Media coverage and accounting conservatism

Abstract

I investigate whether high media coverage decreases accounting conservatism. On one hand, I predict that media creates pressure for managers to provide conservative financial reporting, suggesting that media plays an important corporate governance role in the financial reporting process. On the Other hand, I posit that the media may impose short-term earnings pressure on managers, which induces them to be less conservative. Two main findings follow. First, I find that firms followed by high media coverage provide less conservative financial reporting. Second, I find that the negative association between media coverage and accounting conservatism is stronger in firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms. Overall, the evidence is consistent with my prediction that media news coverage may impose short-term price pressure on managers and drive them to be less conservative. This study makes several contributions. Assessing how media coverage affects firms' conservative behavior is of considerable interest to regulators, investors and researchers. This study is the first to show that media coverage exerts pressure on managers to show good performance and be less conservative and this pressure role of the media is accentuated when the governance mechanisms are weak. My results support the strand of literature about the dark side of media coverage in the capital market. This study also contributes to the literature on the economic determinants of accounting conservatism and adds to the debate on the potency of the U.S. media.