Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/68039
Title: Coordination contracts in the university technology transfer chain
Authors: Chang, X
Fong, PSW 
Chen, Q
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Academy of Management
Source: Academy of Management proceedings, Jan 2015, 13941 (Meeting Abstract Supplement) How to cite?
Abstract: Successful university technology transfer depends on close cooperation between faculty inventor and firm. Their related moral hazard has been investigated separately in previous studies in order to maximize the individual or organizational payoff. However, few researchers have considered the double moral hazard of the participants jointly and attempted to optimize the social welfare of university technology transfer. This paper seeks to narrow this gap through introducing the idea of a university technology transfer chain and examining all stakeholders¡¯ inputs and payoffs in decentralized and centralized decision-making. We find that the commonly observed license contract cannot reduce the double moral hazard of faculty inventor and firm. In order to find a better solution, we consider two types of coordination contracts and find that the portfolio contract with royalties and revenue sharing only works well in a specified feasible solution space. The side- payment self-enforcing contract could effectively coordinate the inputs of faculty and firm, and the implementation Pareto is improved. These findings are also tested by numerical investigation. This paper provides new insights for faculty inventors, universities, and firms, as well as implications for policy makers.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/68039
ISSN: 0065-0668
EISSN: 2151-6561
DOI: 10.5465/AMBPP.2015.13941abstract
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