Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/61613
Title: Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China
Authors: Cheng, LTW 
Leung, TY
Keywords: Government protection
Management turnover
Political connection
Strategic firm
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: JAI
Source: International review of economics and finance, 2016, v. 45, p. 160-176 How to cite?
Journal: International review of economics and finance 
Abstract: Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/61613
ISSN: 1059-0560
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010
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