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Title: Supply chain finance risk management : payment default in tourism channels
Authors: Chen, YMJ
Tsai, H 
Liu, YF
Keywords: Contract design
Default risk
Information asymmetry
Tourism distribution channel
Tourism service provider
Trade credit
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: IP Publishing Ltd
Source: Tourism economics, Aug. 2018, v. 24, no. 5, p. 593-614 How to cite?
Journal: Tourism economics 
Abstract: Based on mechanism design theory on asymmetric information, this study devises a selectable menu of contracts with price discounts and trade credit rates and proposes strategies for mitigating the risk of payment default when a tourism service provider trades with unfamiliar tour operators. Tourism service providers are suggested to remain conservative under a positive economic condition and progressive under a moderate economic condition when engaging in a new business opportunity. However, a fringe level of progressivism may be maintained under a moderate economy and a low-risk environment. The net benefit of tourism service providers increases when the bank rate is high, and the profit of the entire tourism channel increases when the percentage or ability to pay reliable agents is high.
ISSN: 1354-8166
EISSN: 2044-0375
DOI: 10.1177/1354816618762187
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