CHAPTER 6

Implementing the National New-Type Urbanization Plan: Regional Variations

Juan Chen, Pierre F. Landry, and Deborah Davis

Introduction

Across the globe, millions of people leave their village homes to find work and live in towns and cities. Since 1980, the trend has accelerated, and in the Chinese case the acceleration has been particularly pronounced. In 1978, only 17.9 percent of the population were classified as urban; by 2019, the number had soared to over 60 percent (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2020). Two distinct and independent phenomena drive this transformation (Chen et al. 2015). The first is the sustained migration of more than two hundred million rural residents (Chan 2013). The second is the lesser-studied process of in situ urbanization, whereby villagers become urban residents when their land is reclassified as urban (Friedmann 2005; Lin 2007; Liu et al. 2010). In the second situation, villagers do not move to the city; instead, the city comes to them.

China is not the only country to hasten industrialization and spur economic growth by repurposing agricultural land or creating new administrative boundaries, but the Chinese reliance on administrative reclassification of both settlements and people has been unusually sustained and extensive. Between 1981 and 2018, urban land in China increased eightfold, bringing over two hundred million rural residents into new urban folds without them having to leave their homes (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China 2019; Yeh, Xu, and Liu 2011). A comparison between the growth rate of urban land and the growth rate of the urban population

further documents the centrality of administrative reclassification for understanding the process and consequences of rapid urbanization in China (see Figure 6.1).

Even in the second decade of economic reform, the gap persisted; for example, between 1990 and 2014, urban space grew 5.5 percent per year, whereas the urban populations grew only 2.9 percent annually (Hu and Zhang 2018, 457; Shen 2018, 31).[1] Moreover, until recently the Chinese government continued to promote increased urbanization via administrative reclassification. In a project undertaken by the National Development and Reform Commission, 145 of the 156 prefectural cities and 67 of the 161 county-level cities were approved to have sites for new towns. And among these prefectural cities, the average planned area for development of 63.6 square kilometers equaled or exceeded half the area of all current municipalities, which suggests that to populate these new towns it may be necessary to relocate all nearby rural residents to the prefectural municipalities (Li and Fan 2013).

Scholars who have examined China's rapid urbanization of the physical land ahead of its actual settlement by urban residents have raised multiple concerns. First, they argue that because reclassification of rural land is primarily a tool for local governments to augment short-term revenues and



Figure 6.1. Growth in urban population and urban built-up areas, 1978–2018. *Data* source: China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook 2018; China Statistical Yearbook 2019.

local cadres' promotions (Landry 2008; Landry, Lü, and Duan 2018; Wang et al. 2015), higher levels of urbanization did not optimize land use, population densities did not rise, and urban sprawl and underagglomeration characterized Chinese urbanization (Han et al. 2014).

Second, scholars argue that rapid urbanization has not improved quality of life, particularly among those residents newly incorporated into urban districts (Ong 2014). For many years, scholars have criticized the Chinese household registration system—first implemented in the 1950s to ensure economic stability and social control by restricting outmigration from villages—for denying access to local education, employment, housing, health care, and social services to rural-to-urban migrants who lacked an urban *hukou* even as they became long-term city residents (Chan and Zhang 1999; Solinger 1999; Wang 2005). In 2012, for instance, 52.6 percent of the Chinese population considered the city their home, but only 35.3 percent held urban *hukou*. The 17 percent gap reflects the approximately 250 million new urban residents who were unable to obtain an urban *hukou* despite their resettlement in a city and therefore did not qualify for urban welfare benefits (Chen, Davis, and Landry 2017).

In response to these issues—particularly to the inability of new urban residents to access urban education, health, housing, and welfare services—the central government rolled out the National New-Type Urbanization Plan in 2014. Specifically, the plan aimed to raise the proportion of the urban population to 60 percent by 2020, an increase that would have relocated or reclassified one hundred million villagers as permanent urban residents. The plan further stressed that going forward, China's urbanization would be people oriented and designed to improve quality of life through infrastructure investment and *hukou* and housing reforms (Guan et al. 2018). Local governments were also requested to expand access to social welfare and benefits (Wang et al. 2015).

Even in advance of 2020, 60 percent of the nation resided in towns and cities, and the total number of urban *hukou* holders had increased by one hundred million. However, because only 45 percent of that 60 percent held urban *hukou*, with full access to urban welfare and benefits (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2020), scholars are insisting not only that all those living in towns and cities should have permanent urban *hukou* but that the restrictive and divisive *hukou* system should be either dropped or, more realistically, downgraded to a means of tracking residency (Chen, Davis, and Landry 2017).

Reforming the *hukou* system, however, will not resolve all the inequalities arising from the Chinese urbanization process. In particular, because China's urbanization is unevenly spatially distributed, there needs to be more attention paid to the degree and drivers of regional disparities. To date, cities with higher administrative rank—such as Beijing and Shanghai—enjoy more favorable consideration and thus have expanded much faster, even after controlling for other economic and demographic drivers of urban expansion (Li et al. 2015). There is also poor coordination between the levels of government, and as a result, the consequences of urbanization often vary and are unpredictable (Chen, Davis, and Landry 2017; Shih and Cartier 2011). Moreover, given China's regional and administrative heterogeneity, it is unlikely that one policy will work across the entire nation (Wang et al. 2015). In anticipation of this issue, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) launched a series of pilot programs to allow a small number of localities to experiment with how best to meet the broad goals of a more people-centered and equitable urban society (NDRC 2014).

Pilot Programs

Decentralized experimentation (*shidian* [试点]) is a well-established policy process that Chinese leaders have repeatedly adopted to generate institutional and policy innovations for various economic and social reforms, particularly when confronting intensely disputed policy issues (Zhou 2013). For example, pilots were conducted before introducing health-care reforms in the 1990s and when revising the one-child policy in the 2000s. During the policy process, the central government permits local governments chosen as *shidian* to design and implement new approaches to solve officially targeted problems. If successful, these local experiences serve as a model for national policy formulation (Heilmann 2008).

With regard to the National New-Type Urbanization Plan, the central government asked the NDRC (2014) to choose the pilot sites of different administrative levels. In the first year, the agency selected sixty-two cities and towns and two provinces: Jiangsu and Anhui (see Figure 6.2). In line with historical practice, the program did not specify a mandatory policy agenda (Heilmann 2008; Zhou 2013); instead, the participating cities were encouraged to initiate various *hukou*, land, finance, and administrative reforms,



Figure 6.2. Pilot areas in the National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program.

and be innovative in promoting people-oriented urbanization that suits local circumstances and conditions. Each pilot locality submitted a working plan outlining overall goals, main tasks, and follow-ups that the local government would employ in order to achieve its plan. All selected localities were expected to initiate their pilot programs before the end of 2014 and make their initial results available for review by 2017. Ideally, the successful pilot experiments would be replicated nationally between 2018 and 2020.

Following the first batch of selected pilot areas, the NDRC selected a second batch of 73 cities and towns (NDRC 2015) and a third batch of 111

cities and towns (NDRC 2016) (see Figure 6.2). The localities in these second and third batches were expected to initiate their pilot programs before the end of 2015 and 2016 in order to achieve initial results in 2017 and 2018 and become the basis of national initiatives—together with the first batch—by 2020.

As is usually the case with local Chinese experiments, the choice of pilot locations was not random and did not follow randomized control trial (RCT) best practices. Instead, the pilot sites were likely chosen based on their capacity to act as exemplary models (Yang 2013). There is also a risk that participating local governments manipulated the pilot program as an opportunity to extract more funding and additional land quotas for urban construction and prioritize raw urban growth over the improvement of human welfare (Chen, Davis, and Landry 2017; Guan et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2015). Any assessment of the pilot program must therefore consider characteristics of selected localities. In the following section, we use county-level demographic and socioeconomic data to identify the types of localities most likely to have been selected as pilots, patterns of variation in their policies, and whether local experimentation influences in situ urbanization. We then further discuss the potential consequences of nonrandom selection for rapid but uneven urbanization in China.

Who Joined the Pilot Program? Batch Characteristics and Regional Variations

To discover whether pilot areas differed from non-pilot areas and whether pilot areas varied across the three batches, we coded all 2,869 de facto county-level administrative units in China into four categories. We identified 521 county-level administrative units (from two provinces; two sub-provincial cities; seven provincial capitals; twenty-five prefecture-level cities; twenty-five county-level cities, counties, and urban districts; and two townships) affected by the first batch of localities chosen for the 2014 National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program. Similarly, 153 county-level administrative units (associated with 73 cities and towns) joined the second batch, while 245 county-level units (associated with 111 cities and towns) joined the third one. The remaining 1,950 county-level administrative units were coded into the category of non-pilot areas. With the exception of

population density, county-level variables are computed as shares of individual demographic and socioeconomic attributes. In addition to census data, we compiled the GDP of each county for the year 2010 based on data from online sources, statistical yearbooks, and government reports.

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 6.1 show that the first batch of counties chosen for the pilot program had a significantly larger share of cross-county migrants, a higher population density, and higher GDPs than counties belonging to either the third batch or the non-pilot areas. In the first batch, counties were more concentrated in eastern China than those in the second batch and the non-pilot areas, mainly because Jiangsu and Anhui—the two provincial-level pilots—were included in the first batch of the program. The second batch of counties has more in common with the first (in terms of share of cross-county migrants and level of economic development) than with the third batch or the non-pilot areas, except that the second batch of counties was more concentrated in southwestern China.

We next estimated a multinomial logistic regression model to determine what characteristics of county-level administrative units were associated with inclusion in the pilot program and whether these characteristics differed by batch. The dependent variables were coded as follows: 1 = in the first batch, 2 = in the second batch, 3 = in the third batch, and 0 = not in the pilot program. County-level characteristics reported in Table 6.1 are included as independent variables in the multinomial logistic regression model. Robust standard errors are estimated that account for heteroskedasticity across clusters at the provincial level. The statistical results are presented in Table 6.2.

Our estimates suggest that counties with a larger working-age population and a higher GDP were more likely to be selected into the first batch of the pilot program. Higher GDP was also a significant predictor for selection into the second batch. In terms of regional distribution, using north China as reference, counties in the east and south central regions had higher probabilities of being included in the first batch of the pilot program. When demographic and economic factors are controlled for, counties located in the southwest and northwest were more likely to be included in the second batch.

In contrast to the first and second batches, county GDP was not a significant predictor for selection into the third batch of the pilot program. The clear regional division observed between the first and second batches also

Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics of county-level administrative units ($N = 2,869$)

County characteristics	*First batch pilot areas (n = 521)*	*Second batch pilot areas (n = 153)*	*Third batch pilot areas (n = 245)*	*Non-pilot areas (n = 1,950)*
Ages 15–64 (%)	75.853	74.915	74.018	73.504
Age 65+ (%)	9.428	9.085	8.965	8.553
Gender (female, %)	49.089	48.654	48.781	48.571
Ethnicity (ethnic minority, %)	5.498	12.750	8.155	20.388
Marital status (married, %)	72.302	72.324	72.667	70.927
Education (years, mean)	9.172	8.820	8.917	8.558
Occupation (professional/ managerial, %)	6.596	5.624	5.262	5.174
Homeowners (%)	85.419	84.611	88.863	88.264
Urban population (%)	56.475	49.116	49.013	43.924
Urban *hukou* (%)	35.478	29.227	32.034	27.646
Cross-county migrants (%)	9.043	9.078	4.329	4.372
Population density (per square kilometer, mean)	2,043.026	1,336.779	516.766	1,135.712
Population density (natural logarithm, mean)	6.506	5.990	5.392	5.293
GDP (100 million yuan, mean)	261.390	227.009	147.097	121.026
GDP (natural logarithm, mean)	5.089	4.833	4.416	4.109
Regions (%)				
North China	5.566	13.072	6.122	18.564
Northeast China	14.587	4.575	11.429	9.282
East China	51.631	13.072	34.286	13.795
South Central China	18.234	16.340	23.265	23.641
Southwest China	6.718	37.909	11.429	20.000
Northwest China	3.263	15.033	13.469	14.718

Table 6.2. Multinomial logistic regression predicting associations of county-level administrative units with three batches of pilot program ($N = 2{,}869$)

County characteristics	*First batch pilot areas*		*Second batch pilot areas*		*Third batch pilot areas*	
Ages 15–64	11.137**	(3.606)	11.004	(8.568)	−2.665	(4.036)
Age 65+	4.676	(7.654)	8.615	(7.308)	−7.127	(8.103)
Gender (female)	18.836*	(8.180)	6.673	(10.071)	16.337	(10.518)
Ethnicity (ethnic minority)	−0.308	(1.106)	0.536	(0.676)	−1.747*	(0.798)
Marital status (married)	0.681	(2.106)	8.661**	(3.355)	4.393	(2.253)
Education (years)	−0.413	(0.298)	−0.250	(0.286)	0.582**	(0.217)
Occupation (professional/ managerial)	1.322	(5.233)	−5.917	(8.742)	−18.681*	(7.667)
Homeowners	3.263	(2.971)	0.025	(1.661)	1.547	(2.333)
Urban population	−1.364	(1.369)	−0.952	(1.673)	0.218	(1.153)
Urban *hukou*	1.830	(1.594)	0.106	(1.692)	1.502	(1.047)
Cross-county migrants	3.324	(1.861)	2.406	(1.284)	1.530	(2.367)
Population density (natural logarithm)	0.144	(0.110)	0.150	(0.180)	−0.432***	(0.083)
GDP (natural logarithm)	0.447**	(0.171)	0.718***	(0.165)	0.150	(0.199)
Regions						
North China (reference)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Northeast China	0.938	(0.826)	−0.697	(0.717)	0.716	(0.388)
East China	2.192**	(0.823)	−0.311	(0.638)	2.520***	(0.441)
South Central China	1.085*	(0.522)	0.198	(0.579)	1.452***	(0.398)
Southwest China	0.610	(0.676)	1.670*	(0.728)	1.763***	(0.372)
Northwest China	0.304	(0.816)	1.371*	(0.669)	1.309*	(0.567)
Constant	−23.157**	(7.489)	−22.980*	(11.720)	−16.296*	(6.843)

Note: Coefficients are reported; robust standard errors are in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

diminishes, with counties in the east, southwest, northwest, and south central regions all more likely to have been included in the pilot program than those in the north and northeast. These differences indicate that while county GDP was a strong predictor of inclusion in the first batch, over the next two batches, the Chinese central government tried to reduce regional disparities and granted opportunities to more remote areas in the western provinces regardless of their level of economic development.

Localities Selected for the Pilot Program: Striving for Growth

As all the locales in the three batches of the pilot program were expected to achieve initial results in either 2017 or 2018 and become the basis of national initiatives by 2020, we next considered the three batches together to further explore the association between level of economic development and selection into the pilot program, while teasing out whether there were any regional differences in the association. We estimated logistic regression models for selection in the pilot program without differentiating the three batches as the dependent variable. Table 6.3 reports the coefficients and the robust standard errors that account for heteroskedasticity across clusters at the provincial level. Model 1 and Model 2 are estimated with all counties included ($N = 2{,}869$). In Model 1, the independent variables are the county-level characteristics as described in Table 6.1. In Model 2, we added an interaction term between county GDP and region. To better illustrate the relationship of the pilot program to county economic development and regional variation, we graphed the interaction results shown in Figure 6.3.

As shown in Figure 6.3, of the counties with lower GDPs, those located in northeast China have a slightly higher chance of being selected into the pilot program, while counties in east China have a much higher chance of being in the pilot program than units located in the other four regions. However, for counties with higher GDPs, the regional differences become less pronounced. Counties with higher GDPs are significantly more likely to be included in the pilot program except in the northeast and east. The graph clearly demonstrates the regional differences and the preferences of the central government when selecting pilot sites. It is also clear that county-level economic development is an indication of the potential for further urbanization.

Table 6.3. Logistic regressions predicting associations of pilot program with county GDP and regions

	All counties (N = *2,869*)				*Excluding counties in pilot prefectures and provinces* (N = *2,114*)			
County Characteristics	*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
Ages 15–64	6.215**	(2.192)	7.043**	(2.453)	2.289	(2.989)	1.754	(2.894)
Age 65+	2.205	(5.602)	2.541	(5.482)	−2.309	(4.993)	−2.835	(5.267)
Gender (female)	14.103*	(6.278)	15.258*	(6.360)	5.282	(8.765)	4.823	(9.124)
Ethnicity (ethnic minority)	−0.643	(0.600)	−0.200	(0.574)	0.541	(0.458)	0.514	(0.478)
Marital status (married)	3.036	(1.577)	2.554	(1.633)	3.229	(2.741)	3.012	(2.535)
Education (years)	−0.062	(0.208)	−0.122	(0.223)	0.021	(0.166)	0.036	(0.171)
Occupation (professional/ managerial)	−4.591	(3.871)	−1.973	(3.878)	−7.406	(5.561)	−6.769	(5.820)
Homeowners	1.941	(1.933)	2.202	(1.818)	−0.914	(1.238)	−0.733	(1.281)
Urban population	−0.852	(0.864)	−1.099	(0.831)	0.357	(0.924)	0.376	(0.968)
Urban *hukou*	1.601	(1.050)	1.509	(1.093)	−0.726	(1.125)	−0.857	(1.144)
Cross-county migrants	2.750*	(1.374)	2.815*	(1.357)	−0.680	(1.340)	−0.689	(1.371)
Population density (natural logarithm)	−0.067	(0.087)	−0.048	(0.090)	−0.292***	(0.074)	−0.299***	(0.072)
GDP (natural logarithm)	0.400**	(0.140)	0.639***	(0.154)	0.870***	(0.110)	0.836***	(0.134)
Regions								
North China (reference)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Northeast China	0.669	(0.492)	3.292*	(1.513)	0.391	(0.280)	1.645	(1.619)
East China	1.958***	(0.496)	4.411**	(1.611)	0.152	(0.257)	−1.299	(1.191)
South Central China	0.977***	(0.227)	1.051	(1.014)	0.307	(0.262)	0.498	(1.406)
Southwest China	1.264***	(0.245)	0.848	(1.027)	0.640	(0.414)	0.706	(1.046)
Northwest China	0.909*	(0.445)	1.167	(1.072)	0.706*	(0.326)	−0.374	(1.190)

(*Continued*)

Table 6.3. (*Continued*)

	All counties (N = 2,869)				*Excluding counties in pilot prefectures and provinces (N = 2,114)*			
County Characteristics	*Model 1*		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
Interactions								
GDP (natural logarithm) × North China (reference)			—	—			—	—
GDP (natural logarithm) × Northeast China			−0.569*	(0.286)			-0.253	(0.343)
GDP (natural logarithm) × East China			−0.503	(0.282)			0.274	(0.203)
GDP (natural logarithm) × South Central China			−0.024	(0.199)			−0.042	(0.278)
China Cina China								
GDP (natural logarithm) × Southwest China			0.105	(0.202)			−0.025	(0.214)
GDP (natural logarithm) × Northwest China			−0.038	(0.179)			0.262	(0.236)
Constant	−18.208***	(4.123)	−20.019***	(3.908)	−10.522*	(5.296)	−9.795	(5.522)

Note: Coefficients are reported; robust standard errors are in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.



Figure 6.3. Pilot program selection by county GDP and region ($N = 2{,}869$).

We collected and analyzed data at the county level. Still, it is important to note that most county-level units were included in the pilot program as one part of a larger prefecture or province. To further explore the relationship between the pilot program and county-level economic development and potential regional differences, we replicated the first two logistic regression models in Table 6.3 and excluded those counties belonging to the pilot prefectures or provinces ($N = 2{,}114$). The regression results are reported as Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 6.3. The interactive effects are further illustrated in Figure 6.4.

When counties in the pilot prefectures or provinces are excluded from the analysis, the regional differences are no longer significant. County GDP is the most prominent determinant of membership in the pilot program. Counties in different regions of China more or less follow the same pattern: those with low GDPs are unlikely to be included in the pilot program, whereas those with high GDPs are likely to be included. The results indicate that



Figure 6.4. Pilot program selection by county GDP and region, excluding counties in pilot prefectures and provinces ($N = 2{,}114$).

when selecting prefecture and provincial-level pilots, the central government may exhibit certain regional preferences, but for county-level pilots, the particular county's economic development appears to be the decisive factor both in the local government's initiative to apply for the pilot scheme and in the central government's process of selection.

Discussion

In this chapter, we focused on the National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program, which extended from 2014 through 2020. We made novel use of county-level population and GDP data for assessing site selection and potential impact of the pilot program. Based on analysis of county-level population and GDP data retrieved from various sources, we identified regional

differences and revealed the preferences of the central government for selecting high GDP county units for various stages of the pilot program. The results confirm a policy bias in favor of localities already at a development advantage with higher GDPs. Although these preferences have not been explicitly articulated by the designers of the plan, data reveal that policy supporters favored participation of more developed localities in the pilot program in order to maximize the odds that the experiment would succeed. As a result, the additional funding and greater land quotas associated with inclusion in the pilot program will further deepen spatial and social disparities in the already highly uneven urbanization process in China (Chen et al. 2014; Zhu, Breitung, and Li 2012).

Determining whether these spatial and social divisions will cause new challenges in local governance is an important area of research. There has been a concern that the process of urbanization already contributes to greater spatial and social differentiation (Zhu, Breitung, and Li 2012). With additional resources provided through the pilot program, urbanization in the already more developed localities is likely to be expedited, while in less developed areas, particularly those with large migrant populations, local governments will face greater challenges in both building and renewing their urban centers as well as in expanding welfare benefits to more residents. The spatial and social disparities among Chinese citizens will widen further.

The Chinese government has treated sustainable urbanization as an engine of modernization and economic growth (Guan et al. 2018), and the central state continues to support highly interventionist local initiatives (Li, Chen, and Hu 2016). Yet based on our analysis of selection into the pilot program, we are concerned that opportunistic local governments may take advantage of the National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program's opportunities to extract additional funding and land quotas for urban construction, rather than focusing on improving the quality of life of their citizens. Unless the priorities of local governments shift from attracting investments and using land sales to boost government coffers, inclusion in the pilot program will do little to improve the quality of life for new urban residents or stem urban sprawl.

To address these concerns, further research is urgently needed to determine the historical, economic, social, and political considerations that motivate local governments participating in the pilot program to reform their urban development strategies to serve the needs of their citizens. Particular attention should be paid to the effects of this process on formerly rural

residents—the changes in their living environments and lifestyle, the extent to which they are entitled to urban welfare and benefits, and their success in fully integrating into urban life. While China's urbanization has made impressive progress, traditional place-centered urbanization is now threatening the likelihood of future improvement. A more human-centered approach should be adopted in order to realize the promises outlined in the National New-Type Urbanization Plan for more people-oriented urbanization.

Acknowledgments

The 2018 Urbanization and Quality of Life Survey was funded by the General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (PolyU 156637/16H) and the Li & Fung China Social Policy Research Fund. The authors thank Wu Puzhou, who created the pilot map, and Yau Chun To, who compiled the county GDP data.

Note

1. Xu et al. (2016) estimate even higher per annum land expansion of 8.1% for 1992–2015.

References

Central Committee of the Communist Party and State Council of China. 2014. National New-Type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020).

Chan, Kam Wing. 2013. "China, Internal Migration." In *The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration*, edited by Immanuel Ness and Peter Bellwood. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

Chan, Kam Wing, and Li Zhang. 1999. "The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration: Processes and Changes." *China Quarterly* 160 (December): 818–55.

Chen, Juan, Shuo Chen, Pierre F. Landry, and Deborah S. Davis. 2014. "How Dynamics of Urbanization Affect Physical and Mental Health in Urban China." *China Quarterly* 220 (December): 988–1011.

Chen, Juan, Deborah S. Davis, and Pierre F. Landry. 2017. "Beyond *Hukou* Reform: Enhancing Human-Centered Urbanization in China." Paulson Policy Memoranda, Paulson Institute, 23 February.

Chen, Juan, Deborah S. Davis, Kaming Wu, and Haijing Dai. 2015. "Life Satisfaction in Urbanizing China: The Effect of City Size and Pathways to Urban Residency." *Cities* 49 (December): 88–97.

Friedmann, John. 2005. *China's Urban Transition.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Guan, Xingliang, Houkai Wei, Shasha Lu, Qi Dai, and Hongjian Su. 2018. "Assessment on the Urbanization Strategy in China: Achievements, Challenges and Reflections." *Habitat International* 71 (January): 97–109.

Han, Baolong, Rusong Wang, Yu Tao, and Hui Gao. 2014. "Urban Population Agglomeration in View of Complex Economical Niche: A Case Study on Chinese Prefecture Cities." *Ecological Indicators* 47 (December): 128–36.

Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008. "From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy Process." *China Journal* 59 (January): 1–30.

Hu, Biliang, and Kunling Zhang. 2018. "New Urbanization in China." In *China: 40 Years of Reform and Development: 1978–2018*, edited by Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song, and Fang Cai, 455–86. Canberra: Australia National University Press.

Landry, Pierre F. 2008. *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Landry, Pierre F., Xiaobo Lü, and Haiyan Duan. 2018. "Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder." *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (8): 1074–1105.

Li, Bingqin, Chunlai Chen, and Biliang Hu. 2016. "Governing Urbanization and the New Urbanization Plan in China." *Environment and Urbanization* 28 (2): 515–34.

Li, Han, Yehua Dennis Wei, Felix Haifeng Liao, and Zhiji Huang. 2015. "Administrative Hierarchy and Urban Land Expansion in Transitional China." *Applied Geography* 56 (January): 177–86.

Li, Tie, and Yi Fan. 2013. "Investigation and Reflection on the Construction of New Cities and New Districts." [In Chinese.] *Urban and Rural Research Trends* 229. http://ccud.org.cn/phone/article/2955.html.

Lin, George C. S. 2007. "Reproducing Spaces of Chinese Urbanisation: New City-Based and Land-Centred Urban Transformation." *Urban Studies* 44 (9): 1827–55.

Liu, Yuting, Shenjing He, Fulong Wu, and Chris Webster. 2010. "Urban Villages Under China's Rapid Urbanization: Unregulated Assets and Transitional Neighbourhoods." *Habitat International* 34 (2): 135–44.

Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China. 2019. *China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook 2018.* Beijing: China Planning Press.

National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2020. *China Statistical Yearbook 2020.* Beijing: China Statistics Press. www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexch.htm.

NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission of China). 2014. National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program. No. 1229, National Development and Reform Commission.

———. 2015. National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program, Second Batch. No. 2665, National Development and Reform Commission.

———. 2016. National New Urbanization Comprehensive Pilot Program, Third Batch. No. 2489, National Development and Reform Commission.

Ong, Lynette H. 2014. "State-Led Urbanization in China: Skyscrapers, Land Revenue and 'Concentrated Villages.'" *China Quarterly* 217 (February): 162–79.

Shen, Jianfa. 2018. *Urbanization, Regional Development, and Governance in China*. London and New York: Routledge.

Shih, Mi, and Carolyn Cartier. 2011. "Particularities and Complexities: Unpacking State Policy in Local China." *Provincial China* 3 (1): 1–8.

Solinger, Dorothy J. 1999. *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wang, Fei-Ling. 2005. *Organizing Through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Wang, Xin-Rui, Eddie Chi-Man Hui, Charles Choguill, and Sheng-Hua Jia. 2015. "The New Urbanization Policy in China: Which Way Forward?" *Habitat International* 47 (June): 279–84.

Xu, Min, Chunyang He, Zhifeng Liu, and Yinyin Dou. 2016. "How Did Urban Land Expand in China Between 1992 and 2015? A Multi-Scale Landscape Analysis." *PLoS ONE* 11 (5): e0154839.

Yang, Hongshan. 2013. "Dual-Track Approach to Policy Experiment: The Experience of Policy Innovation in China." [In Chinese.] *Chinese Public Administration* 336 (6): 12–15.

Yeh, Anthony G. O., Jiang Xu, and Kaizhi Liu. 2011. *China's Post-Reform Urbanization: Retrospect, Policies and Trends.* London: International Institute for Environment and Development and United Nations Population Fund.

Zhou, Wang. 2013. *Shidian in Chinese Policy Process*. Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishing House.

Zhu, Yushu, Werner Breitung, and Si-ming Li. 2012. "The Changing Meaning of Neighbourhood Attachment in Chinese Commodity Housing Estates: Evidence from Guangzhou." *Urban Studies* 49 (11): 2439–57.