Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/75630
Title: Optimal pricing and alliance strategy in a retailer-led supply chain with the return policy : a game-theoretic analysis
Authors: Taleizadeh, AA
Soleymanfar, VR
Choi, TM 
Keywords: Supply chain management
Pricing
Product return policy
Alliance selection
Game theory
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: Elsevier
Source: Information sciences, 2017, v. 420, p. 466-489 How to cite?
Journal: Information sciences 
Abstract: Motivated by various observed real world practices, we study in this paper a joint pricing and alliance selection decision making problem in a retailer-led supply chain. We examine the case when: (i) a return policy is in place, and (ii) a potential new upstream supplier which provides a substitutable product is entering the market. We first develop a benchmark model for a basic situation in which only a dominant retailer and a supplier are present in the supply chain system. Then we propose four different alliance models for the case when a new supplier enters the system. Detailed solution schemes for the optimal pricing and alliance decisions are developed. We conduct a numerical analysis to present the application of our proposed procedures, and find that having the alliance strategy need not improve the supply chain performance. Finally, we report the sensitivity analysis findings to highlight the fact that the product cost and the return rate of the original supplier's product both significantly affect the optimal alliance strategy decisions.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/75630
ISSN: 0020-0255
EISSN: 1872-6291
DOI: 10.1016/j.ins.2017.08.054
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