Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/8646
Title: CEO compensation and board structure revisited
Authors: Guthrie, K
Sokolowsky, J
Wan, KM 
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Source: Journal of finance, 2012, v. 67, no. 3, p. 1149-1168 How to cite?
Journal: Journal of Finance 
Abstract: Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/8646
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x
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