Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/76584
Title: Coordination of a supply chain with loss-averse consumers in service quality
Authors: Yang, DQ 
Xiao, TJ
Keywords: Supply chain management
Reference effect
Loss-aversion
Coordination mechanism
Game theory
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Source: International journal of production research, 2017, v. 55, no. 12, p. 3411-3430 How to cite?
Journal: International journal of production research 
Abstract: We develop a two-period game model to study the coordination mechanism for a supply chain with loss-averse consumers who are assumed to have dwindling sensitivity to service quality gain relative to loss. We find that all-unit quantity discount coupling with service subsidy rate can coordinate the retailer's price and service quality decisions together in each period. When consumers become more loss-averse in service quality, the coordinated wholesale price in the first period might increase; whereas that in the second period decreases. With Pareto coordination mechanism, larger loss-aversion might weaken the supplier's bargaining power. We provide managerial insights on how to adjust the coordinated contract when the consumers' loss-aversion and reference value of service quality level change.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/76584
ISSN: 0020-7543
EISSN: 1366-588X
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2016.1241444
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