) \qquad C \rightarrow C06 \rightarrow C \rightarrow PS01 \rightarrow PS \rightarrow C17 \rightarrow C (0.47) \qquad (0.72)$	$C \rightarrow 006 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow C01 \rightarrow C$ (0.72)	$C \rightarrow P03 \rightarrow P \rightarrow G07 \rightarrow G \rightarrow C11 \rightarrow C (0.18)$	$C \rightarrow 0.06 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow PS01 \rightarrow PS \rightarrow C17 \rightarrow C (0.47)$	$C \rightarrow SO1 \rightarrow S \rightarrow CO6 \rightarrow C$ (0.41)
$\mathbf{D} \!$	D→D (0.44)	ı	$D\rightarrow0002\rightarrow0\rightarrow G01\rightarrow G\rightarrow D02\rightarrow D$ (0.41)	$D \rightarrow C1 \ 4 \rightarrow C \rightarrow G04 \rightarrow G \rightarrow I02 \rightarrow I \rightarrow O01 \rightarrow O \rightarrow D01 \rightarrow D$ (0.23)	$D\rightarrow002\rightarrow0\rightarrowD01\rightarrow D$ (0.58)	$D \!$	$D \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 001 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow 001 \rightarrow 002 \rightarrow $	ı
G→G	G→G (0.71) (0.41)	(0.41)		$\rightarrow I \rightarrow O01 \rightarrow O \rightarrow G01 \rightarrow G (0.42)$	$G \rightarrow 0004 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow G01 \rightarrow G$ (0.65)	$G \rightarrow 004 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow G01 \rightarrow G$ $G \rightarrow C11 \rightarrow C \rightarrow P03 \rightarrow P \rightarrow G07 \rightarrow G$ (0.18) (0.65)	$G \rightarrow PS02 \rightarrow PS \rightarrow O03 \rightarrow O \rightarrow G01 \rightarrow G (0.39)$	ı
<u>T</u>	(0.37) (0.23)	(0.23)	(0.42)	1	$I \rightarrow 001 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 101 \rightarrow I$ (0.59)	$I \rightarrow P01 \rightarrow P \rightarrow G07 \rightarrow G \rightarrow I02 \rightarrow I (0.12)$	$I \rightarrow 001 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow PS01 \rightarrow PS \rightarrow C17 \rightarrow C \rightarrow G04 \rightarrow G \rightarrow I02 \rightarrow I$ (0.24)	I
0 ← 0	0→0 (0.72) (0.58)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.59)	ı	$\begin{array}{ll} O \to CO1 \to C \to PO3 \to P \to GO7 \to G \to OO4 \to O & O \to PSO1 \to PS \to OO3 \to O & (0.57) \\ \hline (0.15) \end{array}$	$0 \rightarrow PS01 \rightarrow PS \rightarrow 003 \rightarrow 0 \ (0.57)$	ı
$P \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \! \!$	(0.18) (0.10)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.15)	1	$P \rightarrow G07 \rightarrow G \rightarrow PS02 \rightarrow PS \rightarrow C17 \rightarrow C \rightarrow P03 \rightarrow P (0.10)$	1
PS→PS	PS→PS (0.47)	(0.23)	(0.39)	(0.24)	(0.57)	(0.10)	1	1
S→S	S→S (0.41)	I	I	I	1	ı	1	ı




Fig. 4. WSO scores of each stakeholder with the contractor as the focal organizations.




Fig. 5. Top 20 most significant value flows.




Fig. 6. WOO scores of value flows output by the contractor.

obedience to safety laws, regulations and contract rules is of utmost importance in safety management of megaprojects.

Inter-organizational communication, trust and cooperation are essential to establishing high-scoring safety value cycles. The length of value cycles determinates the extent to which safety value can exchange. A long path of communication can lead to the distortion of safety information, resulting in delayed value deliver and response. This indicates that the close communication and rapid feedback between stakeholders are critical to the effectiveness of effective safety management. Therefore, to enhance the value of low-scoring value paths, it is necessary to streamline the value chain by reducing the number of links and promoting more direct and closer communication between

stakeholders. Furthermore, frequent communication is instrumental in fostering trust between stakeholders. In constraining opportunism and achieving project safety goals, trust is proved to be complementary to or even substitute for contracts, which can help overcome some of the inadequacies and limitations of contracts (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Trust, in turn, facilitates communication, which forms a virtuous circle. Safety information exchange based on trust and communication reduces information asymmetry between stakeholders, thus decreasing the likelihood of opportunism (Galvin et al., 2021). Besides, even when the safety accident occurs, the confidence and reliance on their partners will make the stakeholder willing to report the accidents timely and faithfully, rather than conceal the truth and shirk responsibility, just like what $G \rightarrow C11 \rightarrow C \rightarrow G04 \rightarrow G$ demonstrates. Furthermore, trust also strengthens solidarity and cooperation among stakeholders and facilitate the achievement of mutual beneficial agreements (Ruijter et al., 2021), avoiding conflicts and disputes concentrated on safety issues. Due to high level of complexity and innovation and lack of experience of similar projects (Chen et al., 2022), there's a tendency for megaprojects to have unusual potential risks and encounter unpredictable safety accidents. It calls for the joint planning and problem-solving of stakeholders to reduce the chance of accidents. Through effective inter-organizational cooperation, the implementation effectiveness of interactive organizational safety behavior will be enhanced, thus promoting the realization of safety goals of megaprojects.

It's necessary for stakeholders to develop their safety consciousness, especially for the contractor, since it is one of the core and critical stakeholders in megaprojects and participates in the construction process in the most direct way. The analysis of critical stakeholders shows that the government plays a dominant role in the safety network. It reflects the status quo that in China, the implementation of organizational safety behavior has a strong dependency on safety laws, regulations and the supervision of the government, whereas other stakeholders lack the motivation to take spontaneous measures to promote safety performance of megaprojects. Moreover, the analysis of the contractor's important value flows exposes a problem that the current safety management mainly depends on the passive treatment of safety accidents rather than the active prevention of the occurrence, putting the cart before the horse. In addition, the analysis of three categories of organizational safety behavior demonstrates that the implementation effectiveness of participative organizational safety behavior is unsatisfactory, because stakeholders are in lack of recognition of this category of safety behavior and reluctant to implement such behavior spontaneously, which is beneficial to the whole project, but beyond their obligations. The creation and promotion of safety climate has been emphasized as an effective way of improving organizational safety perceptions, consciousness and motivations (He et al., 2020; Maneechaeye and Potipiroon, 2022). To enhance safety climate, safety weeks are suggested to be organized regularly, which include construction site visits, safety promotional campaigns, safety seminars, safety skill training and competitions, etc. (Bronkhorst et al., 2018). Through a series of safety activities, both organizational and individual perception and familiarity of safety knowledge and skills will be enhanced, thus promoting safety consciousness (Wang et al., 2018; Renecle et al., 2021). These safety activities will further strengthen the safety connection and cooperation among stakeholders, promoting safety climate at a project level. Apart from safety weeks, to stimulate the motivation of stakeholders to conduct spontaneous safety behavior, it's recommended to construct a safety incentive system (Meng et al., 2021). For example, the government can give payment and rewards to contractors making prominent contribution to project safety performance. Under the incentive system, safety consciousness will be enhanced remarkably, and contractors are inclined to take initiative and proactive safety behavior even without supervision. When there's a positive safety climate and stakeholders have an in-depth understanding of the meaning and significance of construction safety of megaprojects, they are likely to pay more attention to the achievement of safety goals at the project level and have a

stronger sense of responsibility to safety issues, and willing to investing extra efforts engaging in voluntary safety behavior, demonstrating altruism (Wang et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2020). Under the guidance of altruism, stakeholders tend to show more concern for the safety performance of their partners, provide safety suggestions and offer timely assistance to each other in pursuit of collective welfare of the whole project, thus improving the implementation effectiveness of participative organizational safety behavior and enhancing the safety performance of megaprojects ultimately.

6. Conclusions

In megaprojects, the interdependence collaboration of multiple stakeholders in terms of organizational safety behavior is a complicated process, forming an intricate stakeholder value network with numerous safety value flows. To better understand these complex safety value exchange processes and clarify the value delivery mechanism, this study presents a qualitative and quantitative OSB-SVN model based on stakeholder value network (SVN). This model includes 8 stakeholders and 61 value flows. A questionnaire survey was conducted to assign numerical scores to each value flow. Through data-driven stakeholder mapping (DDSM), a total of 13845 value paths, including 4827 value cycles were identified. Key stakeholders, value flows and value paths, as well as organizational safety behavior categories, have been identified to help formulate specific safety value enhancement strategies.

The key findings of this study can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the government, the owner and the contractor are the three critical organizations in the network, respectively fulfilling the roles of inspecting, planning and coordination, and execution. Key value flows in the network have two characteristics: (1) the behavior itself is important; (2) the value flow occupies a critical structural position in the network, which is essential for the formation of the value path. High-scoring value paths originate from strong constraints between stakeholders. Furthermore, they are highly associated with measures taken after the occurrence of accidents, indicating that safety management in China still relies on reactions after safety accidents rather than active prevention beforehand. Secondly, depending on mandatory constraints, normative organizational safety behavior plays the most critical role in the network. The influence of interactive organizational safety behavior is mainly reflected in the interactions between core organizations. However, the implementation of participative organizational safety behavior in the network is not satisfying due to the passive participation of stakeholders in the related activities. Thirdly, to improve the efficiency of organizational safety behavior and enhance the safety value of the whole project, it is crucial to foster general safety compliance, interorganizational trust, altruism and cooperation and the promotion of stakeholders' safety consciousness.

This study has three main contributions. First and foremost, compared to previous construction safety management research which mainly focused on individual safety behavior, this study concentrated on organizational safety behavior. Specifically, this study further clarified the definition and classification of organizational safety behavior and highlighted the importance of organizational safety behavior to promote overall safety performance of a megaproject, not only contributing to the enrichment of organizational safety behavior field, but also providing a novel research perspective in safety management area. Secondly, the applicability of SVN based on the social exchange theory has been further extended and validated in the context of organizational safety behavior. By applying SVN, this study proposed a new way to visualize and quantify safety value flows existing in the complicated stakeholder network, allowing them to be characterized and compared and helping both researchers and project stakeholders to explore the key value paths in delivering safety value. Furthermore, compared to previous research which rarely considered multi-type (both tangible and intangible, economic and social) value exchanges in the project network, this study took multi-type safety value exchanges into account and emphasized

their significance in safety value promotion. Thirdly, based on the identification and analysis of critical stakeholders, safety value flows and value cycles, practical and effective suggestions for megaproject stakeholders to enhance the overall construction safety performance at the project level were developed.

There are three policy and practice implications inferred from the findings of this study. First, this study validated that the organizational safety behavior interactions among stakeholders in megaprojects should be considered as complicated and systematic activities involving numerous safety value exchanges. To enhance safety value at the level of project, it's essential for stakeholders to coordinate their efforts and seek suitable cooperation modes. The proposed OSB-SVN model can help stakeholders have a better understanding of the safety value delivery mechanism in the projects, thus allowing them to engage in effective multilateral cooperation and allocate resources more appropriately to achieve project safety objectives. Second, the implementation effectiveness of three categories of organizational safety behavior not only depends on the coercive measures and restrict constrains among stakeholders, but also rests on the reciprocal relationship among them. Hence, to enhance the implementation effectiveness of organizational safety behavior, apart from the revision and improvement of laws and regulations, the establishment of cooperative relationship and the creation of safety climate by the joint effort of all stakeholders are vital. Third, key value flows and value cycles identified in this study will help both the researchers and project stakeholders to formulate effective value-based strategies on safety performance promotion.

Despite its enlightening results and findings, this study also has certain limitations, which need to be addressed in future research. In terms of methodology, SVN was designed to illustrate value exchanges and structural properties of multi-lateral networks, which has determined that the model is static and can only capture the value distribution at a specific stage. To overcome this limitation, further study should explore a dynamic analysis approach to demonstrate the dynamic value exchange within the complex system over time.

Moreover, this study only considers the main categories of stake-holders in megaprojects, ignoring the detailed sub-classification of each category. For instance, the contractor can be further divided into general contractor and different categories of sub-contractors. To make the OSB-SVN model more accurate and comprehensive, it is suggested that more categories of stakeholders across the lifecycle of megaprojects be included into the model.

Lastly, as this study focused on megaprojects in a Chinese context, the findings may have context-specific limitations and require appropriate adjustments before applying them to other contexts. It is recommended that future research should consider different project ownership, types, delivery methods, and more to enhance the generalizability of the findings.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Shuang Dong: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Visualization, Funding acquisition, Conceptualization. **Yan Zhao:** Resources, Formal analysis, Data curation. **Heng Li:** Software. **Jiayi Qu:** Visualization.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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