Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/75476
Title: Explicit employment contracts and CEO compensation
Authors: Song, WL
Wan, KM 
Keywords: CEO compensation
Contract explicitness
Employment contracts
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: North-Holland
Source: Journal of corporate finance, 2017, v. 44, p. 540-560 How to cite?
Journal: Journal of corporate finance 
Abstract: This study investigates the relation between the use of explicit employment agreements (EA) and CEO compensation. Overall, our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) that an EA is used to induce CEOs to make firm-specific human capital investments that are vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. We determine that compensation is higher when CEOs have employment agreements that are written, longer in duration, or more explicit in terms. Additionally, such employment agreements are more likely to occur when firms have (i) externally hired CEOs, (ii) CEOs with large abnormal compensation, (iii) low investment intensity, (iv) low growth opportunities, and (v) CEOs with a short employment history with the firm.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/75476
ISSN: 0929-1199
EISSN: 1872-6313
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.11.002
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article

Access
View full-text via PolyU eLinks SFX Query
Show full item record

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

2
Last Week
0
Last month
Citations as of Nov 9, 2018

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

2
Last Week
0
Last month
Citations as of Nov 7, 2018

Page view(s)

21
Last Week
2
Last month
Citations as of Nov 12, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.