Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/74515
Title: Negotiation mechanisms for an order subcontracting and scheduling problem
Authors: Wang, X
Geng, S
Cheng, TCE 
Keywords: Negotiation mechanisms
Performance bound
Scheduling
Subcontracting
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: Pergamon Press
Source: Omega, 2018, v. 77, p. 154-167 How to cite?
Journal: Omega 
Abstract: We consider a decentralized decision-making environment in which a firm and its subcontractor make decisions on subcontracting heterogeneous orders for processing with private information. We design two market-like negotiation mechanisms that adopt the multi-round ascending pricing framework under two negotiation protocols, labeled as and Applying game-theoretic and combinatorial optimization approaches, we analyze the decision behaviors of both players and derive the final negotiation outcomes. We find that the negotiation mechanism under cannot guarantee the existence of the equilibrium price, while the negotiation mechanism under result in equilibrium solutions. For some special cases, we investigate the system performance bounds under the two negotiation mechanisms and find that the performance bounds under the former are better than those under the latter.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/74515
ISSN: 0305-0483
EISSN: 1873-5274
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2017.06.005
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