Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/68236
Title: Playing safe on the board : the role of independent directors - evidence from listed firms in China
Authors: Yu, W 
Zhu, K
Wang, H
Zhang, L
Keywords: Board independence
Information risks
Informativeness of stock prices
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher: 香港理工大學, 清華大學合辦牛津大學出版社
Source: China accounting and finance review (中國會計與財務硏究), 2010, v. 12, no. 3, p. 129-148 How to cite?
Journal: China accounting and finance review (中國會計與財務硏究) 
Abstract: This paper studies the economic consequences of improved board independence on operating performance and information risk. We fi nd that a more independent board does not automatically improve operating performance if reputation and competition in the human capital market do not effectively motivate directors. But risk-averse independent directors do increase the conservativeness of fi nancial reports and the informativeness of stock prices to avoid potential litigation risks. These results suggest that the board mainly plays the role of a “gatekeeper”, with risk reduction as its main objective instead of performance improvement.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/68236
ISSN: 1029-807X
EISSN: 2307-3055
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