Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/61764
Title: Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract
Authors: Gao, C
Cheng, TCE 
Shen, H
Xu, L
Keywords: Moral hazard
Partial cost allocation contract
Quality management
Supply chain coordination
Supply chain management
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Source: International journal of production research, 2016, v. 54, no. 20, p. 6216-6231 How to cite?
Journal: International journal of production research 
Abstract: In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/61764
ISSN: 0020-7543
EISSN: 1366-588X
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2016.1191691
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